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General Introduction
General Introduction
Economies can be characterized as complex adaptive systems of heterogeneous agents
in which the interaction of agents at the micro level forms the macro properties of
the economic system, thereby determining the emergence of macro regularities such
as economic growth, unemployment, and income distributions. These global reg-
ularities in turn feed back into the determination of the interactions at the micro
level. The result is a dynamic system of interacting agents and interdependent
feedback loops connecting the micro and macro level of the economy (Tesfatsion,
2006). This important aspect of the functioning of economic systems has widely
been neglected in contemporary mainstream frameworks based on the paradigm of
equilibrium models of representative agents with full rationality.
Unlike its mainstream counterparts, the methodological approach agent-based
computational economics is able to capture the complexity of dynamical processes
that arise through the local interaction of heterogeneous agents. Following Tesfatsion
(2006), agent-based computational economics can be defined as the computational
study of economic processes modeled as a dynamic system of interacting agents;
agents refers broadly to an encapsulated collection of data and methods representing
an entity residing in a computationally constructed world. Examples of possible
agents include individuals (e.g. workers, consumers), social groups (households,
firms), and institutions (government, central bank, markets). Thus, agents can range
from active information gathering and decision making entities that communicate
and interact with other agents to passive institutional agents without any active
social functioning. A key aspect of the agent-based approach is its assumption
of boundedly rational agents. Bounded rationality means that in decision making
agents are limited to information they have and agents do not fully observe all the
consequences of their own actions and that of other agents.
Aggregate behavior in agent-based models is generated from the bottom up by
explicitly modeling the micro-level interaction of the autonomous agents. Agents
behave according to explicit rules describing how different agents take different de-
cisions. This bottom-up approach provides empirically based micro behavior and
establishes the emergence of strongly micro-founded macro phenomena through an
aggregation of the individual decision making. The complex system in which agents
interact evolve over time so that aggregate properties emerge out of repeated inter-
actions of the agents (Fagiolo and Roventini, 2012).
The agent-based approach allows for a highly empirically grounded taxonomic
classification of agents by providing a systematic way to incorporate whatever taxo-
nomic classification seems to be useful for the explanatory study of a particular eco-
nomic phenomenon (LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). Once a taxonomy is specified,
the set of agent-specific behavioral rules can be implemented, where the concrete
collection of empirically founded rules is subject to their relevance for the particular
macroeconomic phenomena under study. Hence, as stressed by LeBaron and Tes-
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fatsion (2008), agent-based modeling provides a tremendous flexibility to tailor the
breadth and depth of the agents to particular applications at hand. In this context,
issues related to keeping the model analytically tractable that constrain the scope
of a model play a less prominent role for agent-based modeling.
It is this high degree of flexibility that makes agent-based computational eco-
nomics to an appropriate tool for the evaluation of economic policy measures. Gen-
erally, a policy analysis requires a thorough understanding of the underlying mecha-
nisms driving the effects of the policy under consideration. The choice of candidate
explanatory mechanisms and their representation in a model are therefore crucial
for the results of the policy analysis, where a consideration of only one or a subset of
possible explanatory mechanisms can result in misleading policy recommendations
(see Dawid and Neugart, 2011). Such a thorough exploration of different alternative
mechanisms is, however, hardly possible in a model framework that has to take ac-
count of analytical tractability. Unlike most standard models, agent-based models
can incorporate different possible channels in one framework in a flexible manner.
The comprehensiveness of agent-based macroeconomic models allows thereby not
only to consider different possible mechanisms but also to examine the emergence
of simultaneous policy effects on different economic figures. Furthermore, since one
of the tenets of agent-based modeling are out-of-equilibrium dynamics of a complex
evolving system, this approach enables a policy analysis on different time scales,
where policy effects can then be typically distinguished in short-, medium-, and
long-term effects.
The requirement of a new complementary methodological approach in macro-
economic theory has become evident during the financial and economic crisis that
started in 2008. Standard general equilibrium models were not able to predict the
crisis and even after the bubble had broken they were not able to anticipate the
severity of the following downturn. Moreover, these models provided little guidance
for policymakers on how to get out of the downward spiral (see, e.g., Stiglitz, 2011).
It is therefore not surprising that several policymakers have voiced concerns that it
is hard for them to base their decisions on existing mainstream models, which might
not be able to capture the mechanisms that seem to be mainly responsible for the
problems. To quote former ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet:1
’When the crisis came, the serious limitations of existing economic and
financial models immediately became apparent.[...] Macro models failed
to predict the crisis and seemed incapable of explaining what was hap-
pening to the economy in a convincing manner. As a policy-maker during
the crisis, I found the available models of limited help. In fact, I would
go further: in the face of the crisis, we felt abandoned by conventional
tools.’
Jean-Claude Trichet also sketched properties of economic models that would make
them in his opinion more suitable to capture crucial properties of economic systems
and make them more appealing to policy makers:
’We need to deal better with heterogeneity across agents and the interac-
tion among those heterogeneous agents. We need to entertain alternative
1Quoted from the speech ’Reflections on the nature of monetary policy non-standard measures
and finance theory’ by Jean-Claude Trichet, President of the ECB given as opening address at
the ECB Central Banking Conference Frankfurt, 18 November 2010. The text of the full speech
is available at http://www.ecb.int/press/key/date/2010/html/sp101118.en.html (last accessed
on April, 3rd 2014).
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motivations for economic choices. [...] Agent-based modeling dispenses
with the optimization assumption and allows for more complex interac-
tions between agents. Such approaches are worthy of our attention.’
Agent-based analyses have been carried out for numerous policy areas, where
studies related to financial market dynamics, banking regulations, credit linkages
and monetary policies have attracted considerable attention. There has also been
research aiming at the development of comprehensive macroeconomic models us-
ing an agent-based approach. In this respect, a prominent example has been the
EURACE project (’An Agent-based Software Platform for European Policy Design
with Heterogeneous Interacting Agents: New Insights from a Bottom-Up Approach
to Economic Modeling and Simulation’) which was carried out from 2006 to 2009
within the 6th European Framework Programme by a consortium of economists and
computer scientists (see, e.g., Deissenberg et al., 2008). The agenda of this project
was to develop a simulation platform containing a software environment, graphi-
cal user interfaces and an agent-based macroeconomic model with strong empirical
grounding, all together providing a common framework to address issues of different
areas of economic policy. Examples of policy analyses that have been carried out
with the agent-based model developed during the project (the EURACE model) can
be found in, e.g., Dawid et al. (2009, 2012a, 2008).
The EURACE model is the basis for the work presented in this dissertation.2 The
thesis consists of three independent research papers all covering research questions
regarding agent-based macro modeling. Different agent-based models are considered
in the papers, where all models share the same roots that reside in the EURACE
model. The general aim of the dissertation is to apply the agent-based approach for
analyzing concrete structural and fiscal policy measures and to obtain new insights
from this analysis that can be utilized in the process of economic policy design. The
focus of the policy analysis is thereby on the interplay of these policy measures with
the process of technological change. The reason why the role of technological change
is emphasized is that technological change is one of the main sources of dynamism
in capitalized economies and is therefore a main driver of economic growth (see,
e.g., Freeman, 1998). If, however, a policy measure interacts with the process of
technological change, then it might have a sustained impact on the economic devel-
opment in the medium and long term. Therefore, one of the key policy questions is
whether these specific economic policies lead to unexpected and non-trivial medium-
and long-term implications in the presence of technological change. It is particularly
emphasized in how far these implications emerge through interactions and feedback
loops of desired policy effects with the diffusion of technologies, the dynamics of
productivity and skills, and the labor mobility across firms and between regions. In
this context, a further important policy question addressed in the policy analysis
is how these policy implications interact with different institutional settings of the
economy under study.
As discussed in Dawid (2006), there are some properties of agent-based modeling
that make this approach appealing for the analysis of innovation and technological
change. One of them is the decentralized decision making of heterogeneous inter-
acting agents, which is also an inherent characteristic of the process of technological
change. Dawid (2006) argues, innovation and technological progress can be char-
acterized as a decentralized dynamic search process, in which heterogeneous firms
search for new technologies under strong uncertainty, thereby being interlinked with
2The author of this thesis contributed to the EURACE project as a member of the research
group at the Bielefeld University led by Herbert Dawid.
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other firms through market and non-market interactions. Thus, micro-founded eco-
nomic models such as agent-based models have the potential to capture the essential
effects influencing the phenomenon of technological change.
A policy analysis stressing the role of technological change is clearly focused on
the real sphere of the economy and here especially on the production sector. Firms
contribute to the process of technological change by either developing new products
or processes, or by acquiring improved technologies embodied in new machines. Ac-
cordingly, firms as the most relevant actor in the production sector must be modeled
with a stronger emphasis than other agents contained in a model of technological
change. What is, however, missing in the literature of agent-based modeling is a
clear conceptual basis for the choice of firms’ decision rules. This methodological
shortcoming of the agent-based approach is addressed in the first of the three papers
of this thesis (see Chapter 1). This paper reviews different approaches to model firm
behavior in agent-based simulation models and proposes the Management Science
Approach, where well documented heuristics put forward in the managerial litera-
ture are used to capture the decision processes of firms. This approach is illustrated
within the framework of an extend version of the EURACE model. Then, it is ex-
plored how robust the dynamics of this model is with respect to changes of the firms’
decision rules within the set of rules proposed by the Management Science Approach.
This paper is joint work with Herbert Dawid3 and has been published in the book
Evolution, Organization and Economic Behavior edited by Guido Bu¨nstorf.
In contrast to the first paper, which considers conceptual issues of agent-based
modeling, the two other papers contained in this dissertation provide concrete policy
analyses. The second paper, which can be found in Chapter 2, studies the effective-
ness of cohesion policies with respect to convergence of regions. The policy analysis
relies on simulations carried out with the Eurace@Unibi model, which is a com-
pletely revised and in many directions extended and substantially altered follow-up
release of the EURACE model (see Dawid et al., 2012b). A two-region setup of the
model is used to analyze short-, medium-, and long-term effects of policies improving
human capital and fostering the adoption of technologies in lagging regions. In two
different scenarios it is examined whether and how the cohesion policies interact with
the level of spatial integration of the two local labor markets. With fully integrated
labor markets the human capital policy positively affects the economically stronger
region but reduces production in the targeted weaker region. Subsidies for high
technology investment in the weaker region have a positive local output effect and
a negative effect on the neighboring region, thereby fostering convergence. When
labor markets are not integrated both policies support convergence. This paper is
joint work with Herbert Dawid and Michael Neugart4 and has been accepted for
publication in the Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control.
In the third paper in Chapter 3, the author proposes substantial changes to the
Eurace@Unibi model, where especially some of the refinements to the production
sector introduced after the completion of the EURACE project have been revised.
The result of this major revision is basically a completely new production sector in
which especially the investment decision of firms has been modeled in a consistent
manner following the Management Science Approach. The added value of the revised
model is demonstrated by showing that the model generates endogenous business
cycles with realistic properties and that the model replicates several stylized facts
3Department of Business Administration and Economics and Institute of Mathematical Eco-
nomics, Bielefeld University, Germany
4Department of Law and Economics, Technical University of Darmstadt, Germany
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with respect to business cycles, firm size and productivity distributions, and labor
market regularities.
This model is then used to carry out a policy analysis regarding the effective-
ness of fiscal stabilization policies. The research questions are thereby focused on
long-term implications of discretionary stabilization policies. In particular, do fis-
cal stabilization policies affect the long-term growth of the economy? If so, are the
long-term effects growth-enhancing or growth-reducing? These questions have again
become relevant to the political and academic debate since governments have been
forced to spend considerable funds for economic stimulus packages as a response to
the recent economic crisis.
The answers that the economic literature provides are inconclusive. However,
the theoretical literature has emphasized the importance of structural issues of the
models such as the modeling approach of endogenous technological change or sources
of disturbances driving economic fluctuation in the models. In this context, less
attention has been paid to the design of the considered fiscal stabilization policies.
The importance of the policy design for long-term effects of stabilization policies
is demonstrated in the policy analysis of the third paper by comparing a demand-
oriented consumption policy and two different investment subvention policies. The
comparison shows that all policies are equally successful in smoothing the business
cycle but differ in their implications for the medium and long-term growth of the
economy. Therefore, not only modeling assumptions and structural issues as stressed
by the literature but also the concrete implementation of the policy seem to be
important for the long-term effects of stabilization policies and should therefore be
taken into account when deciding about stabilization policies.
Besides detailed policy analyses stressing the importance of the interplay between
policies and several aspects associated with the process of technological change, the
papers in Chapter 2 and 3 also contribute to the literature of agent-based modeling
by proposing the use of generalized additive models (GAM) with penalized spline
smoothers as statistical tools for the analysis of the simulation outcome (see, e.g.,
Wood, 2011, for a discussion of GAMs). In particular, it is proposed to use GAMs
to identify policy effects (Chapter 2 and 3) and to carry out a systematic sensitivity
analysis of the model as well as robustness checks of policy findings, both with
respect to a variation of parameters contained in the model (Chapter 3).
All agent-based models used in the simulations for the three papers of the thesis
have been implemented in FLAME (Flexible Large-scale Agent-based Modeling
Environment)5. FLAME is a simulation environment that has been developed by
computer scientists within the EURACE project. The data analysis for each of the
papers has been based on the statistical software R by using a collection of existing
packages and self-written R-scripts.
5See http://www.flame.ac.uk/ for more information (last accessed April, 4th, 2014)
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Capturing Firm Behavior
Chapter 1
Capturing Firm Behavior in
Agent-Based Models of
Industry Evolution and
Macroeconomic Dynamics∗
1.1 Introduction
The description of the dynamics emerging from the interaction of different types of
economic actors, who independently make decisions and take actions, is a challenging
task underlying any analysis of market dynamics, industry evolution or macroeco-
nomic dynamics. This task has been tackled using a number of different approaches.
In the area of Evolutionary Economics, the use of agent-based simulation models has
traditionally been an important tool and one that continues to attract an increasing
amount of research. Starting with the pioneering work of Nelson and Winter (1982)
various aspects of industry dynamics have been explored using simulation methods
both in rather generic industry frameworks and in specific application areas taking
into account characteristic features of the considered industry (see, e.g., surveys in
Dawid, 2006; Safarzynska and van den Bergh, 2010). Recently substantial effort has
also been invested in the development of agent-based closed macroeconomic models
that capture the interplay of different markets and sectors in the economy while at
the same time providing an explicit representation of behavior of different types of
potentially heterogeneous actors and the institutions governing their (local) inter-
action patterns (e.g. Dawid et al., 2009; Delli Gatti et al., 2005; Dosi et al., 2010;
Silverberg and Verspagen, 1993). In the tradition of Evolutionary Economics, this
kind of work is based on the assertion that economic systems generically are not in
equilibrium and aims to explore of properties that emerge from certain assumptions
about micro-behavior and micro-structure.
In contrast to dynamic equilibrium models, where it is assumed that the behav-
ior of all actors is determined by maximization of the own (inter-temporal) objective
function using correct expectations about the behavior of the other actors, agent-
based simulation models need to provide explicit constructive rules that describe
how different agents take different decisions. The need to provide such rules is not
∗This chapter has been published as H. Dawid and P. Harting (2012): ”Capturing Firm Be-
havior in Agent-Based Models of Industry Evolution and Macroeconomic Dynamics,” in Evolution,
Organization and Economic Behavior, edited by G. Bu¨nstorf, Edgar-Elgar.
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only based on the basic conviction underlying these models, that in most economic
settings actual behavior of decision makers is far away from inter-temporally optimal
behavior under rational expectations, but also on the fact that in most models incor-
porating heterogeneity among agents and explicit interaction protocols (e.g. market
rules) the characterization of dynamic equilibria is outside the scope of analytical
and numerical analysis. Given that need to specify explicit rules for all decisions
taken by all actors in an agent-based model the determination and motivation of the
implemented rules becomes a major modeling issue. The ’Wilderness of bounded
rationality’ (Sims, 1980) is a serious concern since a large number of different ap-
proaches to model boundedly rational behavior and its adaptation have been put
forward in the literature and at this point there is little indication for the emergence
of a widely accepted consensus that provides empirically or theoretically well founded
concepts for tackling this issue (see, e.g., Hommes, 2009). Providing such concepts
however seems important for several reasons. First and foremost, it would add to
the credibility of agent-based models and the normative implications derived from
such models in the areas of firm strategy, market design or economic policy. Second,
the comparison between results derived in different models capturing different eco-
nomic settings is facilitated if these models share a common approach to modeling
certain (standard) decision processes, such as the consumption choice of households
or pricing and investment of firms. Third, if the structure of the considered rules
for a given type of decision can be restricted, for example to a parametrized family
of rules, the test for robustness of simulation results becomes much easier, since
it involves only the consideration of parameter variations rather than of structural
changes in the decision rule.
The most suitable approach to provide empirical or theoretical foundations for
certain types of rules depends strongly on the type of agent that is to be modeled.
Describing the decision rule of an individual choosing a consumption good is very
different from capturing the rule determining the interest rate decisions of a central
bank. In fact, the interest rate decision of a central bank is one of the few types
of decisions where there indeed seems to be some consensus about the structure of
the corresponding decision rule within the agent-based models that include a cen-
tral bank. Since central banks have an interest in making their decision processes
transparent and predictable, there is something similar to publicly documented de-
cision rules (like the Taylor rule) which can be easily implemented in an agent-based
model. If we consider decisions taken by individuals rather than an institution like
a central bank such documentation of the rules or processes leading to a decision is
missing. An obvious candidate to obtain empirically founded insights into the deci-
sion processes of individuals in different economic frameworks is the consideration of
experimental evidence. The fast growing literature in experimental and behavioral
economics provides a rich basis to develop empirically grounded representations of
individual decisions in agent based models. There is quite a bit of work linking ex-
perimental with agent-based work (see, e.g., the survey in Duffy, 2006) and recently
attempts have been made to design individual decision and learning rules as well as
expectation rules in agent-based models in a way such that they closely resemble
experimental evidence (e.g. Arifovic and Ledyard, 2008; Hommes, 2009)).
The focus of this article is on the representation of firm decisions in agent-based
models. Most decisions of firms that are typically considered in agent-based models
are taken according to well structured processes and are only to a small extent at the
discretion of individual decision makers. Hence, evidence from laboratory experi-
Capturing Firm Behavior 9
ments might be of limited use when developing models of firms’ decision rules1. The
fact that firms in many domains indeed follow well established routines or heuristics
has been highlighted in the literature on evolutionary theory (Nelson, 2005; Nelson
and Winter, 1982) but is also evident from considering the Management literature.
For many decision problems relevant for a firm standard decision heuristics have
been developed in the corresponding literature in Management Science and Oper-
ations Research. They are presented in the main textbooks for Business Studies
and have been at least partly implemented in decision support software available to
companies. Hence, for many decision problems of firms there exist well documented
algorithms that determine or at least strongly influence the way the corresponding
decisions are taken in a large percentage of firms. Paying attention to such deci-
sion algorithms and trying to implement them in an agent-based framework should
provide additional empirical grounding for the models and also lead to a stronger
standardization of the representation of firms’ decisions.
The purpose of this article is to highlight how such an approach, which we call the
’Management Science Approach’ can be used in different economic settings to derive
descriptive and in particular normative insights into firm behavior and policy design.
Prior to the treatment of the Management Science Approach in the framework of a
macroeconomic model (Section 3) we will give a brief discussion and categorization
of the approaches to the modeling of firm decision that are present in the literature
(Section 2). A concluding discussion is given in Section 4.
1.2 Approaches to modeling firm decisions in ACE: a
brief survey
To put the different approaches for modeling firm decision processes that have been
put forward in the agent-based literature into perspective it might be useful to realize
that the role of firms and their decision processes depends crucially on the research
agenda underlying the study under consideration. At least three different branches
of the literature that have attracted considerable attention can be distinguished
in this respect. First, papers that deal with the effects of policy interventions or
changes in market characteristics on market outcomes, industry dynamics or growth
(e.g. Dawid et al., 2009, 2008; Dosi et al., 2010; Li et al., 2010; Malerba et al.,
2001; Nelson and Winter, 1982; Winter, 1984). Here the focus is not on the firms
behavior, but on the effects of certain changes in the economic environment given
the decision rules (and maybe their adjustment dynamics) of the firms. Obviously,
different types of decision rules for firms might, in principle, generate quite different
effects of these change in the economic environment. Therefore, although the exact
form of the decision rules used might not be of major importance, the validity of
the derived market design or policy conclusions is strongly affected by the empirical
foundation of the considered rules and the robustness of the qualitative conclusions
with respect to changes of the rules within an (empirically) reasonable range. The
largest part of the ACE literature where firm behavior plays some role falls into
this category. Second, there is some literature exploring the characteristics of firm
strategies that evolve in particular market frameworks (e.g. Dawid and Reimann,
1It should be noted that we do not deal here with issues of the organization of the firm including
the organization of certain decision processes. Experimental, evolutionary and agent-based research
has been very active in this area (see, e.g., Chang and Harrington, 2006), but at this point in Agent-
based Computational Economics (ACE) models of industry-dynamics and macro-dynamics the inner
structure of firms has not been explicitly represented.
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2004, 2010; Dosi et al., 1999; Midgley et al., 1997). Here the focus is on the firm
strategy and, depending on the way decision rules and their updating is modeled,
the structure of the decision rule might be quite flexible without requiring strong
assumptions about its characteristics (see e.g. the brief discussion of Dosi et al.,
1999, below). However, to a certain degree this just transfers the problem of the
empirical or theoretical foundation to the level of the rule adjustment process. The
properties of the evolved strategies in general depend on the type of adjustment pro-
cess considered and any conclusions drawn about properties of (long run) strategies
therefore rest on the validity of the underlying adjustment process or the robustness
of these properties with respect to changes of this process. Finally, a third stream of
literature has treated the question under which kind of assumptions about market
environment and learning behavior ex-ante uncoordinated firms can in the long run
coordinate their behavior and in how far this coordinated behavior resembles Nash
or Walras equilibria (e.g. Arifovic, 1994; Arifovic and Maschek, 2008; Dawid and
Kopel, 1998; Price, 1997; Vriend, 2000). It turns out that even in a given standard
market environment, like a Cournot oligopoly, convergence of behavior and also the
equilibrium selection in case of convergence depends crucially on the way firm strate-
gies are represented (Dawid and Kopel, 1998) or updated (Arifovic and Maschek,
2008; Vriend, 2000).
Within these different branches of literature quite a wide range of approaches
for representation, design and updating of firms’ behavioral rules have been used.
In order to give a somehow systematic overview we have tried to categorize these
approaches, without however claiming that this listing is exhaustive or the catego-
rization is in any way generic.
• Fixed Rules with Heuristic Basis: Maybe the most common way firms’
decision behavior is represented in ACE models is the use of relatively simple
fixed decision rules that are motivated by (sometimes anecdotal) empirical ar-
guments or plausibility considerations. Examples include the original Nelson
and Winter model of Schumpeterian competition where innovation and imi-
tation expenses as well as investments in physical capital are determined by
simple closed form functions that stay constant over time and the output de-
cision is made using the assumption that capacities are always fully exploited
(see Nelson and Winter, 1982). Frequently used simple decision rules with em-
pirical foundations are fixed mark-up pricing rules and R&D-rules assuming
constant R&D intensities of firms (see, e.g., Dosi et al., 2003).
• Adaptation of Actions: In this approach the behavior of a firm is updated
over time due to (typically evolutionary) learning, where the object that is
adapted over time is the action itself (e.g. price, quantity) rather than some rule
determining the action (e.g. Arifovic, 1994; Vriend, 2000). Since the economic
environment in models of this type is often assumed to be static, the fact
that firms’ actions are updated over time due to processes like imitation or
reinforcement could be interpreted as a short-cut for assuming that the decision
rules determining the actions are adjusted in such a way and then applied to
more or less static input data. Another underlying assumption could be that
firms do not follow any structured decision rules to come up with this decision,
but evaluate their different action choices in each period entirely based on past
performance of different choices by the firm itself and its competitors. How
reasonable such an interpretation is seems to depend strongly on the kind of
decision that is considered. In particular for standard operational decisions,
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like production decisions, pricing, investment this interpretation however seems
to be rather far-fetched.
• Adaptation of Rules: Decisions of firms are taken according to rules that
change over time. Either the structure of the rules is fixed and rule parameters
are adjusted over time (e.g. Winter, 1984; Yildizoglu, 2002) or the represen-
tation of the rule is so flexible that its whole structure (including the set of
variables that are taken into account) can evolve over time. A nice example
in this respect is Dosi et al. (1999), where the rules determining the pricing
decisions of firms in an oligopoly are represented as genetic programming trees
and are updated by standard genetic programming operators. Potential input
data for the rules consists of past observations of all prices, aggregate demand
quantity, own costs and market share. It is shown that the rules that emerge
in the long run lead to trajectories where the price a firm charges is moving
almost in parallel to the costs. This means that although a large variety of
pricing rule structures would be available to the firm, in the long run a pricing
rule very close to a mark-up rule with constant mark-up is adopted by the
firms. Other examples of the emergence of firms’ decision rules in large rule
spaces are Marks (1992), Midgley et al. (1997).
1.3 A Management Science Approach to Model Firm’s
Decision Making
Considering the brief literature survey in the previous section several observations
can be made. First, as discussed earlier, only a small fraction of work in this area
refers to actual firms’ decision processes when motivating the employed modeling
approach. Second, typically decision rules are represented by closed form functions
of certain input variables, but there is very little consideration of actual processes
or algorithms that are used to come up with certain decisions, although in princi-
ple agent-based models would allow the capture of such decision structures. Third,
in the agent-based literature firms typically do not engage in any kind of explicit
optimization of an objective function. The insight that determining equilibrium be-
havior in such models is typically infeasible and that firms act boundedly rational
would not necessarily imply such an absence of optimization. In related literature
(see, e.g. Day, 1999) models have been suggested where decision makers build simpli-
fied models of their economic environment and then choose their action in a way to
maximize their objective within their simplified internal model. Also many heuristic
decision rules for managerial decisions result from optimization in relatively simple
models that abstract from many complex aspects of the firm’s decision problem.
The Management Science Approach, which we will illustrate in this section, aims
at implementing relatively simple decision rules that match standard procedures of
real world firms as described in the corresponding management literature. There is a
rich literature on (heuristic) managerial decision rules in many areas of management
science. This includes pricing (see, e.g., Nagle and Hogan, 2006), production plan-
ning (see, e.g., Silver et al., 1998) or market selection (see, e.g., Kotler and Keller,
2009; Wind and Mahajan, 1981). Although, it certainly cannot be assumed that
all firms in an economy rely on such standard managerial heuristics, capturing the
main features of these heuristics when modeling the firm adds a strong empirical
micro foundation to the agent-based model.
To be more specific about the Management Science Approach let us consider the
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modeling of firm decisions in a large agent-based macroeconomic model that was
initially developed in the European project EURACE and extended afterward (see
Dawid et al., 2009, 2010; Deissenberg et al., 2008) for treatments of previous ver-
sions of the model). We only sketch some main features of the model here that allow
the firm decisions we will focus on to the put into perspective. A more extensive
description of the model is given in the Appendix. The model describes an economy
containing labor, consumption goods, capital goods, financial and credit markets in
a regional context. Each agent, these are firms, households and banks, is located in
one of the regions. The spatial extensions of the markets differ. The capital goods
market is global, meaning that firms in all regions buy from the same global capital
goods producer and therefore have access to the same technology. On the consump-
tion goods market demand is determined locally in the sense that all consumers buy
at regional markets, denoted as ’malls’, that are located in their region, but supply
is global because every firm might sell its products in all regional markets of the
economy. Labor markets are characterized by spatial frictions determined by com-
muting costs that arise if workers accept jobs outside their own region. The basic
time unit in the model is one day, where many decisions, like production choice or
hiring of firms, are taken monthly.
In what follows we will concentrate on decisions of consumption goods producers
in this model. These firms use a vintage capital stock and labor to produce the
consumption goods on a monthly basis. The consumption goods are then distributed
to the different regions this producer serves. For simplicity it is assumed that all
producers offer their products in all regions. Each producer keeps a stock of its
products at each of the regional malls and offers the goods at a posted price that is
updated once a month at the point in time when the stock is replenished.
All sales of consumption goods take place at the malls. Each household deter-
mines once a month the budget which it will spend for consumption based on its
income and its assets carried over from the previous period. Once a week the house-
hold then visits the (regional) mall to purchase consumption goods. When visiting
the mall each consumer collects information about the range of goods provided and
about the prices and inventories of the different goods. In the Marketing literature it
is standard to describe individual consumption decisions using logit models. These
models represent the stochastic influence of factors not explicitly modeled on con-
sumption decisions and the power of these models to explain real market data has
been well documented (see, e.g., Guadagni and Little, 1983). Therefore, we rely on
a model of that kind and assume that a consumer’s decision which goods to buy
is random, where purchasing probabilities are based on the values the household
attaches to the different choices he is aware of. In particular, these values are influ-
enced by the prices at which the different producers offer their goods. If possible,
each household spends his entire planned weekly consumption budget at the mall.
If the stock of a certain producer at the mall is empty when the household visits
the mall, then this product is excluded from the consumer’s consideration, which
means that the producer is losing potential sales. The introduction of the regional
malls is supposed to capture in a simple way the interaction on regionally separated
consumption goods markets with search frictions, storage of goods and potential
rationing on both market sides.
Overall, a consumption goods producer has to make a large number of decisions
affecting different markets, but focusing on the mall transactions this boils down to
two major decisions. First, which quantities should be delivered to each mall in a
given period and, based on this, how much should be produced in a given month.
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Second, which price should be posted at the malls in a given period. We will discuss
several aspects of these two decisions in the remainder of this section.
Let us first consider the monthly quantity decision of a consumption goods pro-
ducer. On a given day of the month (which might differ between different producers)
the firm receives messages from all the malls it serves reporting the current stock
levels. Based on this information the firm calculates its sales at each mall every
month. Due to the fluctuations in consumption budgets of households and the
stochastic aspects of the product choice decisions, sales at the malls fluctuate in a
non-deterministic way. Furthermore, it is costly for a producer to keep the stock
at a mall so low that is is fully sold during the month, because households arriving
after the stock has been depleted will buy from competitors rather than put off their
consumption, and therefore potential sales are lost. This means that the producer in
our agent-based economy faces for each of the malls a production planning problem
with stochastic demand and out-of-stock costs, where the delivery intervals are given
and fixed. Such problems have been extensively treated in the Operations Manage-
ment literature as ’Newsvendor problems’. Procedures, how to treat such problems
are presented in most standard textbooks in this area. Although these procedures
are based on optimal solutions to certain optimization problems, they are heuristics
in the sense that the underlying optimization problem is a simplified representation
of the actual problem abstracting from aspects like competition or intertemporal
effects. Furthermore, they are relatively easy to implement and therefore widely
applicable. A standard approach for firms to deal with Newsvendor problems of this
type is the use of a policy where the firm replenishes its stock in each period up to a
given level Y . In order to determine Y the firm estimates the demand distribution
for the following period and then chooses Y in a way that the stock-out-probability
under the estimated demand distribution matches a certain target value. This tar-
get value depends on inventory and stock-out costs and also crucially on the risk
attitude of the firm.
Although this decision heuristic cannot be represented in a single closed form
expression, it is straight forward to implement it in an agent-based model. In the
EURACE model firms follow this heuristic, where the stock-out probability used by
the firm is considered as an important strategy parameter. Below we will consider
effects of changes in this parameter on the dynamics of produced output on the
aggregate level. The actual implementation of the rule in the model then proceeds
as follows. Let vector
{
Dˆi,r,t−τ , ..., Dˆi,r,t−1
}
denote the estimated demands2 for the
good of firm i reported by mall r during the last τ periods. Furthermore, SLi,r,t
is the firm’s current mall stock on the day in period t when the stock is checked.
Following the procedure described above the firm chooses its desired replenishment
quantity for region r according to the following rule:
D˜i,r,t =
{
0 SLi,r,t ≥ Yi,r,t,
Yi,r,t − SLi,r,t else,
where Yi,r,t is chosen such that the firm expects to be able to satisfy the market
demand with some probability 1−χ. Again following standard procedures described
in the managerial literature demand distribution in the following period is estimated
2This quantity is identical to actual sales in all periods where the stock was not emptied during
the month. In periods where the product of the firm was sold out at this mall the estimated demand
is larger than the actual sales.
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using a linear regression based on previous demands. Put formally,
Yi,r,t = aˆi,r,t + τ · bˆi,r,t + q¯1−χ ·
√
σˆ2i,r,t,
where q¯1−χ is the 1 − χ quantile of the standard normal distribution and the re-
gression coefficients aˆi,r,t and bˆi,r,t as well as the variance σˆ2i,r,t are estimated using
standard linear regression methods.
The sum of the orders received by all malls becomes
D˜i,t =
R∑
r=1
D˜i,r,t.
In principle this should be the production quantity of the firm, but to capture
rigidities in production plan adjustments the consumption good producer shows
some inertia in adapting the actual production quantity to the quantity requested
by the malls. In particular, we have
Q˜i,t = ξD˜i,t + (1− ξ) 1
T
t−1∑
k=t−T
Q˜i,k,
where Q˜i,t is the planned production quantity of firm i in period t. As discussed in
more detail in the Appendix, the realized production volume Q,t can deviate from
the planned output Q˜i,t due to rationing on the factor markets. The quantities
actually delivered to the malls, Di,r,t, are adjusted proportionally to the intended
quantities D˜i,r,t so that
Di,r,t =
D˜i,r,t
D˜i,t
Qt.
Production times of consumption goods are not explicitly taken into account and
the produced quantities are delivered on the same day as production. The local
stock levels at the malls are updated accordingly.
This representation of the quantity decision of firms is not only based on a clear
empirical basis, but also leads within the EURACE model to realistic properties of
time series on the macro level (see Dawid et al., 2009, 2008). Several parameters
govern the procedure, in particular, the number of past observations used to esti-
mate the demand distribution (τ) and, more importantly, the stock-out probability
parameter χ. Although empirical evidence allows to values of this parameter to be
restricted to some plausible range, an important consideration is in how far conclu-
sions drawn from the model are robust with respect to changes of the parameter
within this range. The main purpose of the EURACE model is to allow the ana-
lysis of effects of different policy measures, like innovation policies or labor market
policies, on the dynamics of the economy as whole and of different sectors. Hence,
the effects of changes of the stock-out parameter χ on aggregate variables of the
economy are of main interest. In figure 1.1 we show the effect of changes of χ on
per capita output of the economy. The different time series depict averages over
10 runs carried out for the corresponding stock-out probabilities. The figure clearly
shows that, although the aggressiveness of firms with respect to their production
planing somehow influences the total output in the economy, qualitative changes in
the dynamics appear only for an extreme stock-out probability of 80%.
Let us now turn to the pricing decision of the firm. As discussed earlier, a very
popular approach to capture price determination in agent-based models is the use
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Figure 1.1: Dynamics of per capita output averaged over 10 runs for different values
of the stock-out probability: χ = 0.01 (solid line), χ = 0.1 (dashed line), χ = 0.2
(dotted line), χ = 0.8 (dashed-dotted line).
Figure 1.2: Dynamics of per capita output averaged over 10 runs for different values
of the mark-up: 5% (solid line), 10% (dashed line), 15% (dotted line), 20% (dashed-
dotted line).
of mark-up pricing, where typically the mark-up is assumed to be constant over
time. Although there is extensive empirical evidence for, wide-spread use of mark-
up pricing in the real world, it is much less clear what determines the size of the
mark-up chosen by a firm. The size of the mark-up chosen by the firms does not
only have effects on the performance of the individual firms, but, as can be seen in
figure 1.2, also strongly influences the level of the overall output in the economy.
The figure demonstrates that an increase of the mark-up by all consumption good
producers from 5% to 20% reduces the per-capita output by about 20%. This strong
effect is quite surprising because the closed EURACE model takes into account that
firm profits that might be generated by large mark-ups is to a large extent channeled
back to households, and thus to consumption, through firms’ dividend payments.
These observations suggest that a careful analysis of empirically meaningful
mark-up values and of the way the mark-up level is set can be an important factor
in providing confidence in the conclusions drawn from simulation results. As is also
well known from microeconomic theory, the two crucial factors determining the price
a firm should charge are (marginal) costs and the elasticity of the demand for the
product of this firm with respect to its price. In particular the elasticity of the firm’s
individual demand is however typically unknown to a firm operating in a dynamic
complex environment and therefore can only be estimated. In the management liter-
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ature heuristic procedures are proposed that would in the ideal world of oligopolies
with full information about demand and cost lead to standard elasticity-based pric-
ing, but are also applicable in more messy environments where the actual demand
structure is unknown to the firm. We adopt here a simple heuristic of this kind that
can be summarized as follows if it is applied to the EURACE economy (see, e.g.,
Nagle and Hogan, 2006, pp. 136):
For each considered price change do the following:
i) Determine the effects of changes in sales on production costs.
ii) Evaluate buyers’ price sensitivity and determine a sales distribution after the
price change.
iii) Calculate profit implications for various probable sales changes.
iv) Accept or reject the proposed price change based on these considerations.
Step [iv)] of this procedure of course depends strongly on the objective of the firm. In
our implementation of this procedure we assume that the firm maximizes expected
profits and therefore compares the expected profit implications of the different price
changes it considers. The main challenge of this procedure lies in step [ii)], where
the firm has to determine the expected change in its sales for different potential
price changes. To address this challenge we again rely on a procedure put forward
in the relevant literature, ”‘namely simulated purchase surveys”’ (see, e.g., Nagle
and Hogan, 2006, pp. 300). Such surveys are performed by presenting consumers
a sample of products of the firm under consideration and its competitors together
with prices and asking the consumers which product they would choose. Based on
the results of these surveys the sensitivity of buyers with respect to price changes
can be estimated.
To implement this procedure in our model we assume that each firm carries out
market research and updates its prices once a year. From the household population it
draws a sample where the sample size nS has to be sufficiently large in order to obtain
significant results. Therefore, the firm contacts randomly chosen households by
sending an interview request. Contacted households decide whether they are willing
to attend an interview based on a random process. If firms are not able to recruit the
planned number of interviews nS on their activation day, they repeat the recruiting
on the following days until the desired number is reached. Attending households
receive a questionnaire containing a set of prices and goods where both the good
of the firm and those of the competitors are included. The households are asked
whether they would buy firm’s good at one of these prices or if they would decide
on a different good offered at its original price. The simulated purchasing decision is
based on the same logit model that households use for their real purchasing decision.
Based on these answers the firm determines the expected change in sales coming
with each of the considered price changes and calculates the corresponding profit
implications taking into account the cost effects of the change in sales. Among all
considered price changes the one with the highest expected profit is then chosen.
In figure 1.3 we show the dynamics of the resulting mark-ups of firms for a
single run. The bold line depicts the population mean, the dashed lines indicate the
band of plus/minus one standard deviation. The population mean is quite stable
over time fluctuating slightly in a range between 10% and 15%. The heterogeneity
within the population is however substantial and also persistent, as can be seen
from the standard deviation band. So it can be concluded that the standard setting
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Figure 1.3: Dynamics of the mark-up charged by firms in a single simulation run.
The bold line gives the population mean the dashed line the mean plus/minus one
standard deviation.
Figure 1.4: Dynamics of per capita output averaged over 10 runs for synchronized
(dashed line) and asynchronized (solid line) firm decisions.
with a fixed mark-up of 10% for all firms is close to what would emerge from this
endogenous mark-up rule but misses the persistent heterogeneity of mark-ups in the
firm population. To what extend the consideration of such persistent heterogeneity
in firm behavior would affect qualitative properties of the aggregate dynamics or of
policy effects depends on the particular research issue and cannot be discussed here.
Having discussed an empirically founded way to model the quantity and pric-
ing decisions in terms of parametrized families to decision heuristics and having
examined some robustness properties of the results with respect to changes in the
parameters of the heuristic, we now briefly discuss another important issue of the
description of the firm behavior in agent-based models, namely the synchronization,
or lack thereof, of the points in time where different firms in the economy make
their decisions. In the majority of agent-based models, as in almost all models
examining market or industry dynamics, the time structure consisting of discrete
periods without any further fragmentation implies complete synchronization of the
decisions of firms. It is well known that such synchronization is prone to producing
overshooting phenomena and for many firm decisions such strong synchronization
cannot be observed in reality. The EURACE model allows one to study how the
assumption that the points in time where firms act are fully synchronized influences
the dynamics of the model. As briefly discussed above, in the EURACE model the
basic time unit is a day, but many decisions are taken once a week, once a month or
Capturing Firm Behavior 18
once a quarter. The quantity and pricing decisions of firms are taken once a month,
which means that each firm has one fixed day of the month where it applies the
procedures described above to determine these values. In the standard setting it is
assumed that each firm chooses its ’day to act’ randomly and hence the decisions of
the different firms are distributed over time, but full synchronization can be achieved
by assigning identical days to act to all firms. Figure 1.4 shows that synchronization
of firm decisions does indeed have a non-negligible effect on the emerging dynamics.
Rather surprisingly, the effect of synchronization is positive, leading to an increase
in per-capita output of almost five percent. Actually, the effect of the synchroniza-
tion of the firms is larger than the effect of a decrease in the stock-out probability
from χ = 0.2 to χ = 0.01 by all firms. This highlights that the usual assumption
of synchronization of firms’ action in ACE models should be treated with caution
and if possible robustness considerations should be made not only with respect to
parameter variations but if possible also with respect to the schedule of events in a
period. The actual mechanisms and causal chains leading to the positive effect of
synchronization could be identified examining the interrelated dynamics of different
micro-variables, see Dawid et al. (2009, 2010) for examples of extensive examinations
of the economic mechanisms on the micro level that give rise to certain macro level
effects of different economic policy measures. Although certainly interesting, we ab-
stain here from presenting such a detailed analysis of the effect of synchronization
in our model. Rather we want to stress the general point that the assumption of
synchronized actions often does have substantial implications.
1.4 Conclusions
In this paper we have argued that in agent-based models of industry and macro dy-
namics relatively little attention has been paid to the way decision-making processes
of firms are modeled. While in recent literature the effort to provide empirical and
experimental foundations for the description of decisions by individuals in agent-
based models has increased, a clear conceptual basis for the choice of firms’ decision
rules in such models is often missing. A potentially fruitful approach seems to be the
Management Science Approach where decision heuristics that are well documented
in the relevant managerial literature are implemented in the agent-based model in
order to capture the decision processes of the firms. Here this approach has been
illustrated in the framework of an agent-based macro model where the focus of the
analysis lies on understanding the dynamics on the aggregate level and the effects of
policy interventions. It should however be pointed out that the Management Science
Approach has also been applied with success in quite different contexts and with a
quite different focus. In Dawid and Reimann (2004) a normative analysis from the
perspective of the firm was carried out using this approach. In particular they used
parametrized families of decision rules taken from the managerial literature to ex-
amine how the optimal firm strategy with respect to product range expansion and
market selection depends on the properties of the industry environment and the
strategies adopted by the competitors. This study shows that the Management Sci-
ence Approach also has potential as a tool to carry out strategic analysis from a
firm perspective using agent-based modeling.
Obviously, more work is needed to increase the appeal of the approach. Standard
decision heuristics for different types of firm decisions relevant in ACE models will
have to be collected and empirical evidence about which published decision heuristics
are indeed applied by a majority of the firms should be provided. Even if such
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empirical studies showed that the percentage of firms following standard managerial
heuristics is relatively small such research contributing to the development of an
empirically founded systematic approach for the modeling of firm decisions in ACE
models would be most welcome.
1.A Appendix: Detailed description of the (extended
version of the) EURACE model
Although some parts of the model have been described in detail in the body of
the paper we have repeated them here for easier readability of the entire model
description.
1.A.1 Overall Structure
The model describes an economy containing labor, consumption goods, capital
goods, financial and credit markets in a regional context. Each agent (firms, house-
holds and banks) is located in one of the regions.
Capital goods are provided with infinite supply at exogenously given prices. The
quality of the capital goods improves over time where technological change is driven
by a stochastic (innovation) process. Firms in the consumption goods sector use
capital goods combined with labor input to produce consumption goods. The labor
market is populated with workers that have a finite number of general skill levels and
acquire specific skills on the job which they need to fully exploit the technological
advantages of the capital goods employed in the production process. Consumption
goods are sold at malls. Malls are treated as local market platforms where firms
store and offer their products and consumers come to buy goods at posted prices.
The spatial extensions of the markets differ. The capital goods market is global
meaning that firms in all regions buy from the same global capital good producer
and therefore have access to the same technology. On the consumption goods mar-
ket demand is determined locally in the sense that all consumers buy at the local
mall located in their region, but supply is global because every firm might sell its
products in all regional markets of the economy. Labor markets are characterized
by spatial frictions determined by commuting costs that arise if workers accept jobs
outside their own region. The basic time unit in the model is one day, where many
decisions, like production choice or hiring of firms, are taken monthly and others,
like consumption decisions of households are taken weekly.
Table 1.1 summarizes the setup of the model by showing the values of the most
important model parameters.
1.A.2 Consumption goods producer
1.A.2.1 Quantity choice and factor demand
For a detailed description of the quantity choice, the reader is referred to Section 1.3.
Consumption goods producers need physical capital and labor to produce the
consumption goods. A firm i has a capital stock Ki,t that is composed of different
vintages of the production technology V = {V }V max1 ,
Ki,t =
V max∑
V=1
KVi,t. (1.1)
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The accumulation of physical capital by a consumption goods producer follows
Ki,t+1 =
V max∑
V=1
(1− δ)KVi,t +
V max∑
V=1
IVi,t (1.2)
where δ is the depreciation rate and IVi,t ≥ 0 is the gross investment in vintage V .
Every worker w has a level of general skills bgenw ∈ {1, . . . , bgenmax} and a level
of specific skills bw,t. The specific skills of worker w indicate how efficiently the
corresponding technology is exploited by the individual worker. Building up those
specific skills depends on collecting experience by using the technology in the pro-
duction process. The specific skills are updated once in each production cycle of one
month. Further, we assume that updating takes place at the end of the cycle.
A crucial assumption is the positive relationship between the general skills bgenw
of a worker and his ability to utilize his experiences. Taking the relevance of the
general skill level into account the specific skills of a worker w for technology j is
assumed to evolve according to
bw,t+1 = bw,t + χ(b
gen
w ) ·max [Ai,t − bw,t, 0] , (1.3)
where we denote with Ai,t the average quality of the capital stock over all vintages.
The function χ is increasing in the general skill level of the worker.
The production technology in the consumption goods sector is represented by a
Leontief type production function with complementarities between the qualities of
the different vintages of the capital goods and the specific skill level of employees for
using these types of technologies. Vintages are deployed for production in descending
order by using the best vintage first. For each vintage the effective productivity is
determined by the minimum of its productivity and the average level of relevant
specific skills of the workers. Accordingly, output for a consumption goods producer
is given by
Qi,t =
V max∑
V=1
min
[
KVi,t,max
[
0, Li,t −
V max∑
k=V+1
Kki,t
]]
·min [AV , Bi,t] , (1.4)
where AV is the productivity of vintage V and Bi,t denotes the average specific skill
level in firms.
Let Q˜i,t be the planned production quantity of firm i in t and Qˆi,t the feasible
output that can be produced with the current capital stock. This potential output
is computed according to
Qˆi,t =
V max∑
V=1
(1− δ)KVi,t ·min
[
AV , Bi,t
]
. (1.5)
Two cases have to be considered for the factor demand determination:
1. If Qˆi,t ≥ Q˜i,t : In that case the desired output can be produced with the current
capital stock and no additional investments are necessary. We have Ii,t = 0
and the labor input is computed by taking the labor productivity of the last
month into account:
L˜i,t = Q˜i,t · Li,t−1
Qi,t−1.
(1.6)
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2. If Qˆi,t < Q˜i,t : Here we have positive investments Ii,t > 0; the amount depends
on the outcome of the vintage choice (see next section). If V is the selected
vintage, the investment volume is
Ii,t =
Q˜i,t − Qˆi,t
min [AV , Bi,t]
(1.7)
and the labor demand
L˜i,t = Ki,t−1(1− δ) + Ii,t. (1.8)
1.A.2.2 Vintage choice
The consumption goods firm can choose from a set of vintages V = {V }V max1 which
differ regarding their productivity AV . The decision in which vintage to invest de-
pends on a comparison of the effective productivities and the corresponding prices.
For this consideration the complementarity between specific skills and technology,
min[AV , Bi,t], plays an important role: due to the inertia of the specific skill adap-
tation, the advantage of a better vintage with AV > Bi,t cannot be fully taken into
account immediately, but the productivity gap is closed over time. To account for
this updating process the firm computes a discounted sum of estimated effective
productivities over a fixed time horizon S. Therefore the specific skill evolution has
to be estimated for each time step within this period [t, t+S] by using equation 1.3
with as parameters the firm’s mean general skill level Bgeni,t and mean specific skill
level Bi,t. Formally, we have
AˇEffi,t (V ) =
S∑
s=0
(
1
1− ρ
)s
min[AV , B˜i,t+s(A
V )], (1.9)
where ρ is the discount rate and the estimated adaption follows
B˜i,t+s = B˜i,t+s−1 + χ(B
gen
i,t ) ·max
[
AV − B˜i,t+s−1, 0
]
. (1.10)
A logit model is applied for the vintage choice. The decision is random where the
probabilities depend on the ratios of effective productivity and prices
AˇEffi,t (V )
pVt
. The
higher the ratio is for a certain vintage the higher is the probability to buy it.
Formally, we have for vintage V :
Probi,V,t =
exp(γ log(
AˇEffi,t (V )
pVt
))∑
v∈V exp(γ log(
AˇEffi,t (v)
pvt
))
. (1.11)
1.A.2.3 Financial management
If a firm does not have sufficient internal financial resources to cover all expenses
related to production, it has the opportunity to raise external financing on the
credit market. Banks accept credit requests by taking into account individual risks
of the applicant and risks of their loan portfolio according to some stylized Basel
II standards. If the credit request is refused or not fully accepted the firm has to
reduce its planned production quantity as long as the planned expenditures can be
financed.
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The wage bill of the full month as well as capital investments are paid on the
day when the firm starts production.
The monthly realized profit of a consumption goods producer is the difference
between sales revenues achieved in the malls and production costs (i.e. labor costs
and discounted capital costs) in the period just ended. In case of positive profits, the
firm pays dividends to its shareholders and the remaining funds or losses are entered
on a payment account Acci,t. We assume that all households hold equal shares in all
consumption goods producers, consequently the dividends are equally distributed to
the households.
Besides the expenditures for production, i.e. labor costs and investments, the
firm has also financial obligations such as taxes on profits, installment and interest
payments. If the firm is not able to pay these financial commitments it goes out
of business. It also goes bankrupt if the firm’s equity becomes negative. In case of
bankruptcy it fires all its employees, writes off a fraction of its debt and stays idle
for a certain period before it becomes active again.
1.A.2.4 Pricing
The managerial pricing rule corresponds to standard mark-up pricing. The firms set
the price according to
pi,t = ci,t · (1 + µ), (1.12)
where c¯i,t denotes unit costs in production of firm i in the current period and µ the
exogenously given mark-up. Once the firm has determined the updated prices pi,r,t
for all regions r where it offers its goods, the new prices are sent to the regional
malls and posted there for the following period.
1.A.3 Investment goods producer
The capital goods sector is represented by a single capital goods producing firm.
The capital good is heterogeneous and consists of different vintages varying in their
technological productivities. The vintages of the capital goods are offered with
infinite supply.
The quality of the best practice technology increases over time due to a stochastic
process. Every period the quality is increased with probability γinv ∈ (0, 1) where
with probability (1 − γinv) there is no change in quality. In case of an increase,
the quality of the best practice technology changes by a fixed percentage ∆qinv;
this newly developed technology is added as a new vintage to the range of offered
vintages without replacing an old one.
The investment goods producer is modeled as a passive agent meaning that
although producing goods the firm does not deploy any input factors for production
and consequently does not bear any production costs. Revenues accruing to the
capital goods producer are channeled back into the economy by distributing them
in equal shares among all households in order to close the model.
The pricing of capital goods is based on a combination of two pricing methods.
Even if the capital good firm produces at no cost, capital goods pricing is connected
to the labor cost trend in the economy. In our model the development of wages is
mainly driven by the progress of workers’ productivity BEco. Thus, a cost based
price component, which is assumed to be equal for all vintages, evolves over time
according to
pCostt =
BEcot −BEcot−1
BEcot−1
· pCostt−1 . (1.13)
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The second price component is value-based pricing. The value that a vintage has
for the buyer can be derived from its effective productivity in the production process
of a consumption goods firm. For its determination the investment goods firm
replicates the way consumption good producers compute the discounted effective
productivity gains. It computes these values for an average firm, i.e. a firm that has
economy-wide averages for the general skills BgenEco and specific skills B
Eco
t . For the
average firm the discounted sum for vintage V over a time horizon S is denoted by
AˇEfft (V ) =
S∑
s=0
(
1
1− ρ
)s
min[AV , B˜Ecot+s (A
V , bgenEco)]. (1.14)
The relative difference of V to a benchmark vintage is used to compute the value
based price component pV alueV,t , where the benchmark is the best practice V max of
the previous period t− 1:
pV alueV,t = p
V max
t−1
AˇEfft (V )
AˇEfft−1 (V max)
. (1.15)
Finally, the price of the vintage is a linear combination of pCostt and p
V alue
V,t with
weight θ,
pVt = θ · pCostt + (1− θ)pV alueV,t . (1.16)
1.A.4 Households’ consumption
Once a month households receive their income. Depending on the available cash,
that is the current income from factor markets (i.e. labor income and dividends
distributed by capital and consumption goods producers) plus assets carried over
from the previous period, the household sets the budget which it will spend for
consumption and consequently determines the remaining part which is saved. On
a weekly basis, sampling prices at the (regional) mall the consumer decides which
goods to buy.
1.A.4.1 The savings decision
At the beginning of period t, a consumer k decides on the budget Bconsk,t that he
plans to spend. In period t the agent receives an income Ik,t, and has a total wealth
Wk,t, consisting of money holdings and asset wealth in firm shares.
The consumer sets his consumption according to the following consumption rule
Bconsk,t = I
Mean
k,t + κ · (Wk,t − Φ · IMeank,t ), (1.17)
where IMeank,t is the mean individual income of an agent over the last T periods
and the parameter Φ is the target wealth/income ratio. The intuition is that as
long as household wealth matches the target level, the consumption budget Bconsk,t
corresponds to household’s mean income IMeank,t . If it does not match, the budget
has to deviate from the mean income so that the actual wealth can converge to
the target level. Parameter κ indicates how sensitive the consumption reacts to
deviations of the actual wealth/income ration to the target level.
Each consumer goes shopping once a week, but different households on different
days. The monthly budget is equally split over the four weeks. Parts of the weekly
budget that are not spent in a given week are rolled over to the consumption budget
of the following week. This yields a weekly consumption budget Bconsk,weekt for each
week in period t.
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1.A.4.2 Selection of consumption goods
The consumer collects information about the range of goods provided. He receives
information about prices and inventories. In the Marketing literature it is standard
to describe individual consumption decisions using logit models. We assume that a
consumer’s decision which good to buy is random, where purchasing probabilities
are based on the values he attaches to the different choices he is aware of. Denote
by Gk,weekt the set of producers whose goods consumer k has sampled in week weekt
of period t and where a positive stock is available at the attended mall. Since in
our setup there are no quality differences between consumer goods and we also do
not explicitly take account of horizontal product differentiation, choice probabilities
depend solely on prices. The value of consumption good i ∈ Gk,weekt is then simply
given by
vk(pi,t) = −ln(pi,t). (1.18)
The consumer selects one good i ∈ Gk,weekt , where the selection probability for i
reads
Probk,i,t =
Exp[λconsk vk(pi,t)]∑
i′∈Gk,weekt Exp[λ
cons
k vk(pi′,t)]
. (1.19)
Thus, consumers prefer cheaper products and the intensity of competition in the
market is parameterized by λconsk . Once the consumer has selected a good he spends
his entire budget Bconsk,weekt for that good if the stock at the mall is sufficiently large.
In case the consumer cannot spend all his budget on the product selected first, he
spends as much as possible, removes that product from the list Gk,weekt , updates
the logit values and selects another product to spend the remaining consumption
budget there. If he is rationed again, he spends as much as possible on the second
selected product, rolls over the remaining budget to the following week and finishes
the visit to the mall.
1.A.5 Labor market
1.A.5.1 Labor demand
Labor demand is determined in the consumption goods market. If the firms plan
to extend the production they post vacancies and corresponding wage offers. The
wage offers wOi,t,g for each general skill group g stay unchanged as long as the firm
can fill its vacancies, otherwise the firm updates the wage offer by a parameterized
fraction. In case of downsizing the incumbent workforce, the firm dismisses workers
with lowest general skill levels first.
1.A.5.2 Labor supply
Labor supply is generated by the unemployed. An unemployed k only takes the
posted wage offer into consideration and compares it with his reservation wage wRk,t.
A worker will not apply at a firm that makes a wage offer which is lower than his
reservation wage. The level of the reservation wage is determined by the current
wage if the worker is employed, and in case of an unemployed person by his adjusted
past wage. An unemployed worker will thus reduce his reservation wage with the
duration of unemployment. When a worker applies he sends information about his
general as well as his specific skill level to the firm.
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1.A.5.3 Matching algorithm
According to the procedures described in the previous sections, consumption good
producers review once a month whether to post vacancies for production workers.
Job seekers check for vacancies. The matching between vacancies and job seekers
works in the following way:
Step 1: The firms post vacancies including wage offers.
Step 2: Every job seeker extracts from the list of vacancies those postings to which he
fits in terms of his reservation wage. Job seekers rank the suitable vacancies.
He sends an exogenous determined number of applications to randomly chosen
firms.
Step 3: If the number of applicants is smaller or equal to the number of vacancies the
firms send job offers to every applicant. If the number of applicants is higher
than the number of vacancies firms send job offers to as many applicants as
they have vacancies to fill. Applicants with higher general skill levels bgenw are
more likely to receive a job offer.
Step 4: Each worker ranks the incoming job offers according to the wages net of com-
muting costs (comm > 0) that may arise if he were to accept a job in the
region where he does not live. Each worker accepts the highest ranked job
offer at the advertised wage rate. After acceptance a worker refuses all other
job offers and outstanding applications.
Step 5: Vacancies’ lists are adjusted for filled jobs and the labor force is adjusted for
new employees.
Step 6: If the number of untitled vacancies exceeds some threshold v > 0 the firm raises
the base wage offer which is paid per unit of specific skills by a fraction ϕi such
that wbi,t+1 = (1 + ϕi)w
O
i,t. If an unemployed job seeker did not find a job he
reduces his reservation wage by a fraction ψk, that is (w
R
k,t+1 = (1− ψk)wRk,t).
There exists a lower bound to the reservation wage wRmin which may be a
function of unemployment benefits, opportunities for black market activity or
the value of leisure. If a worker finds a job then his new reservation wage is
the actual wage, i.e. wRk,t = wi,t. Go to step 1.
This cycle is aborted after two iterations even if not all firms may have satisfied
their demand for labor. As indicated above this might lead to rationing of firms
on the labor market and therefore to deviations of actual output quantities from
the planned quantities. In such a case the quantities delivered by the consumption
good producer to the malls it serves is reduced proportionally. This results in lower
stock levels and therefore increases the expected planned production quantities in
the following period.
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Table 1.1: Parameter settings
Description Parameter Value
Number of households 1600
Number of firms 80
Number of regions R 1
Depreciation rate of capital (monthly) δ 0.01
Monthly discount factor ρ 0.95
Production smoothing ξ 0.5
Stock-out probability (default value) χ 0.2
Mark-up factor (default value) 1|ei |−1 0.1
Wage update ϕi 0.01
Reservation wage update ψk 0.02
Intensity of choice by consumers λconsk 7
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Economic convergence
Chapter 2
Economic convergence: policy
implications from a
heterogeneous agent model∗
2.1 Introduction
There is a persistent gap in terms of economic performance and growth between
different European regions. Despite large efforts to integrate European economies
the problem of real convergence in the European Union (EU) area is to a large degree
still unsolved and the effectiveness of the cohesion policy measures is contested (see,
e.g., Aiello and Pupo, 2012; Boldrin and Canova, 2001; Cappelen et al., 2003).
EU policies to facilitate convergence of per capita income and productivity refer
to two broad areas. First, there is the funding of regional policies. The European
Fund for Regional Development (ERDF), the European Social Fund (ESF), the
Cohesion Fund (CF), and the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA) are
the major pillars to spur cohesion. Second, European integration has to a large
degree, also been associated with the reduction of barriers for a free flow of goods,
labor, and capital.
This free flow of goods and production factors, however, makes it hard to predict
the spatial distribution of the policy effects and to specifically target economic policy
measures on the lagging regions. It is ex ante not clear how a policy affects the
economic performance of neighboring regions, and how the neighboring regions’
economic performance feeds back on the region at which the policy is targeted. Due
to such feedbacks the overall effect might well be negative such that a policy intended
to accelerate the convergence actually leading to divergence.
In our paper we analyze exactly these questions by considering short-, medium-
and long-term effects of policy measures, which aim at fostering convergence, on
output and real convergence in a two-region setup of an agent-based macroeconomic
model (the Eurace@Unibi model). We define two policies that can be implemented
in the less developed region. The first policy is a human capital policy that leads to
an upgrade of the general skill level in the population. The second policy provides
subsidies to those firms that invest in the most recent technological vintages. These
subsidies give firms incentives to modernize their capital stock which can close the
∗This chapter has been published as H. Dawid, P. Harting and M. Neugart (2014): ”Economic
convergence: policy implications from a heterogeneous agent model,” Journal of Economic Dynam-
ics and Control, Volume 44.
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technological gap to the superior region.
The choice of these policies for our experiments is strongly motivated by the
regional policies funded by the European Union.1 The ERDF aims at strengthening
economic and social cohesion in the EU by correcting imbalances between its regions.
In short and among other things, the ERDF finances direct aid to investments in
companies (in particular small and medium sized enterprises) in order to create sus-
tainable jobs. Large parts of this fund are spent to support investments in physical
capital, mostly through non-repayable grants, but also other tools, such as soft loans.
The ERDF also supports the build-up of infrastructures notably linked to research
and innovation, telecommunications, environment, energy and transport. The ESF
is set up to improve employment and job opportunities in the European Union. This
fund supports actions in the member states in the areas of adapting workers and
enterprises, lifelong learning schemes, designing and spreading innovative working
organizations. It also targets at strengthening human capital by reforming education
systems and setting up a network of teaching establishments. This short description
shows that under the roof of these funds, we find mostly policies targeted at helping
to build up human capital and/or technology improvements.
The available budget for the ERDF and ESF is sizeable. For the period from
2007 to 2013, 277 bn Euros are allocated which makes about 28.5% of the total EU
budged. As all the cohesion policy programs are matching funds with co-financing
by the member countries, total available funding is almost 560 bn Euros which is
about one quarter of the Italian and more than one half of the Spanish yearly gross
domestic product.
Although there is a vivid debate about the past success of EU cohesion policy,
which is based on a variety of econometric techniques (see Becker et al., 2010, for a re-
cent contribution and a brief survey of the relevant literature), the model-supported
basis for a prediction of the effect of such measures, which target either the quality
of human capital or technology upgrading in a spatial framework with labor mar-
ket frictions, is weak.2 Considering the well established complementarity between
workers’ skills and the level of technology employed by firms (see our brief discus-
sion in the next section) it is clear, that each of these policies, if successful, should
affect the dynamics of both human and physical capital. The effective use and the
adoption of different vintages of technology in a region are influenced not only by
policies directly subsidizing physical investments, but also by the skill distribution
in that region, which is in turn influenced both by local human capital policies and
by the mobility of workers. Hence, although these cohesion policies all aim at the
improvement of the productivity in the target region, they rely on quite different
mechanisms and might therefore be differently affected by varying degrees of spatial
labor market frictions. For this reason, a systematic comparison of the effectiveness
of policies targeting human capital endowment and diffusion of technologies into
1See http : //ec.europa.eu/regional policy/thefunds/index en.cfm, accessed on August 9th,
2012.
2A rare model-based contribution related to the issues raised here is Arcalean et al. (2012),
where the authors study in the framework of a two region, two sector overlapping generations
model the effects of the allocation of structural funds between public education and infrastructure.
However, the paper differs in several respects from our main focus. First, infrastructure provides
a public good increasing productivity of all firms, whereas the technology policy in this paper
provides incentives for individual firms to acquire capital goods of high quality thereby improving
productivity of some selected firms (those who invest). Second, a major aspect of our analysis,
namely the complementarity between the dynamics of skills of workers and technology choices of
firms, is not present in Arcalean et al. (2012). Also, spatial labor market frictions play no role in
their analysis.
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weaker regions as well as the interplay of these policies with the policies fostering
labor mobility between the regions needs further investigation. More specifically we
seek to answer the following policy related questions:
1. How does each of the considered cohesion policies affect output growth in both
regions and convergence?
2. How are the cohesion policy effects influenced by labor mobility?
Our aim is to address these questions under consideration of the complementarity
of the dynamics of skills and quality of production technology on the firm level,
where this complementarity is due to learning by doing of workers and endogenous
technology choice by firms. Dealing with this complementarity requires a model that
captures technology choices of individual firms, where these choices are affected by
firm specific characteristics like the availability of appropriate skills in the own work-
force, as well as the evolution of the distribution of (specific skills) in the workforce
and skill specific labor flows across regions.
We opt for a closed agent-based model with two regions as the most appropriate
tool to gain insights into the emergent dynamics on the labor and goods markets.3
Heterogeneous firms and households interact on labor and consumption goods mar-
kets. Productivity of firms is determined by the specific skills of its workers (which
are updated due to learning by doing) as well as the quality of its vintage structured
capital stock. New vintages become available over time from the capital goods sec-
tor and are integrated into the active capital stock based on investment and vintage
choice decisions of firms. Decision making of firms and households is modeled in a
rule-based manner, where the decision rules implemented in the model have strong
empirical foundations and resemble heuristics or rules of thumb that have been put
forward in the specific literature streams that deal with the different decision prob-
lems arising for the agents in the model. This framework allows us to use a strongly
micro-founded model for the analysis of short, medium and long run policy effects
arising from heterogeneous and interacting firms and workers in a spatial context.
We set up the model in a way that one region is initially endowed with a capital
stock whose technological level is close to the frontier, while the other region’s ca-
pital shows a considerable gap. The human capital differs in that the labor force in
the first region is better educated and, by working with the most recent technology,
has acquired higher specific skills than workers in the other region. Regions may be
within a country or could be interpreted as two different countries subject to a fixed
exchange rate regime.
In order to examine the effectiveness of the policies targeted at the human capital
and technologies, and to identify the importance of regional labor market frictions,
on output and convergence, we run and compare two different experimental setups.
The two setups, within which the human capital and technology policies are ana-
lyzed, differ with respect to the level of integration of the two local labor markets.
In the first setup the labor markets are fully integrated such that there are small
frictions and all workers have almost unhindered access to both local labor markets.
In the other setup the labor markets are completely separated and workers can only
work in their home region. These are two extremes where the former may be seen
as the political aim of an integrated European labor market. Actual labor mobility
across regions varies quite substantially within Europe (see, e.g., European Commis-
sion, 2006). Across larger distances and language barriers labor flows are relatively
3Introductions to agent-based modeling can be found, e.g., in Tesfatsion and Judd (2006),
LeBaron and Tesfatsion (2008) or Fagiolo and Roventini (2012).
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small, although it increased after the recent EU enlargement.4 Commuting across
regions is a more relevant source of labor flows with the percentage of commuters
ranging from 2% to 20% for different EU countries. The largest part of the commut-
ing takes place between regions within the same country (European Commission,
2006).
Our analysis is based on a systematic statistical analysis of batches of simulation
runs under the different policies in the two considered labor market scenarios. As
a methodological innovation to the literature on agent-based policy models we use
penalized spline estimates to capture the evolution of policy impacts over time.
The main results of our analysis are that the human capital policy is only effective
in terms of fostering cohesion if labor markets are separated. If labor markets
are integrated, output actually falls in the lagging region at which the policy is
targeted. Technology policies speed up convergence for integrated and separated
labor markets and their effect is substantially stronger if they are specified such
that they incentivize firms to purchase latest vintages. The mechanisms responsible
for the strong influence of spatial labor market frictions on the policy effects are
identified and discussed. Thereby this paper contributes to a better qualitative
understanding of the reasons why cohesion policy measures might have no effect or
even effects that run counter the intention of the policy maker. The mechanisms
we identify rely on the interplay of labor flows of low and high skilled workers
with the technology choices of firms in a region and the shift of demand due to the
competitiveness of firms in different regions, and do not seem to have been considered
in the existing literature. Also, the consideration of policy effects on different time
scales is an innovative contribution relative to previous model based policy analyses.
These insights have clear policy implications. Our results suggest that distinct
EU policies aiming to speed up convergence are potentially offsetting each other.
The HC-policy and the Tech-policy are more effective with respect to achieving con-
vergence if labor markets are not integrated. This insight from our model squares
well with findings from the empirical literature on the effect of EU funding. As we
outline in the following section, there seems to be evidence that EU policies may
foster convergence between countries while they rather fail to spur convergence be-
tween regions. Interpreting the differences between countries and regions as workers
being more mobile between regions and less mobile between countries, this part of
the empirical evidence on the effects of EU policies is what our model predicts for
HC-policies. Thus policies, that target the improvement of labor mobility between
regions may render policies targeting the cohesion of regions ineffective.
In the following section we relate our contribution to the existing literature.
Section 2.3 lays out the model. Section 2.4 introduces the policy experiments and
discusses the results. The last Section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 Related Literature
Our contribution on evaluating the effects of EU policies on convergence is mainly
related to three streams of literature: work on the effects of cohesion policies, work
on the effect of technology policies and a skilled labor force on growth, and work on
agent-based macroeconomic modeling. We briefly discuss our contribution relative
to these three streams.
4In 2010, 2.8% of working-age European citizens lived in another EU member state compared
to 2.0% in 2004 (European Commission, 2011).
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A large literature has studied convergence between countries or between regions,
mainly relying on the concept of ’β-convergence’ (see, e.g., Islam, 2003, for a review).
Previous empirical work on, particularly, the effectiveness of European regional poli-
cies with respect to regional convergence is mixed. Studies taking a national perspec-
tive, such as Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger (2005) find positive effects of the Structural
Funds Program on GDP growth, or at least conditionally positive effects (Ederveen
et al., 2006) meaning that growth rates rise for countries with good institutions. For
studies using disaggregated regional data, the findings with respect to the growth
effects are inconclusive. One of the earliest attempts to evaluate the role of the
Structural Funds Programme can be found in Boldrin and Canova (2001). They
analyzed NUTS 2 data for 221 regions for the years 1980 to 1996, finding that dis-
parities between regions were neither growing nor decreasing, and that EU policies
have little relationship with fostering growth. Contrarily, also using sub-national
data, Cappelen et al. (2003) for example, find positive growth effects. Ramajo
et al. (2008) provide evidence for spatial convergence clubs in Europe, and faster
conditional convergence in relative income of cohesion-fund countries, i.e. Ireland,
Greece, Portugal, and Spain. Finally, Becker et al. (2010) detect positive growth ef-
fects for so-called Objective 1 transfers within the structural program but no effects
on regional employment. Reasons for the differing findings may be that the data
employed refers to various levels of disaggregation, and that some studies look into
the overall effect of the EU funding while others evaluated more specific programs.
Recently, based on a model of technology adoption as laid out in Comin and
Hobijn (2010), Comin and Hobijn (2011) provided evidence that U.S. aid given
within the Marshall plan accelerated the speed of adoption of new technologies.
Recurring on a sample of 10 technologies for 39 countries for the postwar period,
they find that countries which benefited from these policies reduced on average the
adoption lag for new technologies by 4 years. We differ from this work by modeling
technology adoption as a process for which the availability of a skilled workforce
within a particular firm is crucial. In that sense, our modeling of firms’ technology
choices also distinguishes this contribution from the work based on the concept of
directed technological change (see, e.g., Acemoglu, 1998; Acemoglu and Zilibotti,
2001). There, it is assumed that the intensity of R&D leading to high quality
capital goods is influenced by the (local) skill distribution of workers. Our focus is
on the effects of the local skill distribution on the technology choice of consumption
good producers and, therefore, on the speed of diffusion of new technologies in the
economy. Such an approach is backed by empirical evidence, based on firm level
data, that the intensity of a firm’s innovative activities is (positively) influenced by
the skill level of its work force (see, e.g., Piva and Vivarelli, 2009).
A simple macroeconomic model, where the technology choice of firms is influ-
enced by the local availability of skills, is developed and analyzed in Caselli and
Coleman (2006). They, however, do not consider the role of workers’ endowments
of skills on the firm level for the technology choices of firms and their work does not
have a policy focus.
Similarly to our policy experiments Mateos-Planas (2001) investigates school ef-
fectiveness and distortions to the costs of technology adoption on per-capita output,
educational attainment, and age of technologies. Technology specific learning and
education either improves the ability of agents to learn new technologies or provides
a productivity advantage. In contrast, we model the interplay of general and specific
skills of workers within a firm, and incentives of firms to invest into new technolo-
gies. Workers improve their specific skills on-the-job (see, e.g., Argote and Epple,
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1990) faster if they have higher general skills. Also, contrary to our contribution,
the analysis by Mateos-Planas (2001) lacks the spatial dimension.
Combining empirical work with a theoretical arguments based on an endogenous
growth model, Aghion et al. (2009) show that in regions, where productivity is far
from the frontier, educational investments in (research oriented) universities have
negative effects on local growth rates, due to the outwards-migration of high-skilled
workers. Although this empirical observation is in accordance with our findings
the main focus of our underlying model is quite distinct from that in Aghion et al.
(2009). Contrary to our focus on the interplay of the dynamics of firm’s technology
choice, workers’ skill adjustment and inter-regional competition, they mainly study
the allocation of workers between imitative and innovative activities in a region,
assuming that the elasticity of skilled labor is higher in innovation than in imitative
activities. Furthermore, in their paper predictions of the effects of policies regard
long run growth rates in one region, whereas we consider as well short and medium
run effects. In that sense our analysis should be seen as complementary to that in
Aghion et al. (2009).
Finally, we contribute to the literature on agent-based macroeconomic mod-
eling. These agent-based models contrast to the previously laid out approaches.
Generally speaking, the underlying idea is to study emergent phenomena at ag-
gregated levels arising through the interaction of heterogeneous agents. Unlike in
their counterparts, in agent-based models choices do not follow from the assumption
that representative agents inter-temporally optimize some objective function under
rational expectations. Rather the behavior of agents is modeled using rules that
have well-established (empirical) foundations. Micro-behavior may differ between
agents and they do not fully oversee all the consequences of their own actions and
that of other agents. Heterogeneity is allowed to a large degree and there is an
explicit aggregation of individual behavior. In that sense, these model have a strong
micro-foundation and aggregation is not simply achieved by the assumption of a
representative agent. Moreover, aggregation of individual decisions may end up in
situations where markets do not clear. Thus economic frictions may result from the
fact that economic agents are not fully coordinated in their (market-) actions.
In the last ten years a number of closed macroeconomic models using an agent-
based approach have been developed (see, e.g., Ashraf et al., 2011; Dawid et al.,
2012a; Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Dosi et al., 2013, 2010; Gintis, 2007; Raberto et al.,
2012; Riccetti et al., 2013; Wolf et al., 2012). Several of these agent-based macroe-
conomic models have shown the importance of the approach for economic policy
design. For example, the effect of labor market integration policies on the con-
vergence of regions are analyzed by Dawid et al. (2012a). Dosi et al. (2010) look
into the (long run) effects of policies aiming at the strengthening of demand and
of policies facilitating the speed of technological change as well the interaction of
these polices. Monetary policies are addressed in Ashraf et al. (2013) or Arifovic
et al. (2012), whereas regulatory issues relating to credit and financial markets are
analyzed by Delli Gatti et al. (2010), Ashraf et al. (2011), Dosi et al. (2013) or
Riccetti et al. (2013) within agent-based macroeconomic models. We differ from the
existing agent-based macroeconomic models as our set-up jointly features a spatial
dimension and technology adoption by firms which is complementary to an evolving
stock of specific skills within a firm.
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2.3 The Model
2.3.1 Overall Structure
The Eurace@Unibi model describes an economy containing labor, an investment and
a consumption goods sector, and a financial and a credit market in a regional context.
Capital good firms provide investment goods of different vintages and productivi-
ties. Consumption good firms combine this capital and labor of varying degrees of
general and specific skills to produce a consumption good that households purchase.
Households’ saved income goes into the credit and financial markets through which
it is channeled to firms financing the production of goods.
Due to space constraints we describe only the main aspects of the model, which
are crucial for the understanding of the results discussed below. This subsection
provides a global overview of the model, the following subsections elaborate crucial
parts in more detail. A detailed description of the entire model is provided in Dawid
et al. (2012b).
Capital goods of different quality are provided by capital goods producers with
infinite supply. The technological frontier (i.e. the quality of the best currently
available capital good) improves over time, where technological change is driven
by a stochastic (innovation) process. Firms in the consumption goods sector use
capital goods combined with labor input to produce consumption goods. The labor
market is populated with workers that have a finite number of general skill levels and
acquire specific skills on the job, which they need to fully exploit the technological
advantages of the capital employed in the production process. Every time when
consumption goods producers invest in new capital goods they decide which quality
of capital goods to select, thereby determining the speed by which new technologies
spread in the economy. Consumption goods are sold at local market platforms
(called malls), where firms store and offer their products and consumers come to
buy goods at posted prices. Labor market interaction is described by a simple
multi-round search-and-matching procedure where firms post vacancies, searching
workers apply, firms make offers and workers accept/reject. Wages of workers are
determined, on the one hand, by the expectation at the time of hiring the employer
has about the level of specific skills of the worker, and, on the other hand, by a base
wage variable, which is influenced by the (past) tightness of the labor market and
determines the overall level of wages paid by a particular employer. Banks collect
deposits from households and firms and give credits to firms. The interest that firms
have to pay on the amount of their loan depends on the financial situation of the
firm, and the amount of the loan might be restricted by the bank’s liquidity and risk
exposure. There is a financial market where shares of single asset are traded, namely
an index bond containing all firms in the economy. The allocation of dividends to
households is, therefore, determined by the wealth of households in terms of their
stock of index bonds. The dividend paid by each share at a certain point in time
is given by the sum of the dividends currently paid by all firms. The central bank
provides standing facilities for the banks at a given base rate, pays interest on banks’
overnight deposits and might provide fiat money to the government.
Firms that are not able to pay the financial commitments declare illiquidity.
Furthermore, if at the end of the production cycle the firm has negative net worth
insolvency bankruptcy is declared. In both cases it goes out of business, stops all
productive activities and all employees loose their jobs. The firm writes off a fraction
of its debt with all banks with which it has a loan and stays idle for a certain period
before it becomes active again.
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The spatial extensions of the markets differ. The capital goods market is global
and, therefore, consumption good firms have access to the same technologies. On
the consumption goods market demand is determined locally in the sense that all
consumers buy at the local mall located in their region. Supply on this market is
global because every firm might sell its products in all regional markets of the econ-
omy. Labor markets are characterized by spatial frictions determined by commuting
costs that arise if workers accept jobs outside their own region. Finally, it is assumed
that firms have access to all banks in the economy, i.e. credit markets operate glob-
ally. Our setup reflects the consequences of the Single Market Programme of the
EU which aims at integrating the goods, services, and financial markets (European
Commission, 2012), and the implementation of a transition phase to remove labor
mobility barriers with the onset of the Eastern enlargement.
The choice of the decision rules in the Eurace@Unibi model is based on a sys-
tematic attempt to incorporate rules that resemble empirically observable behavior
documented in the relevant literature. Concerning households, this means that, for
example, empirically identified saving rules are used and purchasing choices are des-
cribed using models from the Marketing literature with strong empirical support.
With respect to firm behavior we follow the ’Management Science Approach’, which
aims at implementing relatively simple decision rules that match standard proce-
dures of real world firms as described in the corresponding management literature.
A more extensive discussion of the Management Science approach can be found in
Dawid and Harting (2012).5
In several parts of the Eurace@Unibi model choices of decision makers are des-
cribed by logit models. These models are well suited to capture decisions where
individuals try to maximize some objective function which depends on some vari-
ables common to all decision makers and are explicitly represented in the model, as
well as on aspects that are idiosyncratic to each decision maker and captured in the
model by a stochastic term.
Agent actions can be time-driven or event-based, where the former can follow
either subjective or objective time schedules. Furthermore, the economic activities
take place on a hierarchy of time-scales: yearly, monthly, weekly and daily activities
all take place following calendar-time or subjective agent-time. Agents are activated
asynchronously according to their subjective time schedules that is anchored on an
individual activation day. These activation days are uniformly randomly distributed
among the agents at the start of the simulation, but may change endogenously (e.g.,
when a household gets re-employed, its subjective month gets synchronized with the
activation day of its employer due to wage payments). This modeling approach is
supposed to capture the decentralized and typically asynchronous nature of decision
making processes and activities of economic agents.
2.3.2 Agents, Markets, and Decisions
2.3.2.1 Output Decision and Production
Consumption goods producers need physical capital and labor for production. A firm
i has a capital stock Ki,t that is composed of different vintages v with v = 1, ..., Vt,
where Vt denotes the number of available vintages a time t. The accumulation of
physical capital by a consumption goods producer follows
Kvi,t+1 = (1− δ)Kvi,t + Ivi,t (2.1)
5This paper can be found in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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where δ is the depreciation rate and Ivi,t ≥ 0 is the gross investment in vintage v.
The production technology in the consumption goods sector is represented by a
Leontief type production function with complementarities between the qualities of
the different vintages of the investment good and the specific skill level of employees
for using these vintages. Vintages are deployed for production in descending order by
using the best vintage first. For each vintage the effective productivity is determined
by the minimum of its productivity and the average level of relevant specific skills
of the workers. Accordingly, output for a consumption goods producer i at time t
is given by
Qi,t =
Vt∑
v=1
min
[
Kvi,t,max
[
0, Li,t −
Vt∑
k=v+1
Kki,t
]]
·min [Av, Bi,t] , (2.2)
where Li,t is labor input, A
v is the productivity of vintage v and Bi,t denotes the
average specific skill level in firms as explained in more detail in Section 2.3.2.3. The
fact that the considered production function takes into account the vintage structure
of the capital stock and that firms select among different available vintages enables
us to capture the effect of workers’ skills on the incentives of firms to invest into new
technologies (see Section 2.3.2.4).
Once every month each firm determines the quantities to be produced and de-
livered to each regional mall the firm is serving. Actual demand for the product of
a firm in a given mall and a given month is stochastic (see below) and there are
stock-out costs, because consumers intending to buy the product of a firm move
on to buy from a different producer in case the firm’s stock at the mall is empty.
Therefore, the firm faces a production planning problem with stochastic demand and
stock-out cost. The simplest standard heuristic used in the corresponding Opera-
tions Management literature prescribes to generate an estimation of the distribution
of demand and then choose the planned stock level after delivery such that the (es-
timated) stock-out probability during the following month equals a given parameter
value (which is influenced by stock-out costs, inventory costs and risk attitude of
the firm (see, e.g., Silver et al., 1998). Firms in the Eurace@Unibi model follow this
simple heuristic, thereby generating a target production quantity for the considered
month. Based on the target production quantity the firm determines the desired
input quantities of physical capital and labor. Realizing this production plan might
induce the need to buy new physical capital, hire new labor or to obtain additional
credit. Although there is infinite supply of physical capital the firm might be ra-
tioned on the labor and credit market. In this case the firm accordingly adjusts its
production quantity downwards.
2.3.2.2 Pricing Decision
Consumption goods producers set the price of their products once a year which is
consistent with empirical observations (see, e.g., Fabiani et al., 2006). The pricing
rule is inspired by the price setting described in Nagle et al. (2011, ch.6), a standard
volume on strategic pricing in the Managerial literature. Firms seek for a profit-
maximizing price taking into account the trade-off between price, sales and costs.
To obtain an indication of the effect of price changes on sales the consumption
goods producers carry out simulated purchase surveys (see Nagle et al., 2011, pp.
304). A representative sample of households is asked to compare a firm’s product
with the set of the currently available rival products for a range of prices. House-
holds’ answers are based on the same decision rules they use for their real purchasing
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decisions. Based on the resulting demand estimations and cost considerations firms
choose the price which maximizes their expected discounted profit stream over their
planning horizons.
2.3.2.3 Adjustment of Specific Skills of Workers
Each worker h has two dimensions of human capital endowments namely an exoge-
nously given general skill level bgenh and an endogenously increasing specific skill level
bh,t. General skills can be interpreted as formal qualification or general embodied
abilities while specific skills are experiences or abilities obtained on-the-job reflecting
the productivity of each worker. For simplicity it is assumed that only two general
skill levels exist bgen ∈ {1, 2}, where bgen refers to the general skill level. General
skills are observable by firms in the hiring process while specific skills are not. They
become observable during the production process. Acquisition of specific skills in
the production is faster for the higher general skills. Formally, the workers increase
the specific skills over time during production by a learning process. The speed
of learning depends on the general skill level bgenh of the worker h and the average
quality of the technology Ai,t used by employer i:
bh,t+1 = bh,t + χ(b
gen
h ) ·max[0, Ai,t − bh,t]. (2.3)
Here bh,t are the specific skills of worker h in period t and χ(b
gen
h ) increases with
general skills bgenh and 0 < χ(b
gen
h ) < 1. The distribution of general skills in a
region is deliberately kept exogenous in the model, since the effect of changes in
this distribution is one of the key policy experiments in our analysis. Endogenizing
the general skill distribution in a region would require an explicit representation of
educational choices and the inclusion of an education sector, which would make the
model much more complex and is beyond the scope of this paper.
2.3.2.4 Technological Change
The supply of the capital goods and the process of technological change are modeled
in a very simplified way. We recur to a single capital good producer that offers dif-
ferent vintages of the capital good v = 1, ..., Vt that have distinct productivities A
v.
Alternatively, our representation of the supply of capital goods can be interpreted
as a market with monopolistic competition structure, where each vintage is offered
by a single firm, which uses the pricing rule described below.
New vintages become available over time following a stochastic process. To
avoid spurious growth effects, due to stochastic differences in the dynamics of the
technological frontier between runs, we use identical realizations of the stochastic
process governing the emergence of new vintages in all runs.
To keep the description of this sector as simple as possible, no explicit repre-
sentation of the production process and of the needed input factors is introduced.
To account for the cost dynamics, it is assumed that the main factor of production
costs is the wage bill and, since wages increase on average with the same rate as
productivity grows (see Section 2.3.2.6), the growth rate of productivity is used as
a proxy for the increase in production costs of the capital goods.
The pricing of the vintages pv,t is modeled as a combination of cost-based p
cost
t
and value-based prices pvaluev,t (see, e.g., Nagle et al., 2011):
pv,t = (1− λ)pcostt + λpvaluev,t . (2.4)
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Due to our assumption above, pcostt increases with the average productivity of the
economy. For the value-based price component the average general and specific skills
in the economy are determined first. In a next step the discounted productivities for
each vintage are calculated for a firm that employs workers whose human capital is
equal to the average of the economy. The value based part pvaluev,t is proportional to
this estimated effective productivity of the vintage. The motivation for this rule is
that the capital good producer tries to estimate the value of each vintage, in terms
of effective productivity, for its average customer. Furthermore, it is assumed that
the capital good producer is able to deliver any demanded quantity of any vintage.
The reason why we choose such a simplified representation of the capital goods
sector is our focus on the interaction of labor market and consumption goods market
dynamics. Therefore, we try to keep all other sectors as simple as possible. Not
explicitly modeling the hiring and firing decisions of the capital goods producer has
two main implications. First, there are no wage payments from the capital goods
producer to households. However, in order to close the model, all revenues of the
capital goods producer are channeled back to the households through dividends on
the index bonds. Second, the capital goods producer is never rationed on its input
markets, in particular on the labor market. The qualitative implication of explicitly
capturing the capital goods producer’s hiring process would be that in periods when
labor market tightness is high there would be a relatively high probability that the
capital goods producer is rationed on the labor market. Being rationed the firm
would not be able to deliver the full amount of capital goods that is demanded by
the consumption goods producers. This would slow down the expansion of these
consumption good producers relative to their plans. Such a qualitative effect is
already present in the model since consumption good producers need to hire labor
themselves whenever they want to expand their production. Through this channel a
tight labor market has already a hampering effect on firms’ expansion and potential
rationing of the capital goods producer would not add a qualitatively different effect.
2.3.2.5 Investment and Vintage Choice
If consumption good producers have a target output level which cannot be produced
with their current capital stock, they acquire new capital. To this end, a consump-
tion goods firm has to choose from the set of available vintages. For the decision
in which vintage to invest the complementarity between specific skills and techno-
logy plays an important role: due to the inertia of the specific skill adaptation, the
effective productivity of a vintage with Av > Bi,t is initially below its quality. It
converges to Av over time as the specific skills of workers at the firm catch-up to the
quality of the vintage. Therefore, the firm computes a discounted sum of estimated
effective productivities over a fixed time horizon S. The specific skill evolution is
estimated for each time step within [t, t + S] using (2.3), where the firm inserts its
average general and specific skill values. A logit choice model based on the ratio of
the estimated effective productivity and price for each available vintage determines
which vintage is ordered.
Investment goods are produced on demand, and as consumption goods produ-
cers may find it more suitable for their production plans not to employ the latest
vintages, the investment good producer keeps on delivering also older vintages as
the technology frontier grows. Note, that the way we model the investment good
producer it is a proxy for a more differentiated market with different firms supply-
ing different vintages. In this sense, we capture vertical differentiation in the supply
of investment goods. Having an elaborated vintage supply is crucial for our con-
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tribution given that the dynamics of the model unfold through the interaction of
heterogeneous labor and capital as inputs to competing consumption goods produ-
cers. In particular, our approach allows to capture the effects of the skill endowment
in a region on the vintage choice of firms and therefore on local technological change,
which is an important mechanism in our analysis.
2.3.2.6 Labor Market Interaction
If the current workforce of a firm is not sufficient to produce its target output, the
firm posts vacancies for production workers. The wage it offers has two constituent
parts. The first part is the market driven base wage wbasei,t . The base wage is paid
per unit of (expected) specific skills of the worker. If the firm cannot fill its vacancies
and the number of unfilled vacancies exceeds some threshold v > 0 the firm raises
the base wage offer by a fraction ϕ to attract more workers, i.e.
wbasei,t+1 = (1 + ϕ)w
base
i,t . (2.5)
The second part of the wage offer is related to an applicant’s expected level of
specific skills. Since the specific skills represent the (maximal) productivity of the
employees the wage wi,t is higher for higher (expected) specific skills. For each of
the general-skill groups the firm i offers different wages wOi,t,g in period t. The wage
offers are given by
wOi,t,g = w
base
i,t ×min[Ai,tB¯i,t−1,g] (2.6)
where B¯i,t−1,g are the average specific skills of all employees with general skill g in
the firm.
The underlying assumption of this determination of wage offers is that firms can
observe general but not specific skills of job applicants. Therefore, they use the
average specific skills of all employees with general skill g in the firm in order to
estimate the specific skills of an applicant with general skill level g. A firm can
observe the specific skill levels of all its current employees, however this information
will not be transferred to a competitor in case a worker applies there. The wage
setting rule used is a reduced form representation of the outcome of firm-level wage
negotiations taking into account workers’ expected productivity in the firm as well
as workers’ outside option. While one might think of other models of wage setting
and hiring models, it is crucial for our analysis to capture the link between workers’
wages and their productivity in the employer firm as well as the effect of labor
market tightness on wages. Both aspects are captured in a parsimonious way in the
current set-up .
An unemployed worker takes the wage offers posted by searching firms into
consideration and compares them with his reservation wage wRh,t. An unemployed
worker will only apply at a firm that makes a wage offer such that
(1− c)wOi,t,g > wRh,t, (2.7)
where wRh,t denotes the reservation wage of the worker and c ∈ [0, 1] captures the
commuting costs. If workers and employers are in the same region we have c = 0.
For simplicity it is assumed that workers commute to an employer outside their
own region rather than moving to that region, which means, in particular, that the
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worker consumes in his home region.6
The level of the reservation wage is determined by the current wage if the worker
is employed, and in case of an unemployed worker by his previous wage, where the
reservation wage declines with the duration of unemployment. The reservation wage
never falls below the level of unemployment benefits. If the unemployed worker
receives one or more job offers he accepts the job offer with the highest wage offer.
In case he does not receive any job offers he remains unemployed.
In case the workforce of a firm is too large relative to its target output level, the
firm adjusts its number of workers. Employees with low general skills are dismissed
first as those workers need longer to learn working with more advanced vintages.
Additionally, there is a small probability for each worker-employee match to be
separated in each period. This should capture job separations due to reasons not
explicitly modeled.
2.3.2.7 Consumption Goods Market Interaction
The consumption goods market is modeled as a decentralized goods market. Each
local market is represented by a mall at which the consumption goods producers
can offer and sell their products to their customers. While firms are free to serve all
malls regardless their spatial proximity, households always choose the mall which is
located in their region.
Households go shopping once a week and try to spend their entire weekly con-
sumption budget for one good. The consumption budget is determined using a
(piecewise) linear consumption rule according to the buffer-stock approach (see Allen
and Carroll, 2001; Carroll, 1997). At the beginning of their shopping procedure they
get information about the prices of all available goods at the mall, but they get no
information about the available quantities. The decision which good to buy is des-
cribed using a logit-choice model with strong empirical foundation in the Marketing
literature (see, e.g., Malhotra, 1984). An important parameter in this respect is
the coefficient of the price of a good in the logit choice function. This parameter,
denoted as γC , governs the price sensitivity of consumers and therefore the intensity
of competition between the consumption good producers. Qualitative features of
the economic dynamics are substantially influenced by changes in this parameter.
Therefore, we will check the robustness of our qualitative findings for variations of
this parameter.
The consumption requests for the different goods are collected by the mall and,
if the total demand for one good exceeds its mall inventory level then the mall has to
ration the demand. In this case the mall sets a rationing quota corresponding to the
percentage of the total demand that can be satisfied with the available goods. Each
household receives the indicated percentage of the requested consumption good.
After the shopping activity, rationed households may still have parts of their
consumption budget available. Those households have the opportunity to spend
the remaining budget for another good in a second shopping loop. In this case the
6Empirical evidence shows that even if workers move to the region of their employer a consider-
able part of their wage income is consumed in their home region due to remittances sent back. This
holds, in particular, for workers from low productivity countries which recently joined the EU. In
its report on employment and social conditions the European Commission (2011) informs that for
the new EU member states received remittances amount to at least 1.7% of GDP on average per
year [p.277]. Percentage-wise this almost matches the net population outflow from these countries
of 2.1% (between 2003 and 2010) [p.252]. This clearly suggests that a large fraction of the income
of the emigrants from these countries are channeled back as remittances.
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shopping process is repeated as described above.
The production of the consumption goods firm follows a fixed time schedule with
fixed production and delivery dates. Even if the mall stock is completely sold out
it can only be refilled at the fixed delivery date. Consequently, all the demand that
exceeds the expected value of the monthly sales plus the additional buffer cannot be
satisfied.
2.3.3 Parametrization and Validation
The aim of our parametrization and validation of the model is to establish confidence
in the ability of the model to capture economic mechanisms which are relevant for
real world economic dynamics. For parametrization we follow an approach that com-
bines direct estimation of parameters, for which empirical observations are available,
with an indirect calibration approach. Standard constellations have been identified,
where values of parameters are chosen to reflect empirical evidence whenever pos-
sible and where a large set of stylized facts can be reproduced. Furthermore, the
fact that the development of the Eurace@Unibi model follows as far as possible the
Management Science approach, briefly discussed above, provides empirical ground-
ing to individual decision rules, thereby addressing the important point of empirical
micro-foundations for modeled behavior.
The set of macroeconomic stylized facts that have been reproduced by the stan-
dard constellations of the Eurace@Unibi model includes persistent growth, low posi-
tive inflation and a number of important business cycle properties: persistent fluc-
tuations of output; pro-cyclical movement of employment, consumption and invest-
ment, where relative sizes of amplitudes qualitatively match those reported e.g. in
Stock and Watson (1999), counter-cyclical movement of wages and firm mark-ups.
On the industry level the model generates persistent heterogeneity in firm-size, profit
rates, productivity and prices in accordance with empirical observations reported e.g.
in Dosi et al. (1997). Also labor market regularities, like the Beveridge curve, are
reproduced by the model with benchmark parameter constellations. The reader is
referred to Dawid et al. (2012b) for a more detailed discussion of this issue. Tables
with the list of parameter values used in the simulations underlying this paper are
provided in the Online-Appendix.
2.4 Policy Analysis
2.4.1 General Setup, Method of Policy Evaluation, Policies Con-
sidered
Our policy experiments are concerned with the convergence between a high tech and
a low tech region in a two-region version of the model described above. Table 2.1
summarizes the initializations of the key variable for the two distinct regions R1 and
R2. At time t = 0 the quality of the capital stock in the high tech region R1 is set
to 1.5, and to 1.0 in the low tech region. The choice of the (adapting) specific skills
corresponds initially to the quality of the capital stock. In R1 80% of the workers
have high general skills, and the remaining part has low general skills. For R2 the
general skill distribution is inverted. The technological frontier at t = 0 is set to a
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Table 2.1: Initialization of capital stock and skills
Region 1 (R1): high tech Region 2 (R2): low tech
Initial quality of capital stock 1.5 1.0
Initial specific skills 1.5 1.0
General skill distribution 0.8/0.2 0.2/0.8
quality of 1.7 and afterwards grows at an annual rate of 1.8 percent.7
There is an initialization period of 10.000 iterations to avoid that results are
driven by transient adjustment processes due to the initial conditions imposed. Dur-
ing the initialization period the technological frontier does not evolve, firms only have
the option to buy the vintage with their initial technology, the consumption goods
market is open and the labor market is closed.
For any considered parameter setting the initialization period is run once and
all runs in the policy experiments start with the identical snapshot of the economy
after the initialization period. In the policy analysis we mimic the European Union
integration policies by introducing a subsidy scheme that influences firms’ investment
incentives, and by altering the general skill distributions in the two regions. More
specifically, we are running two policy experiments:
1. In what we are going to call the Human Capital Policy (HC) the general skill
level of R2 is upgraded to the general skill level of R1.
2. In what we are going to call Technology Policy (Tech) firms’ investments in
R2 are subsidized if equipment is bought from the technological frontier.
A more detailed description of the two policies is given below. Both the HC-policy
and the Tech-policy are applied to two scenarios. In one scenario labor markets
in the two regions are fully integrated. This means that workers face only small
commuting costs (c = 0.05). In the second scenario, labor markets are separated
implying that working in the region other than the own residence region causes
prohibitively high commuting costs (c = 1).
In each of the two scenarios (c = 0.05 and c = 1) we consider three treatments
in addition to the base scenario: only HC-policy, only Tech-policy and both poli-
cies. For each of the four cases 15 runs are conducted, with each run encompassing
750 months. The time series are pooled and the policy effects are estimated using
penalized spline methods (see, e.g., Kauermann et al., 2009). More technically, the
isolated effects and the interacted effects of the policies are evaluated with
Yt,p,i = s(t) + I[p(HC)=1]sHC(t) + I[p(Tech)=1]sTech(t) + I[p(HC)=p(Tech)=1]sInt(t)
+η0i + η
1
i t+ εt,p,i, (2.8)
where Yt,p,i is the outcome variable at iteration t, for policy p, and run i. The baseline
spline is s(t) to which the policy splines are added with dummy variables I indicating
if the policy is turned on or off. The linear term involving η0i and η
1
i captures run-
specific random effects and εt,p,i is the error term. The standard deviation of the
7Although we do not have a particular pair of countries in mind for the simulation analysis, the
choice of the relative closeness of the two regions to the technological frontier follows the findings
in Growiec (2008) who compares the production possibility frontier of Germany and Poland, and
the estimates for productivity growth for Germany in the nineties as documented in Deutsche
Bundesbank (2003).
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Figure 2.1: The evolution of output (a) integrated labor markets, (b) separated
labor markets (black line: R1; red line R2)
spline estimates will also be plotted in the figures in order to illustrate significance
of the different policy effects over time.8
2.4.2 Baseline Simulation With No Policies
With no policy treatment we get output trajectories as shown in Figure 2.1. The left
panel refers to an integrated labor market and the right hand panel to a separated
labor market with high commuting costs. There is no difference in the initial output
level gap between the two regions across the two scenarios. As time elapses, however,
completely different growth patterns emerge. For the high tech region R1 (black
line) output grows constantly and almost quadruples until the end of the simulation
period. The low tech region R2 (red line) experiences a drop in output and eventually
recovers showing relatively low output growth. Overall, there is strong divergence
of regional output levels. With separated labor markets, output increases in both
regions but output growth is stronger in the high tech region, again leading to
diverging output levels, although less extreme than in the integrated labor market
scenario. Toward the end of the simulation output is lower in region 1 and higher in
region 2 for closed labor markets as compared to integrated labor markets. Looking
step by step into the evolution of the technologies, prices, and labor flow patterns
will reveal the economic mechanism behind the results for the baseline simulation
with no policies.
Figure 2.2 plots the trajectories for the exogenously evolving technological fron-
tier, and the average technology used by firms for the two regions. Again, the left
panel refers to an integrated labor market and the right panel to separated labor
markets. For integrated labor markets, the gap between the technological frontier
and average technology employed by firms for region 1 (black line) increases over
time. As the gap stays approximately constant for region 2, average quality of
technology employed in region 2 approaches that in region 1. For separated labor
markets, region 1 stays closer to the technological frontier than with integrated labor
markets. Moreover, region 2’s technology gap to the frontier is increasing so that in
8All figures are based on estimations using the R function gamm() from the package mgcv (see,
e.g., Wood, 2011). Although residuals in our estimation show some autocorrelation we abstain from
estimating a computationally much more intensive and less stable model with AR(p) structure of
the noise terms. Krivobokova and Kauermann (2007) have shown that the spline estimations are
robust with respect to misspecified correlation structures, and therefore no qualitative changes of
our results should be expected even if a model with more elaborated correlation structure would be
used.
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Figure 2.2: The evolution of technologies (a) integrated labor markets, (b) separated
labor markets (green line: technological frontier; black line: average technology used
in R1; red line: average technology used in R2)
this scenario the technological advantage of the firms in region 1 increases over time.
Average technology actually used is closely related to the evolution of the output
levels shown before.
The catch-up of average quality of technology employed in region 2 in the scenario
of integrated labor markets is a consequence of two factors, which are both driven by
the strong (initial) reduction in output produced in region 2. First, as can be seen by
considering the dynamics of the distribution of firm output in a region (not reported
here), the downturn in region 2 has a strong selection effect in that region. Only
a few firms survive, namely those that due to early high vintage choices have the
best capital stocks, and they produce only small quantities. Those firms in region
2 which have a capital stock of relatively low quality disappear from the market
because the wages they have to offer in order to attract workers are too high relative
to their effective productivity. This induces that the prices these firms charge are
too high to be competitive. The second factor is that, given the low total output in
region 2, the few surviving firms only use the qualitatively more advanced vintages.
Whereas firms in region 1, given relatively high output, make also use of the older
vintages, which reduces the average quality of technology. Thus, the relatively high
quality of the capital stock in region 2 for integrated labor markets is a consequence
of firm selection and the loss in aggregate demand for firms in this region which, as
we explain now, is driven by relative prices that change due to labor market flows.
Output patterns can be traced down to relative demand for products produced
in region 1 and 2. These relative demands are a function of the relative prices that
firms from region 1 and 2 charge. As Figure 2.3 reveals, prices of products from
region 2 are higher than those from firms in region 1 for the open labor market
scenario, which explains the strongly diverging output patterns. With labor costs
making up a considerably large share of production costs, and prices being set as a
mark-up on unit costs, we can relate the price pattern to the labor flows which arise
as regional labor markets are opened. Figure 2.4 plots numbers of workers with low
general skills (left panel) and high general skills (right panel) for integrated labor
markets. One sees, that there is a significant drop in the number of workers, both
high skill and low skill, in region 2. Early on firms in region 2 have to increase their
base wage offer in order to attract workers in spite of the lower productivity implied
by the lower quality of their capital stock. This increases their unit costs and further
deepens their competitive disadvantage. However, starting approximately at month
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Figure 2.3: The evolution of mean prices (a) integrated labor markets, (b) separated
labor markets (black line: R1; red line R2)
150, the few firms in region 2 have reached a wage level that enables them to attract
more and more high general skill workers. This reinforces their incentives to invest
in high vintages and they are able to close the gap to region 1 with respect to the
quality of their capital stock. Eventually, at about period 400 the need for additional
base wage increases vanishes for firms in region 2 due to the positive evolution of the
productivity and the diverging pattern between the regions with respect to prices
stops. Output produced and sold by the firms in region 2 starts increasing and the
growth of the output gap between the regions becomes smaller (see Figure 2.1 (a)).
The return movement of low skilled workers induced by this expansion in region 2
however then negatively affects the skill mix in region 2, which reduces incentives
for firms to invest in new technologies. This stops the technological catch-up process
by region 2 and the output gap increases again.
As can be seen in panel (b) of Figure 2.3, for separated labor markets the produc-
tivity advantage of firms in region 1 does not translate to a competitive advantage
for this region. In this scenario wages in region 2 stay below the level in region 1
such that unit costs in both regions are approximately equal. The observation that
nevertheless total output produced in region 1 is higher than that produced in region
2 can be explained by the larger production capacity of firms in region 1. The initial
advantage of region 1 in this respect is never eliminated in the absence of a price
advantage of either of the two regions. The costs for firms in region 2 associated
with an expansion of their capacity would be so high such that an induced compe-
titive disadvantage would result for these firms. Due to the pricing and production
planning rules of the firms they realize this and abstain from expansion such that
the initial capacity advantage for region 1 (which stems from the larger productivity
of capital in that region) is cemented.
Overall, the baseline simulations show that in the absence of any cohesion policy
measures region 2 does not catch-up to region 1 either with respect to output or to
technology in both considered labor market scenarios.
2.4.3 Effect of Human Capital Policy
First we examine the dynamic effects of the human capital policy. We assume that
the policy is implemented at the point in time where the two regions enter their
economic union (t = 0), but, since the build-up of human capital takes time, the
effects of the policy become apparent only after a delay of ten years. At t = 120
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Figure 2.4: Commuters for integrated labor markets (a) low general skill, (b) high
general skill (black line: workers from R1 working in R1; red line: workers from R2
working in R2; blue line: workers from R1 commuting to R2; green line: workers
from R2 commuting to R1).
the distribution of general skills in region 2 becomes identical to that of region 1.9
Clearly the assumption that the gap in general skills can be completely closed by
the human capital policy within ten years is very strong, but since we are mainly
interested in understanding the qualitative differences in the policy effects in different
economic environments, an exact quantification of the policy strength is of minor
concern to us.
Figure 2.5 shows the effect of the HC-policy output in both regions for integrated
and separated labor markets as estimated by the penalized spline model discussed
above (i.e. we show the estimated splines sHC(t) in both scenarios). The policy
effect is strikingly different, depending on whether the labor market is integrated
or not. With an integrated labor market the effect on output in the target region
2 is negative, whereas output in region 1 is positively affected. These effects are
not transitory, rather they seem to become more substantial as time evolves. A
very different picture emerges in the scenario with separated labor markets. In
this case the policy has no significant effect for an initial time interval (t = 120 to
approximately t = 200), but afterward leads to an increase in the output produced
in region 2, whereas the output in region 1 is negatively affected. Aggregating over
both regions it can be observed that the effect of the HC-policy on total output in
both regions is positive, and that the effect is much stronger if labor markets are
separated. Hence, spatial frictions, preventing the free allocation of workers across
regions, positively affect the overall effects of this policy.
The negative output effect of the HC-policy in region 2 arises from two counter-
vailing forces. As intended by the HC-policy improving the workers general skills has
a positive effect on firms productivity through the vintage choice. Firms in region
2 become more productive due to easier access to workers with high general skills.
Figure 2.6 depicts the estimated effect of the HC-policy on the ratio of average vin-
tage choice and general skills, respectively, between firms in region 2 and region 1.10
The two lines (plus standard deviation bands) in each panel describe the effects of
9For reasons of simplicity it is assumed that all individuals upgrade their skill exactly at t = 120.
A more gradual skill upgrading over time would be more realistic, but would not qualitatively alter
the effects we identify. The set of individuals who upgrade their skill is selected randomly.
10Technically speaking equation (2.8) is estimated for Yt,p,i =
v¯c2t,p,i
v¯c1t,p,i
, where v¯crt,p,i denotes the
average vintage choice at time t of all firms in region r in run i under policy p.
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Figure 2.5: The effect of the human capital policy on output for (a) integrated labor
markets, (b) separated labor markets (black line: R1, red line: R2).
the policy in the scenario with integrated and separated labor markets, respectively.
A positive sign of the estimated effect means that due to the HC policy the average
value of the considered variable in region 2 has increased relative to region 1. Panel
(a) of this figure shows that the average vintage choice of firms in region 2 increases
relative to the the choice of firms in region 1 as a response to the HC-policy. The
policy effect is, furthermore, larger for separated than for integrated labor markets.
However, the policy sparks another indirect mechanism that overcompensates the
positive effect on vintage choices so that the overall effect on investment becomes
negative. Let us turn to this more involved second effect now.
As the policymakers improve general skills in region 2, the relative endowment
of region 2 with high general skills improves. This is less so if labor markets are
integrated, see Figure 2.6 (panel (b)), because high skilled workers from region 2
get job offers from firms in region 1 that net of commuting costs improve their
earnings. High skilled workers from region 2 therefore eventually work in region
1. As a result, firms in region 2 have problems filling their vacancies. They start
making higher wage offers. Figure 2.7 (panel (a)) shows that wage offers of firms
in region 2 relative to wage offers of firms in region 1 increase as a response to the
HC-policy for integrated labor markets. It decreases for separated labor markets as
the HC-policy increased the supply of high skilled workers in region 2 relative to
region 1. As labor costs constitute a considerable share of firms’ production costs,
unit costs for firms in region 2 relative to region 1 increase for integrated labor
markets, and decrease for separated labor markets, see panel (b) of Figure 2.7. The
unfortunate effect on relative unit costs for region 2 with integrated labor markets
ceases around period 500. However, firms in region 2 react to the alignment of
costs between the two regions by an increase in mark-ups rather than by a decrease
in price (see panel (d) of Figure 2.7). The reason for this is that firms in region 2
anticipate that the expansion corresponding to substantial own price decreases would
be associated with considerable investments (which are not needed by the firms in
region 1, which already have larger production capacities) and hence maximization
of their estimated discounted profit streams yields substantial increases in mark-ups
when their costs converge toward those of firms in region 1. Overall, region 2 suffers
from a loss of competitiveness as a result of the improvement of the skills of its
labor force when labor markets are integrated. Charging higher prices than firms
in the competing region 1, firms in region 2 are losing demand. As lower output
is produced also investments and the diffusion of new vintages decrease so that the
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Figure 2.6: The relative effect of the human capital policy on (a) vintage choice
and (b) general skill mix, computed as the effect on the ratio of variable values
from Region 2 to that from Region 1 (black line: integrated labor market, red line:
separated labor markets).
overall effect on the productivity weighted capital stock11 is negative in the region
at which the policy is targeted for integrated labor markets (Figure 2.8 (a)). The
observation that due to labor flows a policy improving the general skills of (local)
inhabitants might have negative effects on growth in regions where productivity is
relatively small is consistent with empirical results reported in Aghion et al. (2009).
Summarizing, we observe that the HC-policy only has the intended effect of
fostering convergence if the spatial labor market frictions are large. In case that
labor is mobile across borders the policy has detrimental effects for the target region
2 with respect to output and technological development since the indirect negative
effect stemming from the deterioration of the relative competitiveness of region 2
firms dominates the direct positive effect on vintage choices induced by the skill
upgrading of the local labor force.
2.4.4 Effect of Technology Policy
Quite a different picture emerges compared to our discussion in the previous subsec-
tion if we consider the implications of the Tech-policy. Under the Tech-policy a firm
which invests in physical capital of the highest vintage that is available at the time of
the purchase receives a public subsidy in the amount of 5% of its investment. When
deciding about their vintage choice firms take that subsidy into account. In their
vintage choice rule the price is reduced for the vintage on the frontier accordingly.
This distorts the vintage choice of firms in the target region in favor of the best
available vintage. As can be seen in Figure 2.9 by adding up the splines capturing
the policy effects in the two regions, total output in the economy increases. However,
a targeted technology policy leads to an increase in output produced in region 2,
no matter whether the labor market is integrated or separated. The effect is much
stronger if labor markets are integrated and in this scenario there is a significant
negative effect on output in region 1, which is not present under separated labor
markets.
For separated labor markets the effects of the Tech-policy are qualitatively very
similar to the effect of the HC-policy. The two policies are close substitutes. This
11The productivity weighted capital stock is a measure that captures the size and the quality of
the capital stock of a firm. It is computed as a weighted sum of the capital with vintage specific
productivities Av used as weights, i.e.
∑Vt
v=1 A
vKvi,t.
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Figure 2.7: The relative effect of the human capital policy on (a) base wage offers,
(b) unit costs, (c) prices and (d) mark ups, computed as the effect on the ratio of
variable values from Region 2 to that from Region 1 (black line: integrated labor
market, red line: separated labor market)
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Figure 2.8: The effect of the human capital policy on the productivity weighted
capital stocks for (a) integrated labor markets, (b) separated labor markets (black
line: R1, red line: R2).
holds not only for the output dynamics, but also for variables like quality of capital,
vintage choice and price. In our discussion we will, therefore, concentrate on the
effects of the Tech-policy under integrated labor markets.
Figure 2.10 shows for this scenario the implications of the introduction of a
Tech-policy for the dynamics of ratios between region 2 and region 1 for vintage
choice, average quality of capital, general skills, as well as the average price of
the consumption goods. The direct effect of the policy, namely an increase in the
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Figure 2.9: Effect of the Tech-policy on output in region 1 (black line) and region 2
(red line) for (a) integrated labor markets and (b) separated labor markets.
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Figure 2.10: The relative effect of the technology policy on (a) vintage choice and
(b) average quality of the capital stock and (c) general skills of workers employed in
a region and (d) average price posted by firms, computed as the the effect on the
ratio of variable values from Region 2 to that from Region 1 (black line: integrated
labor market, red line: separated labor market)
vintage choice of firms in region 2, can be clearly seen in panel (a) of this figure.
In particular, this figure shows that the vintage choice in region 2 goes up relative
to that of region 1, which means that the gap in terms of quality of newly acquired
machines is reduced. As shown in panel (b) this results in an increase in the relative
quality of the capital stock used by firms in region 2. The improvement of the quality
of the capital stock induces that firms in region 2 are better able to keep workers
with high general skills in their region (see panel (c)), such that the technology
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Figure 2.11: Comparison of the effect of the targeted (black line) and non-targeted
(red line) Tech-policy on output in (a) region 1 and (b) region 2, for integrated labor
markets.
policy also has a positive effect on the human capital stock in region 2. This policy,
although not explicitly targeted at human capital upgrading, is able to improve the
level of human capital employed in region 2 relative to region 1. Also in this respect
the policy performs better than the HC-policy whose explicit aim is to improve
the human capital endowment in region 2. The improved quality of physical and
human capital employed in region 2 leads to a reduction in the price gap between
the two regions (panel (d)) and thereby improves the competitiveness of region 2
leading to the observed positive effect on output produced by region 2 firms. The
higher competitiveness of region 2 comes at the expense of firms in region 1, whose
output actually goes down. Considering the isolated effect of the policy on region
1 variables shows a negative effect on vintage choice and average capital quality for
that region, which is due to the increase in attractiveness of high vintages for region
2 firms, thereby inducing an increase in relative prices of these vintages.
The technology policy considered in our analysis so far is targeted, in a sense that
firms only receive price subsidies if they acquire the highest available vintage. In
practice such a targeted policy might be difficult to implement, since it is not easily
verifiable whether an acquired machine is indeed at the technological frontier of the
considered industry. Hence, one might wonder whether it is essential that price
subsidies are targeted to the best vintages. Similarly to the considered Tech-policy
general investment subsidies could be introduced, where firms receive a 5% subsidy
on all acquisitions of physical capital. Such a measure should foster investment,
thereby inducing a faster diffusion of new technologies, as well as reduce firms’ unit
costs and costs of expansion, which should lead to lower prices and larger output
by region 2 firms. Figure 2.11 shows however that such a policy has a much weaker
effect on output in both regions. In the absence of the stimulation of high vintage
choices in region 2 the quality of capital does not increase as much as under the
targeted technology policy and the fraction of high skilled workers in the region is
not as high. The competitive disadvantage of region 2 with respect to unit costs,
which can be completely eliminated with a targeted technology policy is reduced
but not eliminated with an untargeted version of the policy.12 This shows that it is
indeed important that investment subsidies are targeted in a way that the incentives
of firms to acquire new vintages are increased.
12The time series data from simulations backing these observations are available from the authors
on request.
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Figure 2.12: Comparison of interaction effects for (a) integrated and (b) separated
labor markets. (black line region 1, red line region 2)
2.4.5 Interaction Effects
We conclude the analysis of the effects of HC- and Tech-policies on regional conver-
gence by considering the interaction effects between the two policies. Intuitively, the
relationship between the two policies is not obvious. Both aim at the improvement
of the technological level, specific skills and productivity of firms in region 2 and,
therefore, could be considered as substitutes. On the other hand, the complemen-
tarity between physical and human capital captured in our model suggests that the
impact of each policy might increase if combined with the other one.
As can be seen in Figure 2.12 it indeed depends on the size of the spatial labor
market frictions whether the interaction effect between the policies with respect
to output in region 2 is positive or negative. For integrated labor markets the
interaction effect is positive for region 1 but negative for the target region 2. The
interaction effect becomes significant only after a delay of about 400 periods, which
is due to the fact that the introduction of the Tech-policy affects output in the two
regions only after a considerable delay (see Figure 2.9). In light of our discussion
above about the effects of both policies under integrated labor markets this shape
of the interaction effect is quite intuitive. In Section 2.4.3 it was pointed out that
with an integrated labor market the HC-policy leads to a substantial reduction
of investments in region 2 compared to the benchmark case without policy. This
reduction in investment reduces the positive effect of the Tech-policy, which explains
the negative interaction effect for region 2. Since firms in region 1 profit from this
weakening of the increase in productivity of region 2 firms, we obtain a positive
interaction effect in region 1. In the case of separated labor markets, as discussed
above, both policies have a positive effect on output in the target region. Panel (b)
of Figure 2.12 shows that there is a negative interaction effect, which in this scenario
indicates a certain degree of substitutability between the policies. The intuition for
this substitutive relationship is that the HC-policy already increases the incentives
for firms in region 2 to invest in high vintages, which reduces the positive effect of
the Tech-policy. Hence a negative interaction effect results.
2.4.6 Robustness of Qualitative Findings
Our discussion of the effects of the HC and the Tech-policy was based on simulations
carried out for our default parameter setting and two labor market scenarios, namely
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Figure 2.13: Effects of a variation of commuting costs on the evolution of output
((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the human capital policy ((c) and (d)), and the
effectiveness of the technology policy ((e) and (f)) in Region 1 (left column) and
Region 2 (right column).
c = 0.05 and c = 1. We have carried out substantial robustness checks to confirm
that the qualitative findings stay intact also if we vary the parameters within a
reasonable range. The robustness of the results with respect to changes in the most
important parameters are briefly discussed in this subsection.
In Figure 2.13 we show the spline estimates of the evolution of output without
policy, of the impact of the HC policy, and the impact of the Tech-policy in the two
regions for values of the commuting costs varying between c = 0.05 and c = 0.5. We
restrict attention to this interval because c = 0.5 corresponds already to a de-facto
separated labor market, and hence there are virtually no effects of varying c in the
interval [0.5, 1]. To keep the graphs readable we abstain from showing the standard
deviations for the shown spline estimates. From panels (a) and (b) it can be clearly
seen that in the absence of policies the output in region 1 is monotonically decreasing
and output in region 2 monotonously increasing with respect to the commuting costs
for any considered time t, but the effect becomes much more pronounced in the
long run. Considering the effect of the HC-policy the figure shows that the negative
implications of the policy in the target region for the case of integrated labor markets
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apply to values of the commuting costs up to approximately c = 0.15. In this range
the effect for region 1 is positive as discussed above. Only for commuting costs above
this level is region 2 positively affected by the policy, where the positive effects is
strongest for a scenario where spatial labor market frictions are considerable, but
markets are not fully separated. Also the qualitative findings concerning the effects
of the Tech-policy are confirmed. The effect is positive in region 2 and negative in
region 1, where the sizes of these effects decrease as spatial labor market frictions
increase.
We have carried out numerous robustness checks with respect to variations of
other parameters, in order to check whether the key qualitative findings – in par-
ticular the observations that the HC-policy has negative effects for integrated and
positive effects for separated labor markets in the target region, whereas effects of
the Tech-policy are always positive – stay intact. Robustness of this kind could be
confirmed for all considered parameters. In the Appendix we present such robustness
checks for five additional key parameters.
Finally, one may wonder whether our qualitative findings remain valid if the
policies are financed by taxes raised in the economy and also whether the type of
fiscal policy used influences the policy effects. Our current setup does not allow
to fully address this issue because no market for the acquisition of general skills is
modeled. Therefore, we lack a measure for how costly the upgrading of the general
skills is in our policy experiment, which makes it impossible to introduce endogenous
tax-based financing of the HC-policy. Nevertheless, no matter how the costs of the
HC-policy would look like, the qualitative differences between effects of Tech- and
HC-policies would not change in a version of the model with endogenous policy
financing. In any case, endogenizing the financing of the discussed policies would be
an interesting extension of the present paper.
2.5 Discussion and Conclusion
In this paper we have used the agent-based macroeconomic Eurace@Unibi model to
analyze in how far two types of cohesion policies, which are inspired by measures
applied by the European Union, are suitable to foster convergence between regions
that differ with respect to their initial endowments in the quality of physical and
human capital. We have shown that both types of policies have the intended effects
as long as labor is sufficiently immobile. With integrated labor markets the human
capital policy has detrimental output effects for the region at which the policy is
targeted. Technology policy, implemented through subsidies for acquisition of phy-
sical capital is effective, and particularly so if the subsidy is targeted and only paid
if firms invest in vintages at the technological frontier. Clearly, these findings bear
strong policy implications suggesting that convergence may be better achieved by a
change in the policy mix taking into account that human capital policies will less
likely contribute to the convergence of regions as labor market integration is inten-
sified. Moreover, it suggests that technology policies need to be accompanied with
measures to improve absorptive capacities of the targeted regions to make sure that
capital from the technological frontier is subsidized.
We have explored the mechanisms underlying the different policy effects and
shown that these effects are driven by the interplay of firms’ vintage choices and
investment decisions. While the former is a straightforward and expected outcome
of the policies, the latter is the product of an economic mechanism resulting from
the cohesion policies that affect the evolution of relative output through changes in
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regions’ competitiveness which in turn result from the dynamics of the (general and
specific) skill levels of workers in the two regions. It turns out that for HC-policies the
indirect effect on investments arising through the reduction in the regions’ competi-
tiveness is so strong that the policy has a negative effect on (productivity weighted)
capital stock and output in the target region for integrated labor markets.
To put these findings into perspective it should be pointed out that firms in
the two regions are actually identical in many respects. The firms share the same
production functions, households share the same rules determining their savings,
their consumption decision etc. and apart from the subsidies introduced in the
framework of the Tech-policy the public (fiscal) policies are the same in both regions.
In the baseline scenario the two regions differ only with respect to the initial quality
of the physical capital stock, with respect to the initial distribution of specific skills
in the two regions and with respect to the general skill distributions. Since the first
two of these three items refer to initial values of endogenous variables of the model,
the only structural difference between the two regions is the difference with respect
to general skills.
This asymmetry disappears once the HC-policy, which makes the general skill
distribution in region 2 equal to that of region 1, is introduced. Considering the
long run equilibrium balanced growth path of this two-region economy one would
therefore expect that regardless of the spatial labor market frictions the two regions
grow at the same rate. Furthermore, according to such an analysis, the effect of the
HC-policy would always be positive for region 2 regardless of the amount of labor
market frictions. The analysis in this paper also takes into account the short and
medium run implications of the policies, which arguably for many issues is the most
relevant time-frame for policy evaluation. We obtain much richer and more differ-
entiated insights into the effects of the considered policy measures. In particular,
the fact that the economic dynamics of the two regions is explicitly simulated allows
to capture path dependencies, which in this framework are crucial for the under-
standing of the policy implications in the different considered scenarios. These path
dependencies, which hinge on the interplay of firms’ stocks of physical and human
capital with their vintage choices, investment decisions and worker movements be-
tween firms, generate obstacles to overcome the initial regional asymmetry and leads
to a diversion of positive policy effects from the target region toward the high tech
region 1. Overall, these findings illustrate the merits of an agent-based approach for
the analysis of effects of different policy measures and their combination in different
time-frames.
2.A Appendix
2.A.1 Robustness Checks
In this appendix we show the robustness of our findings with respect to a variation
of five specific parameters of the model. Two of which have a considerable impact on
the simulation outcome. These two parameters, the price sensitivity of consumers
and the speed of change of the technological frontier, have been identified in extensive
experiments with the model as the parameters that have the largest impact on the
qualitative properties of the simulation dynamics. Hence we report our robustness
checks with respect to these two parameters here. Additionally, we show robustness
checks for the depreciation rate of capital, the discount rate applied to the effective
productivity of an investment good, and the replacement rate of unemployment
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benefits. Effects of those three parameter variations turned out to be much weaker.
The first considered parameter specifies the price sensitivity in the consumption
choice problem of households. The decision which good to purchase is modeled as a
logit model where the probability to buy a particular good depends on its relative
price. The weight of the price in the logit function, which can also be interpreted
as the intensity of choice, is given by the parameter γC . Varying this parameter
changes the strength of how households react to price changes and thus it deter-
mines the scope for price changes of individual firms and the overall competitiveness
on the consumption goods market. In the experiment we use a value of γC = 9.0
that is associated with a medium level of competitiveness. For the robustness check
this parameter is varied within a range between 7.0 and 11.0, which is a range
in accordance with empirical estimations obtained for consumption good markets
(see Krishnamruthi and Raj, 1988). Figure 2.14 shows how the variation of this
parameter affects the evolution of the regional output in the initially less developed
region 2 and how the variation of the parameter influences the effectiveness of the
human capital and technology policy in this region. It can be clearly seen that the
qualitative features worked out for the default parameter setting, namely that the
effect of the HC-policy is negative for integrated and positive for separated labor
markets, whereas the effect of the Tech-policy is positive in both labor market sce-
narios stay intact for the entire considered range of the parameter γC . An interesting
additional observation is that the size of the negative respectively positive impact
of the policies under an integrated labor market goes down if the consumption good
market becomes more competitive. The intuition for this observation is that in such
a strongly competitive environment the weaker region 2 shows almost no growth
without policy (see panel (a)), which, on the one hand, means that there is little to
lose by the ill-suited application of the HC-policy. On the other hand, even with the
help of the Tech-policy, the growth in region 2 is very slow in the presence of the
intensive competition of firms from region 1.
The second parameter with a strong impact on the simulations is the speed of
technological change. As described in Section 2.3.2.4 the development of improved
capital goods is the result of a stochastic process, where with an exogenously given
probability a new vintage emerges whose productivity is improved by ∆qinv com-
pared to the previous best practice technology. In the experiments, we use identical
realizations of the stochastic innovation process in order to avoid spurious growth
effects due to different dynamics of the frontier. To check the robustness of the po-
licy analysis with respect to different speeds of technological growth, we keep using
the same realization of the stochastic process determining the period when inno-
vations take place, but vary the parameter for the productivity progress ∆qinv at
each innovation step within a range of 0.0 and 0.07. Thereby, a value of 0.0 means
no technological progress. In the policy experiments we use a value of 0.05 that
translates to an average productivity growth of the frontier by 1.8% per annum.
Figure 2.15 shows the impact on the output evolution and the policy effectiveness
in region 2. Again, it can be clearly seen that all qualitative effects of the policies
in the entire interval correspond to those observed in our default setting.
The remaining three parameters are the depreciation rate δ that was set to a
monthly value of 0.01 in the simulations, the discount rate ρ = 0.02, and the re-
placement rate for unemployment benefits u = 0.7. For the robustness test we varied
the monthly depreciation rate between 0.004 and 0.012. The range captures what
national accounts report for capital depreciation rates. The monthly discount rate
was varied between 0.005 and 0.04, and finally, the replacement rate was increased
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from 0.6 to 0.8 which covers the range of typical net replacement rates for OECD
countries. The results for the robustness checks for those three parameters are shown
in Figures 2.16, 2.17, and 2.18, respectively. Figure 2.16 shows that for integrated
labor markets and very low levels of capital depreciation the downturn in region
2 leads to an almost complete absence of investment in that region. Hence, both
policy effects are very minor. Overall, the qualitative effects of the policies corre-
spond to the ones which we report in our analysis where we use the default settings.
In conclusion, variation of all five parameters suggests that our main findings are
robust with respect to parameter specifications.
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Figure 2.14: Effects of a variation of households’ price sensitivity on the evolution
of output without policy ((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the human capital policy
((c) and (d)), and the effectiveness of the technology policy ((e) and (f)) in the
lagging Region 2 for integrated (left column) and separated (right column) labor
markets.
Economic convergence 60
Months
200
400
600
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 ch
an
ge
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
output
200
400
600
800
Main Effect
Months
200
400
600
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 ch
an
ge
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
output
800
1000
1200
1400
1600
1800
Main Effect
(a) (b)
Months
200
400
600
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 ch
an
ge
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
output
−600
−400
−200
0
HC Effect
Months
200
400
600
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 ch
an
ge
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
output
0
500
1000
HC Effect
(c) (d)
Months
200
400
600
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 ch
an
ge
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
output
0
200
400
600
800
Tech Effect
Months
200
400
600
pr
od
uc
tiv
ity
 ch
an
ge
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
output
0
100
200
300
400
500
600
Tech Effect
(e) (f)
Figure 2.15: Effects of a variation of the speed of technological change on the evo-
lution of output without policy ((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the human capital
policy ((c) and (d)), and the effectiveness of the technology policy ((e) and (f)) in
the lagging Region 2 for integrated (left column) and separated (right column) labor
markets.
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Figure 2.16: Effects of a variation of the depreciation rate on the evolution of output
without policy ((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the human capital policy ((c) and
(d)), and the effectiveness of the technology policy ((e) and (f)) in the lagging Region
2 for integrated (left column) and separated (right column) labor markets.
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Figure 2.17: Effects of a variation of the discount rate on the evolution of output
without policy ((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the human capital policy ((c) and
(d)), and the effectiveness of the technology policy ((e) and (f)) in the lagging Region
2 for integrated (left column) and separated (right column) labor markets.
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Figure 2.18: Effects of a variation of the unemployment insurance replacement rate
on the evolution of output without policy ((a) and (b)), the effectiveness of the
human capital policy ((c) and (d)), and the effectiveness of the technology policy
((e) and (f)) in the lagging Region 2 for integrated (left column) and separated (right
column) labor markets.
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Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth
Chapter 3
Stabilization Policies and Long
Term Growth: Policy
Implications from an
Agent-based Macroeconomic
Model
3.1 Introduction
The recent world economic crisis marks the deepest downturn in the postwar era.
Triggered by the subprime mortgage crisis in the United States that evolved into a
world financial liquidity crisis, the recession affected the entire world economy, with
greater detriment to some countries than others. According to OECD statistics,
the U.S. economy declined by 3.5% from the first quarter in 2008 to the second
quarter in 2009, whereas Japan recorded a contraction of 8.0%. In the area of the
European monetary union, economic activity fell by 5.1% and in Germany as the
biggest economy in the Euro area, the GDP declined by 6.3% in the same period
(see OECD, 2010b). The severe economic contraction forced many governments to
take appropriate countermeasures, where retrospectively discretionary fiscal policies
turned out to be a central tool to counteract the recession. In fact, the U.S. ad-
ministration enacted economic stimulus packages in the years 2008 and 2009 that
accounted for 5.6% of the GDP in 2008. For Japan and Germany, the sizes of the
economic recovery plans were slightly lower but with 4.7% for Japan and 3.2% for
Germany still remarkable (see OECD, 2010a).
Stabilization policies that aim at alleviating the effects of economic downturns
have been the focus of a passionate decades-long dispute in macroeconomics that
yet remains to be resolved. For a long time, the central question of this debate had
been whether stabilization policies are an effective tool to smooth business cycles.
The endogenous growth theory and its implication that any type of shock - be it
temporary or permanent, real or nominal - can have permanent effects in the long
run opened a new perspective: the link between short-term volatility and long-
term growth. Inspired by this new perspective, a strand of the subsequent growth
literature dealt with the question of whether stabilization policies will reduce or
enhance long-term growth. A drawback of a large part of this literature is, however,
that it has paid less attention to incorporating a concrete stabilization policy to check
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whether the policy itself introduces implications for long-term growth. Instead of
incorporating policies in the analysis, conclusions regarding the connection between
stabilization policies and long-term growth have been solely derived from considering
the link between short-term volatility and long-term growth. And in the sparse
attempts that have explicitly accounted for stabilization policies, the explanation
of the direction of possible long-term effects of stabilization policies has focused on
either the modeling approach of endogenous technological change or the source of
shocks driving the short-term volatility.
The concern of this paper is the important, but largely neglected, question
whether the design of fiscal stabilization policies matters for the long-term effects
of the policies. We use a closed agent-based macroeconomic model that generates
endogenous business cycles to show that alternative fiscal policies can have different
implications for long-term growth. Therefore, we run policy experiments in which
three distinct fiscal policy measures are applied to mitigate the amplitude of the
business cycle. The first policy provides consumption subsidies to households and
the two other policies provide investment subsidies to firms. The difference between
the investment subsidies is that the one policy subsidizes any investment in the
physical capital stock and the other only those that flow in the most up-to-date
technology. We can show that all policies are equally effective in smoothing busi-
ness cycles but they substantially differ in their implications for long-term growth.
In particular, the technology subsidy is associated with a strong positive effect on
long-term growth while the consumption subsidy leads only to a weak positive effect.
And for the investment subsidy, even a negative effect on the growth rate can be
observed.
The policies analyzed in the experiments are stylized instances of policies that
have actually been used by the U.S. government during the crisis. In the Economic
Stimulus Act of 2008, the U.S. administration of President George W. Bush put
together a stabilizing program that consisted of basically three main packages.1
The largest package contained a $100 billion tax rebate program for households.
First estimates show that these tax rebates led to a stimulus of aggregate demand
of 0.5 to 1.0% in the second quarter of 2008 and 0.16 to 1.81% in the third quarter
of 2008 (see Broda and Parker, 2012). The other two packages contained business
provisions that aimed at encouraging investments by increased limits on expensing
investment costs and accelerated depreciation for some investments. According to
estimations of the U.S. Congress, the investment enhancing policy reduced the tax
revenue by $51 billion in fiscal 2008 and 2009. Since the claims for depreciation were
only anticipated, revenues have risen by $43.5 billion in the subsequent years; but
the net effect might still be $7.5 billion. The American Recovery and Reinvestment
Act of 2009 was signed into law by President Barack Obama as a follow up program
of the Economic Stimulus Act. This package had a total size of $900 billion and
provided also tax cuts ($275 billion) and increased existing programs. But in contrast
to its predecessor, some of the measures contained in the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act had a strong focus on encouraging the technological advance of
the U.S. economy.2 Besides expending $15 billion directly for scientific facilities
and research, it provided over $30 billion for investments in renewable energy and
smart grid power networks as well as $7 billion for expanding broadband internet
access. This government money was designated to flow to both the private sector
1See, e.g., http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/background/stimulus/2008.
cfm (accessed on March, 29th, 2014).
2See, e.g., http://www.recovery.gov/Pages/default.aspx (accessed on March, 29th, 2014)
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and directly to federal, state, and local government.
The importance of discretionary fiscal policies during the economic crisis does
not correspond with the role that fiscal policy has recently played in contemporary
macroeconomics. Going back in economic history, fiscal policy had been the central
macroeconomic tool in the aftermath of the Great Depression and the following era
of Keynesian macroeconomics (see Blanchard et al., 2010). But over the decades, the
focus has been moving from fiscal to monetary policy and in the past two decades
fiscal policy has taken clearly a backseat (see, e.g., Eichenbaum, 1997). The reasons
for the declining importance of fiscal policy are manifold. One is the general skep-
ticism regarding the effectiveness of fiscal policy as stressed by the New Classical
school (see, e.g., Lucas and Sargent, 1979). A second reason might be problems of
time lags in detecting recessions and the implementation of policies. But also issues
related to the political economy might play a role. A third possible explanation is
related to the Great Moderation, which is the empirically observed phenomenon of
a substantial reduction in the volatility of U.S. business cycle fluctuations starting
in the mid-1980s (Blanchard and Simon, 2001; Stock and Watson, 2003). Some
studies such as Summers (2005) have shown that an improved monetary policy can
explain the emergence of the moderation. But if there is already an effective policy
to stabilize the business cycle, then there is no need for another policy instrument
such as fiscal policies. The question remains, however, why governments have used
fiscal policies so extensively during the crisis. Blanchard et al. (2010) argue that
monetary policy, including quantitative easing and credit, had largely reached the
limits with the result that policymakers had little choice but to rely on fiscal policy.
Furthermore, fiscal stimulus measures had been more accepted by policymakers even
before the crises and had been used in many instances, not only as a response to
severe shocks.
Until the 1980s, short-term fluctuations and long-term economic growth had
been considered by most mainstream macroeconomists as two coexisting and inde-
pendent phenomena. As a consequence, a major divide had emerged in macroeco-
nomic theory. On the one side, business cycle theorists had considered long-term
growth as an exogenous trend and analyzed the cyclical component by typically
using Keynesian macroeconomic models. On the other side, growth theorists had
typically used Neoclassical growth models to analyze the trend component, where
short-term shocks have no impact on the long-term growth rate of the economy
(see, e.g., Gaggl and Steindl, 2008; Martin and Rogers, 2000). Stabilization policies
that aim at smoothing the business cycles had then been analyzed in the context
of short-term models neglecting any possible effect on the long-term growth rate.
This traditional dichotomy eroded when Nelson and Plosser (1982) found empirical
evidence that long historical time series data for the U.S. could be characterized by
non-stationary processes that have no tendency to return to a deterministic path.
When decomposing the time series in a secular and a cyclical component, shocks to
the secular component would substantially contribute to the variation in observed
output. As a consequence, Nelson and Plosser (1982) questioned the general sepa-
ration of business cycle and growth theory.
Real Business Cycle (RBC) models were the first models that incorporated busi-
ness cycles and long-term growth in a unified framework. Classic RBC models such
as Kydland and Prescott (1982) amended the neoclassical growth model by stochas-
tic technological growth. In RBC models, the economy is characterized by a general
equilibrium with rational expectations and fully flexible prices, in which households
maximize life-time utility and price-taking firms maximize profits. Volatility is in-
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troduced by real shocks to the technology, where the optimal response of firms and
households causes business cycle fluctuations. Long-term growth is determined by
a long-term steady state path so that stabilization policies have typically no im-
plications in the long run. But in the short run, fiscal policies can have positive
effects. In a literature survey, Hebous (2011) describes the short-term effect of a
fiscal expansion in a typical RBC model as follows: the rational household real-
izes that government spending is financed by future taxes. This causes a negative
wealth effect as the present value of the household tax liability increases. As a result,
consumption declines whereas interest rate, saving and labor supply increase. The
increasing labor supply in turn causes real wages to fall whereas investment and
output increase. In this case, fiscal policy can stabilize the economy in the short
run.
Forward-looking, microfounded New Keynesian models are the second important
branch in contemporary macroeconomics. Early New Keynesian models aimed at
describing the dynamical behavior of output, inflation, and nominal interest rates
and were mostly focused on monetary policies (see, e.g., Mankiw and Romer, 1991).
Recent New Keynesian models adapted many features of RBC models but differ in
their explicit consideration of nominal rigidities such as price and wage stickiness
and the assumption of monopolistic competition on markets for intermediate goods
(see, e.g., Ireland, 2004). Growth is exogenous by construction with the result that
in a New Keynesian setup stabilization policies have no implications for the long-
term growth (compare Gaggl and Steindl, 2008). Thus, predictions of these models
regarding possible long-term effects of stabilization polices are in line with that
of RBC models. Regarding the short-term effect, Hebous (2011) points out that
the predictions of typical New Keynesian models are also similar to those of RBC
models, i.e. an increase in output and a decrease in consumption. But differences
emerge at the labor market; the rising output increases labor demand, which offsets
the increased labor supply due to the negative wealth effect.
In the last two decades, the borders between RBC and New Keynesian models
have been blurred and to some extent even disappeared. This softening of the
methodological stance has been accompanied by a general convergence of the New
Classical and the New Keynesian school, which is also associated with a reduction of
the fundamental disagreement among macroeconomists of the two different schools.
This process of convergence has been discussed in the literature under the term New
Neoclassical synthesis (see, e.g., Goodfriend and King, 1997). In fact, many recent
macroeconomic models combine elements of both approaches. The major workhorse
in mainstream macroeconomics are models that feature the structure of RBC models
and inherited nominal rigidities from New Keynesian models (see, e.g., Woodford,
2009).
In any case, the line of research that has applied models with RBC and/or New
Keynesian features is basically interested in replicating business cycles and analyzing
transient effects of shocks on macroeconomic aggregates. The determination of long-
run growth is not the question of this research per se (Gaggl and Steindl, 2008). Since
the steady state growth is exogenous by construction, models of both types cannot
account for a causal relationship between short-term volatility and long-term growth
as evidenced by Nelson and Plosser (1982).
The endogenous growth literature has tried to fill this gap. The key assump-
tion and main difference to the RBC and New Keynesian literature is that in en-
dogenous growth models technological change is not determined exogenously but
endogenously. The process of technological change, which is the main driver of
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 72
long-term growth, has many determinants, including investments in human capi-
tal and research and development. Some of these determinants are influenced by
the volatility of the business cycle, which provides a connection between short-term
fluctuations and long-term growth. In that sense, endogenous technological progress
acts as a propagation mechanism for shocks that have only transitory effects in New
Keynesian and RBC frameworks (Stadler, 1990).
The endogenous growth literature provides an ambiguous answer to the question
of the relationship between (the smoothing of) cyclical fluctuations and long-term
growth. In this context, two contrasting explanatory paradigms can be identified,
reflecting two different approaches for the modeling of endogenous technological
change: the one following Schumpeter’s concept of creative destruction and the
other based on the learning-by-doing hypothesis (see Priesmeier and Sta¨hler, 2011).
In models following the creative destruction hypothesis, one can typically find
a positive link between short-term fluctuations and long-term growth. This posi-
tive effect emerges as recessions have a positive effect on the long-term productivity
level of the economy. There are basically two explanations for this positive rela-
tion. The first describes a cleansing effect of recessions (Caballero and Hammour,
1994), through which unproductive firms that lack competitiveness are driven out
of the market. As a consequence, the overall productivity of the economy will be
higher when the economy recovers. The second explanation, used by e.g. Aghion
and Saint-Paul (1998), stresses the importance of procyclical opportunity costs for
productivity-enhancing activities. According to Saint-Paul (1997), activities such
as research and development, training, and implementation of new technologies are
costly in terms of forgone current production. This is because these activities tie
up production capacities that are not available for production. Therefore, in a re-
cession when output is currently low, the cost of such activities is low relative to
their benefit, which includes increased production in the future when the economy
is back to an expansionary phase. An important aspect of this mechanism is, as ar-
gued by Saint-Paul (1997), the intertemporal substitution of productivity-enhancing
activities for direct production activities, which are postponed to better times.
In any case, the assumption of creative destruction being the main driver of en-
dogenous technological change implies a trade-off between short-term volatility re-
duction and long-term growth. If the policy reduces the business cycle and therefore
prevents the economy to fall into recession, then it will also suppress the cleansing
mechanism or, respectively, the reduction of opportunity costs. As a result, the
speed of technological change will eventually fall. This implies a conflict of goals so
that a government must sacrifice long-term growth for achieving short-term stability.
Aghion et al. (2005) show that the opportunity cost argument is only valid
if credit markets are perfect. If credit markets are sufficiently imperfect, then
productivity-enhancing investments become procyclical and a reduction of the vo-
latility would lead to higher growth. In this scenario, the goals of short-term stabi-
lization and long-term growth are not conflicting. This finding is consistent with the
results one typically obtains when considering the alternative explanatory paradigm
for endogenous technological change, the learning-by-doing hypothesis. In models
of this type as e.g. Stadler (1990), Martin and Rogers (1997, 2000), the propaga-
tion mechanism is assumed to emerge through an endogenous formation of human
capital. Stadler (1990) describes the learning process as a by-product of production
in which workers build up skills and experiences during their employment. Since
labor can move freely between firms, the generated skills become an externality and
constitute to a common stock of technical knowledge. Periods during a negative
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output shock, when output and employment are low, are forgone opportunities for
learning-by-doing and have a negative effect on the accumulation of human capital.
If, as Martin and Rogers (2000) argue, the employment is increasing and concave
in the business cycle disturbance, the forgone learning cannot be fully regained over
the next upswing. Then, a transitory shock translates in a permanent effect on
the long-term growth path of the economy. In this case, a stabilization policy that
counteracts a negative shock will have an enhancing effect on long-term growth.
But the picture is also not unambiguous for models based on the learning-by-
doing hypothesis. Blackburn (1999), for example, shows that it depends on the
concrete specification of the human capital accumulation function, i.e. the techno-
logy underlying the learning process, to determine whether growth and volatility are
positively related. And Blackburn and Pelloni (2004) emphasize the source of the
fluctuation. Their analysis of a monetary growth model with nominal rigidities and
learning-by-doing predicts that the relationship between output growth and output
volatility may be positive or negative according to whether real or nominal shocks
predominate.
The focus of most endogenous growth models has been on the relation of short-
term volatility on long-term growth, from which possible effects of stabilization
policies are derived as a corollary. This, however, does not include issues of formu-
lation and evaluation of stabilization policies, a point that has to some extant been
neglected in the literature. Blackburn (1999) and Blackburn and Pelloni (2005) con-
sider monetary stabilization policies governed by feedback rules. While the former
finds a negative effect on long-term growth, the latter find that the monetary sta-
bilization policy may work either for or against the promotion of long-term growth
depending on the source of the fluctuations. Martin and Rogers (1997) develop a
model in which learning-by-doing is at the origin of growth and analyze the effects
of a fiscal stabilization policy that subsidizes labor during bad periods and taxes
in good times. They find that in many configurations of disturbances and model
parameters, the countercyclical tax policy can have positive effects on long-term
growth by minimizing the adverse effects that recessions have on learning-by-doing.
These examples illustrate that mostly structural aspects have been emphasized in
the few investigations that incorporate a concrete stabilization policy. These struc-
tural aspects include the specification of the learning function (Blackburn, 1999),
the nature of the shocks (Blackburn and Pelloni, 2005), and structural parameters
controlling the severity of shocks, their likelihood to occur, and the speed of learn-
ing (Martin and Rogers, 1997). But no emphasis has been put on investigating the
question whether different (fiscal) policies, which all aim at stabilizing the business
cycle can have different implications for the long-term growth path.
This paper aims at addressing this question by means of an agent-based po-
licy analysis. The model used for the policy analysis is an extended version of the
agent-based macro model Eurace@Unibi (see Dawid et al., 2012b). We opt for a
closed agent-based macro model because of some important generic properties of
the agent-based approach. Especially the explicit representation of heterogeneous
interacting agents makes an agent-based model to an appropriate tool for analyzing
the long-term effects of fiscal stabilization policies. This modeling approach can ex-
plicitly capture the emergent dynamics of skills, productivity and wages that arise
at the micro level and that are important drivers of the evolution of aggregate vari-
ables at the macro level. An explicit modeling of feedback loops between the micro
and macro level will be particularly important if the considered policies influence
the emerging dynamics at the micro level in different ways and, therefore, lead to
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different dynamics at the aggregate level.
In the model, heterogeneous households and firms interact on labor and goods
market. Productivity of firms is determined by relating specific skills of workers and
the productivity of the capital stock in a complementary way. There is a capital
goods market at which vertically differentiated vintages of the capital good are of-
fered. The choice in which vintage a firm invests is explicitly modeled as part of the
investment decision. The endogenous vintage choice allows incorporating an aspect
that has yet received less attention in the integrated business cycles and growth
literature, the process of technological diffusion. While technological shocks are the
main source of fluctuations in several models of the RBC, New Keynesian and en-
dogenous growth literature, Blanchard (2008) argues that technological progress is
a smooth process as it is about the diffusion and implementation of new ideas. And
Comin (2009) shows in a theoretical framework that the diffusion process amplifies
the business cycle and that temporary fluctuations in the intensity of adoption will
have persistent effects on the productivity. Our model accounts for a possible propa-
gation mechanism through technological diffusion and can therefore assess possible
implications of this transmission channel for stabilization policies.
Besides the diffusion of technologies, also the accumulation of human capital
within firms and the allocation of human capital among firms is modeled in an
explicit microfounded way. The productivity of workers is determined through
learning-by-doing; in that sense the model shares a common feature with the strand
of learning-by-doing models in the endogenous growth literature. However, the
learning takes place at the individual level, i.e. single workers build up skills for
the technology they are currently using at the workplace. Since workers can switch
jobs via an explicitly modeled labor market, the knowledge transfer between firms in
the form of spillovers is endogenized and takes place at the disaggregated firm level.
This is in contrast to the assumption of endogenous growth models that assume
perfectly externalized knowledge spillovers (see, e.g., Stadler, 1990).
In most mainstream macroeconomic models, exogenous stochastic shocks are the
source of short-term fluctuations, where these disturbances hit the economic system
when the economy is either in equilibrium or at the way back to equilibrium. The
fact that these models require shocks in order to introduce business cycles has been
criticized by e.g. Dosi et al. (2006). In contrast, the model presented in this paper
generates endogenous business cycles that emerge through a complex interplay of
investment, pricing and production strategies as well as financing opportunities of
heterogeneous and boundedly rational firms. These endogenous business cycles make
the analysis of stabilization policies independent from the introduction of exogenous
disturbances.
The model exhibits a government that runs automatic stabilizers in the form of
income and profit taxes as well as unemployment benefits. Furthermore, the govern-
ment installs and finances the three discretionary stabilization policies analyzed in
the policy experiments. In order to abstract from time lags and politically economic
considerations, we model the policies as quasi feedback rules so that stabilization
policies are applied without time lags as soon as a downturn has been detected. The
government is allowed to run deficits with the consequence that the government can
accumulate public debts. The tax rates are assumed to be fixed and set such that
without the implementation of a discretionary policy the budget is intertemporally
balanced. This setting provides the opportunity to investigate the implications of
the different policies for public debts, which has recently become a relevant concern
due to the current government debt crisis in Europe.
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In general, there is a growing literature on agent-based macroeconomic modeling.
In the last ten years, a number of closed macroeconomic models using an agent-based
approach have been developed (see, e.g., Ashraf et al., 2011; Dawid et al., 2012a;
Delli Gatti et al., 2010; Dosi et al., 2006; Gintis, 2007; Wolf et al., 2013). Several of
these agent-based macroeconomic models show the importance of the approach for
economic policy evaluation. Monetary policies are addressed in Ashraf et al. (2012)
or Arifovic et al. (2013), whereas regulatory issues relating to credit and financial
markets are analyzed by Delli Gatti et al. (2010) or Ashraf et al. (2011) within
agent-based macroeconomic models.
Previous versions of the model presented in this paper have been used for po-
licy analyses in the context of regional convergence (see, e.g., Dawid et al., 2012a,
2014). Dawid et al. (2012a) analyze the effect of labor market integration policies on
the convergence of regions. Dawid et al. (2014) study the effectiveness of cohesion
policies subject to the spatial integration of labor markets.3
Dosi et al. (2010) have carried out an analysis similar to ours in which they ex-
amine short- and long-term effects of different policies within an agent-based macro
model with endogenous business cycles. In their analysis, they consider two policy
regimes. The first is a Keynesian policy that consists of an automatically stabiliz-
ing fiscal policy in the form of taxes on wages and profits as well as unemployment
benefits; the second is a Schumpeterian policy that can change several fundamentals
of the innovation process thereby facilitating technological change. They show that
if the Keynesian policy is switched off, the average growth is much lower and the
short-term volatility is higher. In that sense, Dosi et al. (2010) find a positive link
between fiscal stabilization policy and long-term growth. However, the focus of their
study is not the policy design of fiscal stabilization policies but the interaction of
the Keynesian policy with the Schumpeterian policy. They find a complementary
relation between the policies so that without a Keynesian policy the effect of the
Schumpeterian policy is almost zero. But if the Keynesian policy is switched on,
then the Schumpeterian policy has positive effects on long-term growth.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 lays out the model. In Section 3.3
we show some characteristics of the endogenous business cycle and relate them to
empirically observed stylized facts. Section 3.4 contains an extensive policy analysis
of the policy question raised above. Section 3.5 provides a detailed sensitivity ana-
lysis of the model regarding its parametrization as well as robustness checks for the
policy experiments. Finally, Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 The Overall Structure
The model describes a market economy in which heterogeneous agents interact on
different markets. The agents populating the economy are households, firms, where
we distinguish consumption and capital goods producing firms, and banks. Addi-
tionally, there is a central bank and a government that collects taxes and finances
social benefits.
The focus of our analysis is on the real sector of the economy including a con-
sumption goods market, a capital goods market and a labor market. At the market
for consumption goods, firms produce a homogeneous consumption good that is
sold at a central market place called outlet mall. Households are consumers and
3This paper can be found in Chapter 2 of this thesis.
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they purchase the consumption good when visiting the outlet mall several times per
month.
For the production of the consumption good, firms require labor and capital as
inputs which they can purchase at the corresponding factor markets. A monopolistic
capital goods firm produces vertically differentiated capital goods and offers several
vintages of the capital good at a time. The vintages differ with respect to produc-
tivity. From time to time, the capital goods firm carries out a successful innovation
and introduces a new vintage with an improved quality onto the market. Thus,
technological change is embodied as innovations diffuse into the economy through
capital goods investments.
The labor market is populated with workers that have either high or low general
skills as human capital endowment. Moreover, workers build up technology specific
skills on the job. A crucial assumption is hereby that the specific skills of workers and
the productivity of machines are linked in a complementary way. This implies that
better technologies can only be used efficiently when workers have already acquired
sufficient specific skills. Firms adjust the workforce according to their labor demand
where the labor market interactions are modeled as a search and matching process.
Households earn a labor income or, if unemployed, they receive unemployment
benefits from the government. Moreover, since households are shareholders of firms,
they receive dividends. Based on the monthly income and driven by precautionary
motives, households determine once a month how much of the income they will
spend for consumption during the month.
Consumption goods firms retain parts their profits as a cash reserve or for fi-
nancing capital investments. As an alternative financing source, firms can obtain
external financing at a credit market. Credits are provided by commercial banks
which collect deposits of firms and households. Whether a loan is accepted and how
much interests the firm has to pay depends on its financial standing. However, the
ability to provide credits is limited by regulations regarding capital requirements
and cash reserves.
Firms that are not able to pay their financial commitments declare illiquidity. If
debts exceed wealth at the end of the production cycle, a firm has to declare insol-
vency. In both cases, a bankrupt firm is liquidated after stopping production and
dismissing all employees. On the other side, new firms enter the market incidentally
starting from scratch only endowed with an initial stock of cash that is provided by
a venture capitalist.
The financial sector is completed by a financial market at which agents can trade
shares of a single asset. This asset is an index bond that contains all firms and banks
of the economy. The total sum of dividends paid out by all firms is distributed among
households according to the number of shares a household owns. The central bank
provides standing facilities for the banks at a given base rate, pays interest on banks’
overnight deposits and might provide fiat money to the government.
Finally, there is a statistical office (Eurostat) that collects data from all individual
agents in the economy and generates aggregate indicators according to standard
procedures. These indicators are distributed to the agents in the economy which
might use them as input for their decision rules.
Agent actions can be time-driven or event-based, where the former can follow
either subjective or objective time schedules. Furthermore, the economic activities
follow a hierarchy of time-scales: yearly, monthly, weekly and daily activities, all
taking place following calendar-time or subjective agent-time. Agents are activated
asynchronously according to their subjective time schedules that are anchored on an
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individual activation day. These activation days are uniformly randomly distributed
among the agents at the start of the simulation, but may change endogenously (e.g.,
when a household gets re-employed, its subjective month gets synchronized with the
activation day of its employer due to wage payments). This modeling approach is
supposed to capture the decentralized and typically asynchronous nature of decision-
making processes and activities of economic agents.
In the following subsections, we describe main aspects of the model in more
detail, where we focus on the innovations introduced to the consumption and capital
goods sector of the Eurace@Unibi model. Furthermore, we describe aspects of the
model, which are crucial for the understanding of the results discussed below. A
detailed description of the other parts of the model such as the financial and credit
market is provided in Dawid et al. (2012b).
3.2.2 Decision-Making and Expectation Formation
While agents in a typical dynamic equilibrium model are endowed with rational
expectations and perfect information on their environment, agent based models are
characterized by bounded rationality. This requires the formulation of explicit rules
describing how agents build expectations and how they take their decisions based on
the available information. In our model, this is captured by modeling the decision-
making of agents using a rule-based approach; rule-based means that agents of the
same type have an identical set of behavioral rules, each specifically designed for
solving a particular decision problem. The design of the decision rules is based on
a systematic attempt to incorporate empirically observable behavior documented in
the relevant literature. Concerning households, this means that the saving rule and
purchasing choice are described by using models from the marketing literature with
strong empirical support. With respect to firm behavior, we follow the Management
Science approach, which aims at implementing decision rules and heuristics that
match standard procedures of real world firms as described in the corresponding
management literature. A more extensive discussion of the Management Science
approach can be found in Dawid and Harting (2012).4
In general, the decision rules are parametrized, where different values of param-
eters can lead to different outcomes of a particular rule. Besides exogenous model
parameters, those parameters can either be agent specific variables or aggregated
(macro) variables provided by the statistical office Eurostat.
Current values of some variables are ex ante unknown such that agents have
to form expectations. For most of them, especially for aggregated variables, the
agents use adaptive expectations, i.e. the expected value depends on observed values
in the past. A special case is, however, the estimation of the uncertain demand.
In this context, the price sensitivity of households in the consumption choice is
important information when planning the production and investment. But it is not
possible to estimate the price sensitivity from observable information. In order to
gather reliable information, firms carry out market research by conducting simulated
purchase surveys (see Section 3.2.4.1).
Expectations on the future value of certain variables are not only important as
parameters for the decision rules. Some of them are also used as objective variables
based on which a decision is eventually taken. Therefore, agents apply procedures
to determine estimated values for those variables conditioned on different possible
realizations of the decision. Instances of more sophisticated procedures are estima-
4This paper can be found in Chapter 1 of this thesis.
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tions of profits of consumption goods firms conditioned on the price as it is used for
the pricing (see Section 3.2.4.2) or cash flow estimations associated with different
investment strategies as used in the investment planning (see Section 3.2.4.3).
3.2.3 Skill Dynamics
We assume that workers are characterized by two dimensions of human capital
endowments. The first dimension is the general skill level and can be interpreted
as the formal qualification and those abilities that a worker has obtained during
schooling and professional education. There are two skill groups bgenh ∈ {1,2} with
bgenh referring to the general skill level of worker h. The two groups represent low and
high levels of general skills, where workers from skill group 1 belong to the low-skill
group and those with skill level 2 to the high-skill group.
Specific skills are the second dimension of human capital. They are technology
related and are measured in terms of productivity. They can be interpreted as
competences and the experience a worker has collected while working with a certain
production technology. The underlying assumption of learning-by-doing is thereby
supported by empirical evidences. Bahk and Gort (1993), e.g., found a significant
effect of learning-by-doing on output of 15 industries, where the learning appeared
to be uniquely related to embodied technological change of physical capital.
The learning process and hence the speed of acquiring specific skills is assumed
to be depending on the general skill level of the worker. Suppose the machines used
by h’s employer i at time t have an average productivity of Ait, then the specific
skills of worker h evolve according to
bht+1 = bht + χ(b
gen
h ) ·max[0, Ait − bht]. (3.1)
The function χ is thereby increasing in bgen. Note that we assume that the generation
of new technologies is a cumulative process. This implies that specific skills are
transferable between vintages, even from old to new technologies.
Furthermore, we assume that general skills are observable by firms in the hiring
process while specific skills are not. But specific skills become observable ex post
during the production process.
3.2.4 The Consumption Goods Firm
For the production of the consumption good, firms use labor and physical capital
as input factors. The capital stock of a firm is composed of different vintages of the
capital good. It depreciates over time and increases through investments such that
the accumulation of capital of a vintage v follows the law of motion
Kvit = (1− δ) ·Kvit−1 + Ivit. (3.2)
The parameter δ is the depreciation rate and Ivit is the investment in vintage v.
Technology is embodied in the capital stock and characterized by vintage specific
productivity levels Av.
The production technology is represented by a Leontief production function such
that labor and capital are used in a complementary way. Moreover, there is a
complementarity between the productivity of a vintage v and the average specific
skills level Bit of the workforce of the firm. This implies that a vintage cannot be
used at its full productivity as long as the workers have not acquired a sufficient
level of specific skills.
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Given the capital stock and the number of workers Lit, the produced output can
be computed according to the production function
Qit =
Vt∑
v=1
min
[
Kvit,max
[
0, Lit −
Vt∑
k=v+1
Kkit
]]
·min [Av, Bit] . (3.3)
The output Qit is sent to the mall in which it is added to the inventory stock
and supplied to households.
The demand for the product of a firm is stochastic. In the Management sci-
ence literature there are standard heuristics for production planning problems facing
stochastic demand. A simple heuristic prescribes to generate an estimation of the
distribution of demand and to supply a quantity that is sufficient to fully serve the
emerging demand at a probability χS . The converse probability 1− χS is then the
stock-out probability (which is influenced by stock-out costs, inventory costs and
the risk attitude of the firm, see, e.g., Silver et al., 1998). The planned output is
then the difference of that target supply and the current inventory stock at the mall
(see Section 3.2.4.2).
The estimated demand depends on the price that is set before the firm decides
the production plan. It is determined with a procedure that is described in Sec-
tion 3.2.4.1. After the determination of the target output, the firm determines the
labor demand and the financial needs. The production plan might induce the need
to hire new labor or to obtain additional credits, where there is the possibility that
firms are rationed on the labor or credit market. In these cases, the output and
prices are both adjusted accordingly.
Disconnected from the production planning is the capital investment decision,
which is taken before the firm enters the production planning (see Section 3.2.4.3).
In the financial planning, however, both the production plan and the investment
plan are considered and, in case of credit rationing, the investment is revised and
adjusted first.
3.2.4.1 Demand Estimation
The price and investment choice are core decisions of the consumption goods firm
predetermining most of the activities following in the production chain. Because of
their operative and strategic importance, these decisions are based on sophisticated
procedures, which judge the available options by predicting possible effects on the
firm’s performance. For both decisions, an important ingredient is an accurate
estimation of the demand. However, the demand for the product of a firm is governed
not only by its own price but also by other factors which cannot be controlled by
the firm itself. Those factors are, for example, the development of the total market,
strategies of competitors and consumer specific attributes.
In an elaborate estimation procedure, firms try to find a closed form expression
for the demand that translates observed or unobserved but estimated determinants
of the demand into an expected value. This expected demand can be used in the
production planning. The derivation of this demand function is decomposed in two
steps. The first step describes an estimation of the development of the consumption
goods market represented by the growth of the market size. The market size is given
by the overall budget of households disposed for consumption. We assume that firms
can ex post observe the aggregated consumption budget, where they use previous
realizations to predict the market development by estimating an expected growth
rate gˆ.
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Let MSt−1 be the observed market size in the previous period and gˆit the average
monthly growth rate of the market between period t− TS and t− 1; then, the firm
assumes that the market size for the current period t is
MˆSit = MSt−1 · (1 + gˆit). (3.4)
In the decision process for capital investments, the firm requires estimates of the
market sizes for periods further ahead, i.e. for t + τ with τ > 0. In this case, the
firm adjusts the expected growth rate by assuming that the more farsighted the
estimation is, the more the growth rate approaches its long-term average gˆL. With
gˆit+τ being the corresponding expected growth rate for period t + τ , the expected
market size for this period is computed according to
MˆSit+τ = MˆSit+τ−1 · (1 + gˆit+τ ). (3.5)
The second step of the demand estimation describes which market share the
firm can expect to achieve. Since sales of the firm are driven by the consumer’s
choice of households, this procedure must try to incorporate those factors influencing
households’ purchasing decision. We assume that the estimation follows a procedure
that is proposed in Train (2009). Train (2009) describes a discrete choice model in
which a household indexed h can choose one good from a set of available goods J,
where good j is selected with a probability probhj .
The average choice probability probj for the product of the firm is used as a
proxy for its market share. In order to find a closed form expression for the choice
probabilities, the firm assumes that consuming good j denotes household h a utility
Uhj which is represented by a utility function
Uhj = γ log(pj) + hj . (3.6)
The variable hj is independently, identically distributed extreme value and γ is an
unknown parameter. The intuition of this utility model is that the firm knows that
the price pj of the good is an important factor for the consumer’s choice. There may
also be others, either product or household specific factors but those are unknown
and treated by the firm as random.
In this case it can be shown that the probability to choose product j over the
other products is a multinomial logit probability given by
probhj =
exp (γ log(pj))∑
∀k∈J exp (γ log(pk))
. (3.7)
The parameter γ is the intensity of choice that indicates how sensitive the demand
reacts on price changes. However, this parameter is a consumer specific variable
that cannot be easily estimated with data observed at the market. Thus, in order
to estimate γ, the firm carries out simulated purchase surveys as described in Nagle
and Hogan (2006). We assume that the firm draws a random sample of consumers
and present them a set of products at differing prices. The interviewed households
are asked to decide for one of the presented goods based on the same considerations
as if they would do their normal shopping.
Based on the reported decisions in combination with the prices of the presented
goods and the assumed model for the choice probability (Expression 3.7), the firm
can estimate the parameter γ by maximizing the log-likelihood function
LL(γ) =
nS∑
h′=1
log (probh′(γ)) (3.8)
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with respect to γ. In the log-likelihood function, probh′(γ) denotes the probability
of the observed outcome for the decision of household h′ and nS is the sample size
that has to be sufficiently large. The maximization problem is numerically solved
by applying the Newton-Raphson algorithm as proposed by Train (2009).
The estimator γˆ, which is the best fitting value for γ, is then used to estimate the
market share in period t+ τ associated with price p˜. Suppose pˆ−it+τ is the vector of
expected prices of all competitors in period t+ τ , then the estimated market share
is
sˆ(p˜, pˆ−it+τ ) =
exp (γˆ log(p˜))
exp (γˆ log(p˜)) +
∑
k∈pˆ−it+τ exp (γˆ log(pkt+τ ))
. (3.9)
For the prices of the competitors, we basically assume the same expectation forma-
tion as for the market growth. There are adaptive expectations so that the price of
an individual competitor k is expected to change by the average monthly inflation
rate pi observed over the last TS months. However, the more a considered period is
ahead, the more the expected inflation rate approaches its long-term average.
After both steps, i.e. the determination of the expected market size as step one
and the estimation of the market share as step two, the firm combines the results
of the two steps to determine a functional form for the expected demand in t + τ ,
which is
Dˆit+τ =
1
pit+τ
·MSit+τ · sˆ(pit+τ , pˆ−it+τ ). (3.10)
Note that the market size MS is measured in monetary units; in order to express
the demand in real terms, the product of market share and market size must be
divided by price pit+τ .
3.2.4.2 Pricing and Production Planning
The price setting of consumption goods firms is based on an elaborate analysis of
potential profits. Therefore, the firm defines a set of candidate prices P˜ that is
drawn from an interval around the price pit−1 charged in the last month. The firm
estimates revenues and costs for the upcoming production cycle associated with each
candidate price and selects that price with the highest potential profits.
The decision regarding prices and output levels are shortsighted and disconnected
from the more farsighted investment decision (see Section 3.2.4.3). For this reason,
the production capacity is not adjusted to lower prices even if they yield higher
expected profits. Thus, when estimating the revenues and costs, the firm has to
take into account that the production quantity is constraint by the capital stock.
The maximum output that can be produced with the capital stock including the
pending investments of the current period is
Q¯it =
V∑
v=1
Kvit ·min[Av, Bit−1]. (3.11)
The expected revenues associated with a candidate price p˜ are the proceeds of
selling a certain quantity at price p˜. Sales are basically determined by the demand
Dˆit that depends on the firm’s own price p˜ and the prices of the firm’s competitors
pˆ−it. Since the firm cannot sell more goods than available, sales are limited by the
sum of the inventory stock Sit−1 left over from the previous period and the feasible
output Q¯it. The expected revenue is then
Rˆit(p˜) = min
[
Dˆit(p˜, pˆ−it), Sit−1 + Q¯it
]
· p˜. (3.12)
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The expected production quantity associated with price p˜ is given by
Qˆit(p˜) = min
[
Q¯it, Dˆit(p˜, pˆ−it) + Ψˆit − Sit−1
]
. (3.13)
The variable Ψˆ yields an inventory buffer that depends on the expected volatility of
the demand σ2D and the accepted stock-out probability 1−χS . Assuming a normally
distributed demand, the buffer is determined according to
Ψˆit = Dˆit(p˜, pˆ−it) · qχS ·
√
σ2D, (3.14)
where qχS is the χ
S-quantile of the normal distribution and σ2D and χ
S are exogenous
model parameters.
Since the investment costs are sunk and, therefore, fixed costs in the profit
calculation, the only cost type that affects the price setting are labor costs. Suppose
Lˆit is the labor demand required to produce Qˆit(p˜) and w
base
it−1 is the base wage offer
(for a detailed description of the determination of wage offers see Section 3.2.6). The
estimated average wage that the firm has to pay for its workforce would then be
wˆit =
max
[
Lˆit − Lit−1, 0
]
Lˆit
· wbaseit−1 min[Ait−1, Bˆit−1]+
+
min
[
Lit−1, Lˆit
]
Lˆit
· wit−1.
(3.15)
Expression 3.15 incorporates that the wage for additionally hired workers deviates
from the average wage wit−1 of the incumbent workforce.
Altogether, we can write the expected profit associated with a candidate price p˜
as
Πˆ(p˜) = Rˆit(p˜)− Lˆit(p˜) · wˆit(p˜). (3.16)
The firm chooses that price which yields the highest expected profit for the next
month, i.e.
pit = arg max
p˜∈P˜
Πˆ(p˜). (3.17)
After completing the price setting, the firm can determine the planned produc-
tion quantity and the input and financial needs to fulfill the desired production plan.
The planned output is
Q˜it = min
[
Q¯it, Dˆit(pit, pˆ−it) + Ψit − Sit−1
]
, (3.18)
where Q¯it is determined according to Expression 3.11.
For the determination of the labor demand, the firm draws on the labor pro-
ductivity of the previous production cycle. Let Qit−1 be the actual production in
t− 1 and Lit−1 the employed workforce to produce Qit−1, hence, the labor demand
in period t is given by
L˜it = Q˜it · Lit−1
Qit−1
. (3.19)
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3.2.4.3 Investment Decision and Vintage Choice
It is the nature of investment projects to spend money with the expectation to gain
over a longer term. Therefore, the investment decision of consumption goods firms is
based on an appraisal of whether long-term capital investments are worth the funding
of cash. That means the firm evaluates the investment options systematically by
checking whether an investment is potentially profitable over a planning horizon
rather than to decide based on a myopic consideration of output expansions in the
current production period.
Firms can purchase different vintages of the capital good at the capital goods
market that are distinguished by their embodied productivity and the market price.
For this reason, the investment decision is not only to decide on the quantity but
also in which vintage of the capital good the firm should invest.
We assume that the decision-making is a three step process. In the first step,
the firm appraises the investment strategies and preselects the most profitable one.
Given the required expenditures for the best strategy and the current financial situ-
ation, the firm checks in the second step whether it has to raise additional credits to
finance the project. If external financing is needed, the firm assesses the impact on
its financial stability. If it turns out that the investment risks the financial standing,
then the project is abandoned.
The third step takes account of the fact that timing of investments can also
matter. A capital investment is an opportunity that can either be executed today or
postponed to a later date. But, due to its irreversibility, once it has been committed
it cannot be recovered. In those cases, deferring can yield additional value because
the economic environment can change in the meantime and so might the estimated
value when reevaluating the project after the arrival of new information. If a project
is postponed and later it turns out that the value has not changed or has even
increased, the firm has still the opportunity to carry out the investment. But if it
turns out to be a poor investment, the deferring strategy has preserved the firm
to make possible losses. However, by waiting and not carrying out the investment
immediately, the firm can also make losses in the form of foregone profits. The
investment is finally executed if the forgone expected profits exceed the additional
value of waiting.
In the following, we consider the steps pre-selection, financial impact, and opti-
mal timing in more detail.
Preselection: A standard textbook method for evaluating investment projects is
the net present value (NPV) technique. The net present value is defined as the sum
of discounted expected cash flows over a planning horizon. Capital budgeting based
on NPV techniques is also reported to be widely used by Chief Financial Officers
(CFO) in their decision-making (see, e.g., Ryan and Ryan, 2002). Following the
Management Science approach, we assume that this method is applied by consump-
tion goods firms for pre-selecting the most profitable investment from the set of
available strategies.
Suppose Iv
′
is the investment project under consideration, where Iv
′
denotes
the amount that would be invested in vintage v′. For the sake of simplicity, firms
assume that it is always worth keeping the capital stock constant over the considered
planning period, where depreciated capital is replaced by capital of vintage v′. Then,
the expected cash flow for a given future period t+ τ is the inflowing revenue minus
the outflowing labor costs and capital expenditures to reacquire the depreciated
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capital. Formally, we can write
CˆF it+τ = Rˆit+τ − wˆit+τ Lˆit+τ − pˆv′It+τ
(
V∑
v=1
δKvit + δI
v′
)
. (3.20)
For determining revenues, the firm needs an accurate estimation of possible sales.
Sales are basically determined by the demand but at the same time sales are also
limited by the amount of available goods. The available goods, in turn, are partially
determined by the stock left over from the previous period. In order to account for
these intertemporal links in the production planning of the foresighted investment
evaluation, we distinguish two different types of demand expectations. First, we
define the ex ante demand Dˆit+τ as demand that the firm assumes to face at the
beginning of a period t+ τ ; this demand expectation is used for the determination
of the notional output and price (see below). Its determination is described in Sec-
tion 3.2.4.1. Second, we define the ex post demand DˆPit+τ . This demand expectation
is the amount of goods that is subtracted as notional sales from the calculated in-
ventory at the end of planning period t+ τ . In order to account for the volatility of
demand, which influences the inventory stocks and thus the production quantities,
the value of DˆPit+τ is a normally distributed random variable with mean Dit+τ and
the exogenously given variance σ2D.
Suppose the firm calculates with price pˆit+τ , with inventory level Sit+τ−1, and
with output level Qˆit+τ ; then, the notional revenue is
Rˆit+τ = min
[
DˆPit+τ , Sˆit+τ−1 + Qˆit+τ
]
· pˆit+τ (3.21)
and the stock left over at the end of period t+ τ is
Sˆit+τ = max
[
Sˆit+τ−1 + Qˆit+τ − DˆPit+τ , 0
]
. (3.22)
Given the expected change of the environment, the firm computes for each pe-
riod of the planning horizon the price pˆ with the highest period profit. The price
adjustment basically follows the same price setting procedure as described in Sec-
tion 3.2.4.2. A key difference is, however, the determination of the maximum output
that the firm can expect to produce in period t+τ . In addition to the feasible output
that is limited by the available capital stock, the firm takes a possible rationing at
the labor market into account. This means, depending on the labor market tension,
the firm cannot expect to fill all open vacancies at a time. Suppose κRit is the aver-
age share of vacancies actually filled in the last hiring processes and ∆L˜it τ is the
number of additionally desired workers. Then, the expected additional labor is
∆Lˆit+τ = κ
R
it ·∆L˜it+τ . (3.23)
Incorporating the restricted adjustment of the workforce in the determination of the
expected maximum output yields the following expression:
Qˆmaxit+τ =
V∑
v=1
min
[
Kˆvit+τ ,max
[
0, Lˆit+τ−1+
+∆Lˆit+τ −
V∑
k=v+1
Kˆkit+τ
]]
·min[Av, Bˆit+τ−1].
(3.24)
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Altogether, the notional production quantity for period t+ τ is determined by
Qˆit+τ = min[Qˆ
max
it+τ , Dˆit+τ + Ψˆit+τ − Sˆit+τ−1], (3.25)
where Ψˆit+τ is the inventory buffer as described in the price and production planning
(see Expression 3.14).
The estimated size of the desired workforce can be derived from the required
amount of capital for producing the output quantity Qˆit+τ . We can write L˜it+τ as
L˜it+τ =
V∑
v=1
min
[
Kˆvit+τ ,max
[
0, Qˆit+τ
− min[Av, Bˆit+τ−1] ·
V∑
k=v+1
Kˆkit+τ
]]
.
(3.26)
The mean specific skill level Bˆit+τ−1 in Expression 3.26 is adapted according to the
specific skill adaptation procedure described in Section 3.2.3, where the aggregated
level of general skills in t − 1 is used to estimate the adjustment speed of mean
specific skills in t+ τ .
In the modeling of the wage determination of incumbent workers, we assume
that wages increase in relation to the productivity growth pˆr in the economy (see
Section 3.2.6). For this reason, the firm also adjusts the expected wages of its in-
cumbent workforce by the average productivity growth pˆr. By contrast, additionally
hired workers earn the current wage offer, which is the base wage offer times the
effective productivity of the firm. Altogether, we have for the expected mean wage
in t+ τ
wˆit+τ =
max
[
Lˆit+τ − Lˆit+τ−1, 0
]
Lˆit+τ
· wbaseit min[Aˆit+τ , Bˆit+τ ]+
+
min
[
Lˆit+τ−1, Lˆit+τ
]
Lˆit+τ
· wˆit+τ−1(1 + pˆrt+τ ).
(3.27)
For finally determining the net present value of the investment project Iv
′
, we
define
Πˆit+τ = Rˆit+τ − wˆit+τ Lˆit+τ (3.28)
as the estimated profit in t+ τ . The net present value is then computed according
to
NPVit(I
v′) = −Iv′pv′It + ∆Πˆit +
TLT∑
τ=1
ρτ
(
∆Πit+τ − δIv′ pˆv′It+τ
)
, (3.29)
where ∆Πit+τ is the difference of the profit Πit+τ with and without the investment.
If there are investment strategies associated with positive net present values, the
firm chooses that strategy with the highest NPV as the candidate strategy for further
evaluation. Otherwise, the firm does not invest in the capital stock in period t.
Financial Impact: In the second step of the investment decision, the firm checks
the impact of the investment on its financial standing. The available cash is not
necessarily sufficient to cover the required investment expenditures. In this case, the
firm has to obtain external financing from banks. Bank credits can lead to a liquidity
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crisis if the payments for interests and installments exceed the additional cash-flows
gained during the pay-back period of the loan. In order to avoid a downgrade of
its standing, the firm checks whether the net inflow of the investment covers the
financial commitments of the loan during the installment period.
Suppose Mit−1 is the cash available at the beginning of period t and Lˆit is the
amount of labor required to produce the estimated output Qˆit, given the investment
is about to be realized. Then, the firm estimates its financial requirements Nˆit for
period t to be
Nit = I
v′pv
′
It + Lˆitwˆit (3.30)
and the credit demand Cˆit to be
Cˆit = max[0, Nit −Mit−1]. (3.31)
In case of required external financing, the firm rejects the investment project as
too financially risky if the discounted cash flow including installment and interest
payments is negative over the repayment period TL of the loan, i.e.
∆Πˆit +
TL∑
τ=1
ρτ
(
∆Πit+τ − δIv′ pˆv′It+τ −
Cˆit
TL
− iCˆit · (1− τ
TL
)
)
< 0. (3.32)
Optimal Timing: If the firm expects the financial risk to be acceptable, it checks
in a last step whether it is actually profitable to carry out the investment today or
to postpone it to a later date. There is an appealing analogy between a deferrable
investment project and financial options - in both cases the option holder has the
right but not the obligation to execute the option. Accordingly, a strand of the real
option literature suggests to apply well-established option analysis techniques from
Finance to those capital budgeting evaluation problems (see Luehrman, 1998).
Benaroch and Kauffman (1999) point out that the validity of these models is
often questioned particularly with respect to their theoretical basis and key assump-
tions. Nevertheless, they present a case study similar to the investment problem of
consumption goods firms, in which the firm has the opportunity to defer an invest-
ment project. They argue that this problem is analogous to holding an American
option on a dividend paying asset, where dividends are foregone revenues during the
waiting time. In those cases, a direct application of the Black-Scholes model is not
possible but they suggest to use the Black approximation instead (see, e.g., Hull,
2006). In a similar study, Luehrman (1998) presents a framework in which the fun-
damental Black-Scholes model is used as a practical and ’good enough’ rule-of-thumb
application of formal option pricing theory to real capital budget problems.
Following the idea of the Management Science approach, we apply the procedure
as described in Benaroch and Kauffman (1999) to the consumption goods producer’s
investment decision. Therefore, we assume that firms explore the opportunity to
defer within a fixed time interval of length TEx. In this case, the firm holds an
American option with an expiration date at t + TEx, which can be exercised at
any date before TEx. Those American options can be translated into a portfolio
of European options, where one of the European options expires at each month
between t+ 1 and t+ TEx. According to the Black approximation, the price OA of
the American option is the maximum value of the European options, i.e.
OAit(T
Ex) = max
[
{Oit(τ¯)}T
Ex
τ¯=1
]
. (3.33)
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The values Oit(τ¯) of the European options can thereby be determined according
to the standard Black-Scholes formula. Suppose U is the underlying value of the
option’s risky asset, i.e. the present value of additional revenues from the investment.
If the investment is carried out in t+ τ¯ , it can be estimated by
Uˆit(I
v′ , τ¯) =
TLT∑
τ=τ¯
ρτ
(
∆Πit+τ − δIv′ pˆv′It+τ
)
. (3.34)
The project’s value in t+ τ¯ , i.e. its terminal value is then
Oit+τ¯ = max[
Uˆit(I
v′ , τ¯)
ρτ¯
− Iv′ pˆv′It+τ¯ , 0]. (3.35)
Following Benaroch and Kauffman (1999), the present value Oit(τ¯) of the option is
the expected discounted terminal value. Assuming that Uˆit(I
v′ , τ¯)/ρτ¯ is log-normally
distributed, it can be shown that
Oit(τ¯) = Uˆit(I
v′ , τ¯)N(d1)− exp(−ρτ¯)(Iv′ pˆv′It+τ )N(d2), (3.36)
where
d1 =
log
(
Uˆit(I
v′ , τ¯)/(Iv
′
pˆv
′
It+τ )
)
σV
√
τ¯
+
1
2
σV
√
τ¯ , and d2 = d1 − σV
√
τ¯ . (3.37)
N() is the cumulative normal distribution and σV is the volatility of the expected
rate of return on Uˆ .
After computing the option values for each maturing date t + τ , the firm can
determine the total value of its deferring option according to Expression 3.33. The
final decision whether or not to realize the investment project by purchasing Iv
′
units of vintage v′ of the capital good is positively decided if the net present value
of investing today exceeds the value of the deferring option.
3.2.4.4 Firm Entry and Exit
Since there is only one market for consumption goods, firms have no opportunities
to find a new business somewhere else. Consequently, entry and exist of firms at the
consumption goods market arise only by firm birth and death.
The birth of a firm is assumed to be a random event occurring at an exogenously
given hazard rate hFB. At the time of birth, the firm starts from scratch meaning
that it does not have initial capital and workers. However, due to the credit accep-
tance rule of banks, the firm requires a positive equity to obtain credits for building
up the capital stock and to hire workers in the first place. To keep the model closed,
we assume that a seed funding is provided by a simple kind of venture capital fund.
Owners of that fund are the consumption and capital goods producing firms and
banks in equal shares such that it is indirectly owned by households. Firms have to
pay a small fraction dF of their monthly positive profit as a payment of contribution
as long as the wealth of the fund MFt does not exceed a threshold.
In case of a firm birth, the fund provides an initial equity that is sF times the
current capital goods price of the best practice technology, though the payment is
restricted by the available cash MFt . The memory of a new firm is initialized with
average values reported by the statistical office Eurostat. Given the initialization,
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a new firm applies the investment and pricing rule as described above and sets the
planned output, labor demand, and credit demand accordingly.
The death of a firm arises when a firm has to declare bankruptcy. This is the
case when it is either illiquid or insolvent. The former means that the firm is not
able to serve its financial commitments, e.g. taxes, interest and debt installment
payments, and the later that the firm’s total debts exceed its assets.
In case of being bankrupt, the firm follows a bankruptcy procedure that includes
as a first step the stop of any production activity and the dismissal of all workers.
In a next step, the bankrupt firm tries to liquidate the non-liquid capital assets.
Therefore, we assume that there exists a secondary market at which only bankrupt
firms can sell and only the capital goods firm can buy the pre-owned capital at a
discounted price.
The proceeds of the liquidation are used to pay back the firm’s liabilities, where
primarily the creditors and secondarily the shareholders are served. In most cases,
however, the liquidity will not be sufficient to repay all debts such that the creditors
have to write off their claims partially and the firm’s shareholders will lose all their
investments.
3.2.5 Technological Change
Technological change is modeled in form of embodied technological change as des-
cribed e.g. by Greenwood et al. (1997). The quality of capital goods is permanently
improved through innovations. Productivity gains can be achieved by using capital
for production whose productivity is higher than the productivity of the pre-existing
capital stock. But due to the inertia of the complementary specific skills, purchasing
better capital does not immediately lead to higher productivity (see Section 3.2.3).
Since the focus of our analysis lies on the interactions of the dynamics of labor
and consumption goods markets, the capital good sector is modeled in a simplified
stylized way. There is a monopolistic capital goods producer that supplies different
vintages of the capital good. A vintage v is characterized by its productivity Av and
supplied at infinite supply at a price pvIt.
The capital good can be produced and delivered immediately without input
factor requirements and consequently without production costs. In order to close
the model the revenues are channeled back into the economy by distributing them
to households as dividends.
The development of new vintages with an improved quality is assumed to be a
stochastic process. At the beginning of month t, the development of a new vintage is
accomplished at an exogenously given and memoryless probability probInno. In case
of a successful innovation, the new vintage becomes the best practice technology
where its productivity AV increases compared to the former best practice AV−1 by
AV = (1 + ∆qinv) ·AV−1, (3.38)
with being ∆qinv exogenously given and ∆qinv > 0.
The pricing of the vintages is modeled as a combination of cost-based and value-
based pricing. Although there are no actual costs in the production process of capital
goods, we assume as-if costs that the capital goods firm takes into account. The
production of a unit of the capital good, regardless of which vintage, is associated
with unit costs cCt . To account for the cost dynamics, we assume that the main
factor of production costs is the wage bill. Since wages increase on average with the
same rate as productivity grows, the growth rate of productivity is used as a proxy
for the increase in production costs of the capital goods.
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Furthermore, we assume that the capital goods firm can observe certain charac-
teristics of its customers and it has certain knowledge of how clients decide on the
investment. Moreover, it receives the same market signals as consumption goods
firms such that it can estimate the development of the consumption goods market.
The capital goods firm uses this information to estimate the average value of one
unit of each vintage v for a reference firm whose characteristics, i.e. the set of vari-
ables as mean specific skills, average wage etc., match the observed average values
of its recent clients. The capital stock of this reference firm is assumed to consist
of two vintages, where the quantity of the first vintage K1 and, respectively, its
productivity A1 is
K1 = (1− c¯u) · K¯ and A1 = A¯
T − c¯uA¯
1− c¯u . (3.39)
In this expression, c¯u is the average capacity utilization, A¯ is the average productivity
of the used capital stock, A¯T is the average productivity of the total capital stock
and K¯ the average size of the capital stock. K1 reflects the idle capital stock that
is not used for production. The second vintage representing the employed capital
stock is characterized by
K2 = c¯u · K¯ and A2 = A¯. (3.40)
The capital goods firm computes the present value of additional profits that
the reference firm could generate if its capital stock is expanded by one unit of
vintage v. The additional profit is thereby estimated by an analogue procedure as
the consumption goods producer’s pre-selection of investment strategies described
at page 83 ff. The value of v is then estimated according to
V vt =
TL∑
τ=0
ρτ∆Πˆvt+τ −max[0,
1− ρτ
1− ρ · δ ·
TL∑
τ=0
ρτ∆Πˆvt+τ ]. (3.41)
The later term in Equation 3.41 reflects that the reference firm expects to keep
the capital stock constant over the planning horizon. Thus, besides the initial in-
vestments, there are follow-up costs for replacing depreciated capital leading to a
reduction of the vintage value.
As a general rule, the price is set at a level that corresponds to the estimated value
of the vintage as the capital goods firm interprets the value V vt as its costumers’
average willingness to pay. There is, however, one exception for which the firm
deviates from this rule. It occurs when the value V vt is below the unit costs c
C
t . In
this case, the vintage is not offered in t. It might be the case that all values of the
vintages are below cCt , though. Then, only the best practice technology is supplied
at a price corresponding to the unit costs cCt .
Altogether, we can write the price setting rule as
pvIt =

0, if v < vˇ and V vt < c
C
t ,
V vt , if v ≤ vˇ and V vt ≥ cCt ,
cCt , if v = vˇ and V
v
t < c
C
t ,
(3.42)
where vˇ denotes the best practice technology.
There are two implications of this price setting rule. The first is that the capital
goods firm realizes that out of date vintages, i.e. those vintages with producti-
vity significantly below the average productivity of costumers’ capital stock and
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workforce, do not have any value for the clients. Consequently, those vintages are
withdrawn from the market. The second implication is that capital goods prices
react to changes of expectations of consumption goods firms concerning the market
performance. Thus, prices are higher in prospering than in economically bad times.
3.2.6 Labor Market Interaction
Based on the planned output and the available financial resources, consumption
goods producers determine the labor demand L˜it for the current production cycle t.
If the workforce employed at the beginning of t is not sufficient to cover the re-
quired labor demand, firms enter the labor market in order to recruit new employees.
Therefore, they post vacancies that can be read by job searchers.
The wage offer plays an important role in the hiring process. In an ideal world
firms would pay workers an individual wage that matches the productivity level of
each worker perfectly. But as the productivity of applicants is assumed to be un-
observable, they cannot directly link the wage to the individual productivity. What
firms can, however, observe is the general skill level of applicants. Furthermore, they
can monitor the productivity of the incumbent workforce in total and the averages
for the two general skill groups separately. By interpreting the general skill level g
as a signal for the productivity, firms expect the specific skills of applicants to be at
the average level B¯igt−1 of incumbent workers belonging to the same skill group as
the applicants do. For each general skill group g, firms post a separate wage offer
wOigt that is determined according to
wOigt = w
base
it ·min[Ait, B¯igt−1]. (3.43)
The first factor wbaseit of the right-hand site represents a market driven base wage offer
that is paid per unit of specific skills. The second factor is the effective productivity
that a new worker is expected to yield. Effective productivity means that, due to the
assumed complementarity, high specific skills cannot be fully utilized if the capital
stock does not have a sufficient productivity, i.e. Ait ≥ B¯igt−1. In those cases, firms
are unwilling to pay wages that correspond to their actual labor productivity and
limit the wage offers accordingly.
Unemployed workers accept only those job offers whose salary exceeds a reser-
vation wage wRht. When becoming unemployed, the reservation wage is set at the
level of the last earned wage and, as long as the household cannot find a new job, it
declines over time by
wRht+1 = (1− ψ) · wRht. (3.44)
Note that the reservation wage cannot fall below the level of unemployment benefits,
which itself is a fraction u of the last labor income.
The labor market interaction between households and firms is described by a
simple two-round search-and-matching algorithm. In the first step, firms post va-
cancy notifications that can be read by unemployed households. Job seekers consider
the posted wages wOigt for the skill group they belong to and send applications for
those jobs whose wage offers exceed the reservation wage. The number of applica-
tions per workers is thereby limited. In the next step, firms collect all applications
and decide based on a logit discrete choice model which applicants to send a job
offer. A parameter γgenof the logit model specifies the weight that general skills have
in the decision process. Finally, households getting one or more job offers become
re-employed, where households with more than one offer accept that one associated
with the highest wage and reject the others. Thus, it is not ensured that firms can
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fill all vacancies. At the same time, there might also be households that have not
received any job offers.
Both, rationed firms and households, have a second opportunity to be matched
in a second round of the labor market procedure. Before reentering the labor market,
the rationed firms increase their base wage offer wbaseit by
wbaseit = (1 + ϕ) · wbaseit . (3.45)
This should account for the fact that firms that have failed to fill vacancies try to
attract new workers by raising their wages.
In the opposite case, when the labor demand is lower than the number of workers
employed at the beginning of t, firms have to make redundancies. They expect that
high-skilled workers have either higher specific skills or, at least, are capable of
learning faster while working with more productive technologies. Therefore, firms
dismiss workers with low general skills first. Additionally, there is a small probability
for each worker-employer match to be separated in each period. This should capture
job separation due to reasons not explicitly captured in the model.
Not only the wage of new workers but also the wage of the incumbent workforce
is linked to the productivity. By assuming that the wage keeps pace with the produc-
tivity growth in the economy, the individual wage of a worker h changes according
to
wht = (1 + prt−1) · wht−1, (3.46)
where prt−1 is the average productivity growth achieved in the previous period t−1.
3.2.7 Consumption Market Interaction
There is a considerable degree of uncertainty regarding the household’s monthly
income stemming from two sources. The first source is the labor income that can
rapidly change by being fired or hired. The second source of uncertainty is the capital
income that depends on fluctuating dividend payments of firms. For a saving and
consumption decision with uncertain income, a strand of the consumption theory
literature describes models with buffer stock saving in which households undertake
precautionary saving in order to preserve them against bad future incomes. This
theory is also supported by empirical evidences (see, e.g., Carroll and Summers,
1991; Deaton, 1991).
For determining the consumption budget, households apply a linear approxima-
tion of an optimal buffer stock saving rule as described in Allen and Carrol (2001).
The desired buffer stock depends on the current income and is determined by a tar-
get ration Φ of wealth to income. As long as the actual wealth matches the desired
buffer, a household would completely spend the monthly income for consumption.
In case the actual size of the wealth deviates from the planned buffer, the household
reacts by increasing or decreasing the monthly consumption budget relative to the
income, depending on the deviation of the wealth from its target. A parameter κ
indicates how sensitive the consumption reacts on the deviation. The rule can be
written as
Cexpht = Iht + κ(Wht − ΦIht), (3.47)
where Iht is the monthly income consisting of labor or unemployment benefits, re-
spectively, as well as dividend payments. Wht is the wealth consisting of money
holdings and asset wealth in shares.
The consumption goods market is represented by a central outlet mall in which
consumption goods producers offer and sell their goods to households. Households
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visit this outlet mall once a week and try to spend the entire weekly budget for
one good. The days at which they go to the mall are randomly distributed among
households. In the mall, the customers can observe the prices but they do not get
information about the available quantities. The purchasing decision of households
is described using a logit model as suggested in the Marketing literature (see, e.g.,
Malhotra, 1984). The relative price of goods is an important factor influencing the
outcome of the decision, where the intensity of choice with respect to the prices is
set by a parameter γC .
Since firms have inflexible production cycles they can refill the mall inventories
only once per month. Furthermore, the individual delivery dates of firms are asyn-
chronized. Thus, the supply is strictly limited by available inventory stocks and,
since the households have no information on the inventories, there is the possibility
to be rationed. In this case, the mall sets a rationing quota corresponding to the
percentage of the total demand that can be satisfied with the available goods and
each household gets the indicated percentage of the requested consumption. Ra-
tioned households have a second chance to spend the remaining budget for another
good.
3.2.8 Parametrization and Initialization
The model hosts a considerable number of parameters. In order to determine a
parametrization used for the simulations, we follow an approach that combines a
direct estimation of parameters for which empirical observations are available with
an indirect calibration approach. Calibration means we use the degrees of freedom
stemming from parameters without empirical counterparts to tweak the model in
such a way that it generates economically accurate simulation outcomes. This facil-
itates the ability of the model to capture economic mechanisms which are relevant
for real world economic dynamics. Table 3.1 provides an overview of the standard
constellation of model parameters obtained from the empirically grounded calibra-
tion procedure.5 Besides the parametrization, the table also shows the set-up of the
model regarding the number of agents of each type, the general skill distribution
among households and the adjustment speed of specific skills for the general skill
groups.
In Section 3.5 we provide a detailed sensitivity analysis for the parameters listed
in Table 3.1. By changing the model parameters within a given range, we can
identify possible effects of these parameters on key economic variables as e.g. the
output growth and can, therefore, assess the sensitivity of the model with respect
to the choice of parameters.
In the model, technological change is one of the main drivers of long-term eco-
nomic growth, where the technological development is mainly determined by the
growth of the technological frontier and the diffusion of technologies. To avoid
spurious growth effects stemming from stochastic differences in the dynamic of the
technological frontier between runs, we use an identical realization of the stochastic
process governing the emergence of new vintages in all considered runs.
Agent based models are typically characterized by strong path dependencies.
Therefore, the initial state of the system, which is an exogenous input to the si-
5Table 3.1 shows all parameters that are mentioned in the model description and their values
used for the simulations. Additionally, the table lists some parameters especially for the credit
and financial market that are not explicitly discussed in this paper but are listed for the sake of
thoroughness. For a detailed description of those parameters, the reader is referred to Dawid et al.
(2012b).
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 93
Symbol Name Value
Agents
Households 1600
Firms (initially) 80
Investment good producers 1
Banks 2
Central Bank 1
Government 1
General skill distribution
bgenh = 1 Low-skilled workers 50%
bgenh = 2 High-skilled workers 50%
Specific skill adaptation speed
χ(bgenh = 1) Speed for low-skilled workers 0.0125
χ(bgenh = 2) Speed for high-skilled workers 0.03703
Parameters
tax Income tax rate 0.025
κ Consumption adjustment 0.001
δ Capital depreciation rate 0.01
χS Service level expected demand 0.7
γC Intensity of consumer choice 12.0
ρ Discount rate 0.02
∆qinv Technological progress 0.05
TEx Maximum deferral period 24
σV Demand volatility 0.1
TLT Investment planning horizon 60
σ2D Expected variance 0.1
TLoan Debt repayment period 18
ω Debt rescaling factor 0.50
rc ECB base rate 0.03
mrc ECB rate markdown deposit rate 0.1
df Dividend payout ratio 0.70
d¯ Threshold full dividends (firms) 0.5
αb Basel capital requirement 10.0
βb Min. cash reserve ratio 0.10
hFB Firm birth hazard rate 0.01
sF Initial equity for start ups 4.0
ϕ Wage update 0.01
ψ Wage reservation update 0.01
%up Upper bound firing 0.1
γgen Logit parameter general skills 0.5
u Unemployment benefit pct 0.55
Table 3.1: Set-up and parametrization of the model.
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mulation, can have considerable effects on the simulation output. This makes the
choice of the initial state to a crucial one. In general, there are several conditions
that constrain the initialization of agents’ state variables. First and foremost, the
initial values of the variables should be plausible in order to avoid odd initial states
generating economically unreasonable simulation outcomes. Second, we have to con-
sider several interdependencies of variables. Especially with respect to the balance
sheet of agents, we have to initialize the variables according to the criterion of stock-
flow consistency. If the balance sheets are inconsistent from the start, they would
remain so throughout the entire simulation. Thus, we are constrained to set the
initial values in such a way that the balance sheet relationships between agents hold
(a deeper discussion of these constraints can be found in Dawid et al., 2012b).
We set up the model in such a way that the agents are initially homogeneous
with respect to most characteristics. Firms have identical assets (a capital stock
of the same size and quality, and the same amount of liquidity) and liabilities, and
there are no established worker-employer matches. Households own the same wealth
and are endowed with the same specific skills. The general skills of households are
heterogeneous and distributed according to the distribution reported in Table 3.1.
After a simulation has started, the distributions of certain variables of agents
such as firm size, capital productivity or households’ wealth evolve endogenously
over time. Whether the properties of the emerging distributions match empirical
distributions can be considered as a proof for the validity of the model.
It should be clear that any initialization has invariably transient effects but these
transient effects level off with elapsing simulation time. In order to alleviate that
those transient effects distort the policy experiments, we use a start state of the
economy for the simulations which is already settled. Therefore, we have run a pre-
simulation based on the initial state described above and chosen a post-transient
snapshot of this simulation as the initialization for all simulations considered in the
following sections.
3.3 Business Cycle Properties and Stylized Facts
In this section, we present some properties of a representative simulation run gene-
rated with the default parametrization of the model. The aim is to demonstrate that
the model described in Section 3.2 generates simulation outcome with realistic pro-
perties, thereby replicating various empirical stylized facts. The ability of a model
to replicate stylized facts is one possibility to verify the model. Our focus is on the
ability to generate endogenous business cycles with realistic properties, which can
be seen as proof of its applicability for considering policy questions regarding the
stabilization of business cycles.
Figure 3.1 shows the main macro variables output, annual output growth rates,
inflation and unemployment rate. From panel (a) and (b), one can clearly see that
the model generates endogenous business cycles. Output dynamics are characterized
by persistent fluctuations and growth with a business cycle component around the
trend. The long-term annual growth rate is 1.6% while over the business cycle the
growth rate deviates considerably from its long-term average. The volatility of the
business cycle6 can be measured by computing the percentage standard deviation of
the cyclical component. Therefore, the time series has been detrended by means of
the HP filter with λ = 1600, which is a standard choice for a business cycle analysis
6The volatility of the business cycle is of particular interest in Section 3.4, in which different
policies with the goal of reducing the business cycle volatility are discussed.
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Figure 3.1: Time series of (log) output (a), annual growth rate (b), annual inflation
rate (c), and unemployment rate (d).
of quarterly data (for more details, see, e.g., Hodrick and Prescott, 1997). The
relative standard deviation is 1.54% for the representative simulation run. Sorensen
and Whitta-Jacobsen (2005), for example, report a volatility of 1.66% for the U.S.
business cycle between 1955 and 2001, hence the volatility generated by the model
matches the empirically observable values substantially.
A further property of the business cycle is its persistence. Persistence describes
the dependency of the level of output in period t from its previous realizations
and is typically measured by the one-quarter auto-correlation. The auto-correlation
coefficient of the cyclical component of output is 0.9. A value of 0.9 implies that
the business cycle is highly persistent. This observation is also in accordance with
empirical observations (see again Sorensen and Whitta-Jacobsen, 2005, who report
a value of 0.86 for the U.S. economy).
The average length of the detected business cycles is about 21 quarters (corre-
sponding to 5.25 years) with a minimum length of 17 quarters and a maximum of
24 quarters. This is within the range of 6 to 32 quarters, which is customarily used
for defining business cycles in the empirical literature (see, e.g., Baxter and King,
1999). Moreover, Figure 3.1 shows a persistent inflation, fluctuating in a corridor
between -0.5 and 4% with a mean of 1.8% (panel c). Also the unemployment rate
fluctuates, where its range is between 5.5 and 11.2% with a mean of 7.8% (panel d).
The empirical business cycle literature examines the relationship between the
aggregate business cycle and various other macroeconomic variables, such as prices,
wages, employment, productivity, investment, and consumption. A broader discus-
sion of business cycle properties of 71 U.S. economic time series can be found in
Stock and Watson (1999). Table 3.2 on page 97 summarizes the business cycle pro-
perties for a set of economic time series of the benchmark simulation. The second
column of the table shows the volatility by means of percent standard deviation as
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Figure 3.2: Capital growth rate distributions; unweighted and weighted by invest-
ment.
described above and the remaining columns indicate the co-movement of the vari-
ables with GDP. The co-movement is measured by cross-correlations Cor(xt, yt+k)
of the cyclical component of a time series x with the cyclical component of output,
y. A large positive correlation at k = 0 indicates procyclical co-movement and a
large negative correlation countercyclical behavior. A maximum correlation at, for
example, k = −1 indicates that the cyclical component of series x tends to lag the
aggregate business cycle (series y) by one quarter.
From Table 3.2 one can see that the total consumption is procyclical and almost
as volatile as output, where in contrast to the empirical findings, the consumption is
more volatile. The volatility of investments is considerably higher than the volatility
of consumption and output, a fact that is often reported (see, e.g., Stock and Watson,
1999). A difference can be seen in the co-movement of investments and output.
While the empirical literature observes coincidence, investments lead the business
cycle in the baseline simulation. But the cyclical component of the capital stock is
strongly procyclical in the simulation.
Lumpiness of investments at the firm level is a frequently reported stylized fact
for the capital accumulation (see Dosi et al., 2006). Based on U.S. plant level data,
Doms and Dunne (1998) show that 51.9% of plants expand their capital stock by less
than 2.5% in a year, while 11% of plants increase their capital stock by more than
20% within the same time interval. Figure 3.2 presents two distributions generated
from the benchmark simulation, the density of annual capital growth rates of all
firms and the density of the growth rate weighted by firms’ investment (see Doms
and Dunne, 1998, for more details). The figure shows that 59% of firms invest less
than 2.5% within a given year, while 7% of firms increase their capital stock by more
than 20%. However, these 7% significantly contribute to the aggregated investment.
The weighted density shows that these firms account for 20% of the total investments.
At the other end of the distribution, the 59% of firms, which increase the capital
stocks by less than 2.5%, contribute to about 22% of the overall investment. This
suggests that, in accordance with empirical evidences, the investment behavior of
firms in the model is characterized by a considerable lumpiness.
The labor market indicators behave as one would expect: employment is strongly
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Figure 3.3: The Beveridge curve approximated by means of a log-linear regression.
procyclical and, as a direct consequence, the unemployment rate is strongly coun-
tercyclical. During boom phases, firms tend to expand their workforce while during
recessions they need to reduce the number of workers. This pattern is also reflected
by the strongly procyclical co-movement of vacancies. The empirical relation of un-
employment and the amount of open jobs is typically summarized in the Beveridge
curve, where a negative correlation between unemployment rates and the number of
open jobs is an empirical fact (see, e.g., Blanchard et al., 1989). Figure 3.3 shows
a clearly downward sloping Beveridge curve for the simulation run, which indicates
that the model is able to generate a negative relationship between unemployment
rate and number of vacancies.
Total credit moves procyclical leading the cycle by two quarters, which shows
that private debt expands during booms and contracts during a decline. This indi-
cates that the primary reason for firms to increase debt is to finance expansion of
production rather than to re-finance already existing debt.
A further observation is that the Herfindahl index, which is a measure for the
market concentration, moves coincidentally with the business cycle. This suggests
that during boom phases firms expand their production volumes unequally. Thus,
some firms can increase their market shares at the expense of other firms, which leads
to an increased market concentration. As a result, the different growth patterns
generate heterogeneity of firms with respect to firm sizes. Despite sector specific
differences, the empirical literature on firm size distributions reports a common
regularity, namely the tendency of firm size distributions to be right-skewed with
upper tails made of few large firms (see, e.g., Dosi et al., 2006). Panel (a) of Figure 3.4
shows the simulated firm size distribution in a Log Rank vs. Log Size plot, where
output is used as a proxy for firm size. The actual firm size distribution is represented
by circles while the solid line shows the log-normal distribution with the sample mean
and standard deviation as distribution parameters. The plot indicates that the firm
size distribution is close to the log-normal distribution so that it is characterized by
a considerable right-skewness. It should be noted that the firm size distribution in
panel (a) is based on a snapshot of the simulation at month 250; in panel (b) we
show the evolution of the firm size distribution over time. This panel indicates that
the right-skewness of the distribution is persistent.
Coming back to the co-movement of variables, Table 3.2 shows the co-movement
of the price index, nominal wages, and two measures of productivity, the produc-
tivity of the capital stock and the average level of specific skills of the employed
workers. The price index is countercyclically lagging the business cycle and for the
wage, there is no significant cross correlation. Stock and Watson (1999) report coun-
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Figure 3.4: Firm size distribution; Log Rank vs. Log Size plot of firm output (a)
and evolution of output distribution (b). The color code indicates the density of the
population distribution in the considered range of the variable output.
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of the productivity distribution (a) and evolution of average
productivity of firms that are low-productive (red) and high-productive (black) at
t = 100 (b).
tercyclical and leading co-movement for wages and prices. For the co-movement of
productivity, we find a procyclical evolution for both measures, which is consistent
with the findings in Stock and Watson (1999).
The productivity dynamics of firms generated by the model shows some charac-
teristics which are widely described in the empirical literature (see again Dosi et al.,
2006). Figure 3.5 (a) depicts the evolution of the productivity distribution over time
where productivity is measured as the productivity of the utilized capital stock. Be-
sides the general increase of the average productivity due to technological progress,
this figure indicates that there is considerable productivity dispersion among firms
and the distribution, as that of firm sizes, tends to be right-skewed. Panel (b) indi-
cates a high persistence of productivity differentials between firms which is a further
empirical regularity reported by Dosi et al. (2006). The panel shows the evolution of
the average productivity of two subgroups of firms, which belong either to the lower
50% quantile (red line) or to the upper 50% quantile (black line) of the technology
distribution at months 100. Evidently, there is only little technological catch up of
the lagging firms. Firms that have belonged to the group of low-tech firms in an
early phase of the simulation show a high probability to remain low-tech throughout
the simulation.
Unlike in most standard macroeconomic models, the mark-ups are determined
endogenously at the firm level and change over time. As it can be seen in Table 3.2,
mark-ups tend to move countercyclical. It has been argued in Blanchard (2008) that,
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indeed, there is empirical indication of countercyclical mark-ups (see Bils and Chang,
2000) and that it is a wide open macroeconomic research question to provide sound
theoretical explanations for the movement of mark-ups along the business cycle.
3.4 The Policy Analysis
3.4.1 Policy Design
The previous section has demonstrated that the model generates endogenous busi-
ness cycles with realistic properties, thereby replicating important stylized facts of
micro- and macroeconomic dynamics. In this section we employ this model in order
to carry out policy experiments in which we investigate the effectiveness of fiscal
policy measures that aim at smoothing the business cycle volatility.
As pointed out in the introduction, the U.S. administration of President George
W. Bush and Barack Obama enacted 2008 and 2009 two stimulus packages of con-
siderable size in response to the world economic crisis started in 2008. Both pack-
ages contained, among others, tax rebates to households as a stimulus for private
consumption as well as direct and indirect investment subsidies to business firms.
The investment policies of the two programs differed from each other by a varying
technological targeting. While the package of 2008 aimed at basically stimulating
any investment by changed tax treatments of investment costs and capital deprecia-
tion, the economic stimulus plan of 2009 had a stronger focus on those investments
supporting the technological advance of the U.S. economy. Broadly speaking, the
different policy measures of the two packages can be summarized under three distinct
policy categories; demand subsidization, investment subsidization, and technology
subsidization. We mimic these policies in a highly stylized way and try to address
the following research questions in three independent policy scenarios: Are these
three policies actually able to smooth the business cycle? Do the policies have long-
term effects on the growth path of the economy? And finally, is the financing of the
policies self-sustained or must the government finance them separately?
In the policy analysis we abstract from problems associated with time lags in
detecting recessions and implementing policies and also from other issues of the
political economy. Therefore, even if we interpret the policies as discretionary, we
implement them in a rule-based fashion. With rule-based we mean that the stabi-
lization policies are automatically introduced and adjusted when there is a risk of the
economy to plunge into an economic crisis. Therefore, we define a threshold growth
rate gth at which the policy is automatically installed if the quarterly growth rate
gQt−1 of the last period is below this threshold.
7 In order to achieve the stabilizing
effect, the expansion of the policies are adjusted depending on the deviation of the
last-period growth rate from the threshold.
The first of the considered policies is a classical demand-oriented Keynesian
stimulus. The aggregate demand is increased by stimulating consumption through
a direct subsidization of households. When the quarterly growth rate is below the
critical growth rate, all households receive a subsidy, where the individual subsidy
is a percentage sHHt of the household’s current monthly consumption budget. As
pointed out above, we assume that the subsidy rate sHHt increases with the gap
7The target growth rate is set such that it corresponds to the average growth rate of the tech-
nological frontier, which can be interpreted as the natural growth potential of the economy. As will
be pointed out below, the frontier grows at an annual rate of about 2%. Thus, the threshold value
at which the policy is activated is gth = 0.005.
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between the actual and the threshold growth rate. Thus, the larger the deviation of
the growth rate from gth, the more subsidies are paid out to households. The size
of the subsidy rate is determined according to the following equation:
sHHt = µ · tanh
(
max
[
0, gth − gQt−1
])
. (3.48)
Besides the deviation of the quarterly growth rate from the threshold gth, the size
of the subsidy rate depends on a exogenous parameter µ. This parameter is used in
the policy experiments to control the intensity of the policy (see below).
We assume that households know the conditions of the policy ex ante and take
the subsidy as additional budget into account when deciding about consumption
plans. It is not possible to retain and save the subsidies because households have to
spend subsidies immediately.
The second policy is a subsidization of firms’ capital investment. When the
policy is implemented, all investing firms receive a fraction sInvt of their investment
expenditures as subsidies. Again, we assume that firms know the conditions of the
policy ex ante and incorporate the subsidy in their investment decision by taking
a reduced capital price into account. The subsidy percentage sInvt is determined
according to the same rule as described in Expression 3.48.
The third policy scenario also considers an investment subsidization, but in con-
trast to the second policy, firms receive subsidies only if they choose the currently
available best practice technology for their investment. As for the other policies, the
subsidy rate sTecht is determined according to Equation 3.48.
8
We set up simulations in which we vary the intensity parameter µ incrementally
by steps of size 0.25 within an interval between null and a maximum level µmax.
This enables us to examine a quasi-continuation of policy effects and allows a better
analysis and comparison of the three policies. The maximum intensity is different for
each policy and is chosen such that a further increase does not lead to a significant
reduction of business cycle volatility. We have µmax = 12.0 for the consumption
policy, µmax = 28.0 for the investment policy, and µmax = 20.0 for the technology
policy.
We run 12 batch runs for each of the considered values of µ. With µ = 0 no
policy is applied; this case is the baseline scenario and is considered in the following
subsection in more detail. When µ > 0, then one of the three stabilization policies is
implemented, where the intensity of the policy differs depending on the parametri-
zation of µ. It should be noted that identical values of µ for different policies do not
imply quantitatively comparable policy scenarios.
3.4.2 The Baseline Scenario With No Policies
Before we start the discussion of the policies, we consider the baseline scenario in
more detail. For the baseline scenario, we have 12 independent simulation runs that
are based on the same parameter setting and initial condition. Nevertheless, since
each single run represents the outcome of a Montecarlo process, there can be a con-
siderable variance among the runs. In order to demonstrate generic properties of
the baseline case and to eliminate spurious effects stemming from statistical outliers,
we consider aggregated time series of economic variables in the following discussion.
Therefore, we have pooled the 12 single time series of a particular variable under
8Applications of the latter two policies are considered in Dawid et al. (2014) in the context of
cohesion policies within a two region setup of the Eurace@Unibi model.
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Figure 3.6: Spline smoothed evolution of the trajectory of aggregated output (a)
and quarterly growth rates (b).
study and estimated a statistical representation of the whole batch by using Gen-
eralized Additive Models (GAM) with penalized splines (see, e.g., Wood, 2011, for
more details). Predictions of the estimated GAM9 given by
gt = g0 + s(t) (3.49)
are used as the aggregated representation of the time series. In this expression, g is
the response variable that is distributed following some exponential family distribu-
tion, time t in months is the covariate of the statistical model and g0 is a parametric
intercept. The term s(t) is an unknown smooth function that depends on covariate
t. The GAM yields a smoothed time series for the considered variable in which
those interferences are filtered out that might arise by shifted business cycles waves
between batch runs.
With no policy treatment the simulation of the model with 12 runs yields output
trajectories that are represented by the time series in Figure 3.6 (a). One can see
that the positive trend observed for the output trajectory in the discussion of the
single run in Section 3.3 seems to be a generic feature of the simulation. If the short-
term business cycles are statistically smoothed out, the economy shows persistent
growth at an average annual rate of 1.61%. Recall that we have observed an average
growth rate of 1.6% for the illustrative single run in Section 3.3. Furthermore, the
average business cycle volatility of the batch is with about 1.65% also close to the
value 1.54% described in Section 3.3.
Panel (b) depicts the evolution of the quarterly growth rates of the economy.
Apparently, the smoothed growth rates are not constant over time. This suggests
that the simulation generates not only short-term volatility but also long-term dy-
namism. The economy is characterized by a persistent disequilibrium rather than by
a quasi-equilibrium with constant long-term growth around which the business cycle
fluctuates in the short run. This observation is also supported when looking at other
macroeconomic variables. Panel (a) of Figure 3.7, for example, depicts the evolution
of the unemployment rate. After smoothing out short-term fluctuations, the unem-
ployment rate evolves dynamically in long waves. The lowest unemployment rate
can be observed at the beginning of the simulation and the highest between month
300 and 400. Similarly, the (smoothed) quarterly inflation rate varies over time,
where it has its highest level at the outset. This is plausible as at the same time
also the labor market tension is high. Firms have difficulties to fill open vacancies
9We have used the function gam of the mgcv package in R for estimations of Generalized Additive
Models in this paper. An introduction how to estimate GAMs in R can be found in Wood (2006).
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Figure 3.7: Spline smoothed evolution of the trajectory of unemployment rates (a),
quarterly inflation rates (b), capital stock (c); panel d: spline smoothed evolution
of capital productivity (black), specific skills (red) and the unsmoothed evolution of
technological frontier (green).
so that a dynamical change of base wage offers emerges that drives unit costs up
and eventually results in higher inflation. As time elapses, the unemployment rate
becomes gradually higher, which takes some pressure off the labor market. With
the increasing unemployment rate also the inflation rate declines.
The evolution of the aggregated capital stock in panel (c) mirrors the evolution
of the unemployment rate, which is a consequence of the assumed complementarity
of labor and capital. In panel (d) we show the evolution of the productivity in the
economy. The green line displays the evolution of the technological frontier, whose
average annual growth is at about 2.01%.10 The other two lines show the evolution
of the average productivity of the employed capital (black line) and the average
specific skills of workers (red line). Apparently, there is a persistent gap between
the capital productivity and the productivity of workers. This gap can be explained
by the fact that the learning process of employees takes time. Furthermore, the
panel shows that specific skills are the limiting factor within the complementary
relation of physical and human capital.
The average annual growth rate of the specific skills is 1.87% and the growth
rate of the productivity is 1.74% p.a. This means that the gap between specific
skills and the capital productivity tends to become closer. At the same time, the
growth of the aggregated productivity is lower than that of the frontier so that the
average productivity and the frontier diverge over time. Compared to the aggregate
output, the growth rate of the productivity is higher so that the output growth can
10Note that, as discussed above, the innovation process within the capital goods sector is modeled
as a stochastic process. In the simulations, however, we use an identical realization of this process
in each simulation run.
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Figure 3.8: Spline smoothed standard deviations (in percent of the mean) used as an
indicator for the heterogeneity of firms with respect to firm size (a) and technological
productivity (b).
largely but not completely be explained by the speed of technological progress in
the economy.
In Section 3.3 we have already considered the distributions of firm sizes and
productivity. For both variables we have found a right-skewness in the hetero-
geneity. The productivity distribution seemed to be persistent over time so that
low-productive firms catch up to the technological leaders only at a very low speed.
In Figure 3.8 we depict the evolution of indicators for the heterogeneity of both dis-
tributions. In this figure, panel (a) shows the relative standard deviation of firms’
output and panel (b) the relative standard deviation of the capital stock productivity.
Both panels indicate a non-stationarity of heterogeneity. In fact, the heterogeneity
of both distributions seem to increase first and start to decline substantially later.
The turnaround occurs earlier for the productivity distribution rather than for the
output distribution.
For the remaining discussion in this subsection, we define two firm groups and
assign all firms in each period to either of the groups by comparing the individual
capital productivity with the current median productivity of the firm population.
Panel (a) of Figure 3.9 shows the average productivity of these groups, the black line
indicates the productivity of the high-tech group and the red line the productivity
for low-tech firms. As one would expect, there is a substantial difference in terms of
productivity. In addition, there exists a gap from the start indicating that the pre-
ceding pre-simulation has already generated a considerable heterogeneity of firms.11
In order to detect whether or not there is technological catch up, we plot in panel (b)
the relative productivity as a ratio between high- and low-tech firms. Apparently,
the path of the relative productivity resembles Figure 3.8 (b), which has described
the heterogeneity of firms’ productivity. While the technological distance between
less and more productive firms increases in the short run, we observe technological
catch-up in the long term.
Panel (c) plots the average output for low- and high-tech firms. Evidently, there
is a strong correlation between productivity and firm output so that high-productive
firms account for significantly more output than low-productive firms. As in case of
productivity, the pattern changes over time; in the short term high-tech firms grow
at a high rate while the output of low-tech firms declines. As a result, a strong
output divergence emerges during this phase (compare panel d showing the relative
11Recall that the start state of this simulation is a snapshot of a simulation, whose start state
was characterized by a homogeneous initialization for almost all variables.
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Figure 3.9: Upper row: Spline smoothed evolution of the capital productivity of
high- and low-tech firms (a) and corresponding productivity ratio between high-
tech and low-tech firms and output (b); lower row: Spline smoothed evolution of
the output of high- and low-tech firms (c) and corresponding output ratio between
high-tech and low-tech firms and output (d) .
output). Eventually, the growth of high-productive firms becomes less intense and,
at the same time, the output of low-tech firms starts to grow at a high rate. Thus,
a convergence of output can be observed in the long run, which is consistent with
the long-term decline of the firm size heterogeneity.
The physical investment and the resulting evolution of capital stocks is closely
linked with the output pattern (see Figure 3.10 a and b). During the period of output
divergence, high-productive firms expand their capital stocks whereas investments
of low-tech firms are below the depreciation so that their capital stocks decline. In
the later phase, when output levels converge, we can also observe a convergence of
capital stocks.
The vintage choice of firms is one of the important drivers of the evolution
of capital productivity. The vintage choice is displayed in panel (c) and (d) of
Figure 3.10, where panel (c) shows the average vintage choice per productivity group
and panel (d) the relative vintage choice. Evidently, firms belonging to the group of
high-productive firms systematically invest more in higher vintages than their low-
productive competitors. In contrast to the gap for the capital productivity, there
is no divergence of vintage choices at the beginning of the simulation; instead the
productivity of the selected vintages converges from the start, where the convergence
begins to cease at month 400.
When working with high-productive machines, an individual worker builds up
specific skills faster if the worker is well educated, i.e. his general skill level bgenh is
high (compare Section 3.2.3). For this reason, an important driver for the vintage
choice is the educational attainment of the employed workforce. In the decision-
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Figure 3.10: Spline smoothed evolution of investments (a), capital stocks (b), vintage
choices (c) with the corresponding ratio high vs. low-tech firms (d), average general
skills (d), and growth rates of productivity for low-tech (red line) and high-tech
(black line) firms (f).
making regarding the vintage choice, the firm estimates the expected specific skill
adjustment given the current average level of general skills of the incumbent work-
force (see Section 3.2.4.3). If the firm has only a low-educated workforce, it will
anticipate the only limited advantage of a high-productive vintage. In this case, the
firm will invest in a less productive but cheaper one.
Panel (e) shows the average general skill level for the two firm groups. Appar-
ently, there is a self-selection of workers according to their general skill groups so
that high-productive firms attract mainly high-skilled workers. This self-selection
might explain the persistence of productivity gaps between technological leaders and
laggards. The preference of high-skilled workers to work for high-productive firms
results in a general skill dispersion among the productivity level of firms. The po-
larized skill distribution, in turn, reinforces the spread of vintage choices. Moreover,
panel (e) indicates that the gap in terms of general skills between high- and low-tech
firms narrows over time. This convergence of general skills provides an explanation
for the tendency of vintage choices to converge in the long run.
The quantitative investment decision and the vintage choice can explain the
evolution of firms’ heterogeneity in terms of productivity. While in the early stage
of the simulation investments of low-productive firms are low, the high-productive
firms intensively invest in their capital stocks. The purchased capital vintages are
thereby more productive, which leads, as indicated in panel (f), to a temporarily
higher growth rate of the productivity for high-tech firms. This translates in a
technological divergence during this period.
On the other hand, the frontier grows steadily and from time to time the in-
vestment goods firm withdraws old vintages from the menu. Since the productivity
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Figure 3.11: Spline smoothed ratios high-tech vs. low-tech firms for base wage offers
(a), wage offer for high-skilled (red line) and low-skilled (black line) workers (b) and
unit labor costs (red line) and unit production costs (black line) (c).
of the capital menu increases in total, also the vintages in which low-tech firms in-
vest become more productive over time. Consequently, there is a gap between the
productivity of the purchased capital and the productivity of their existing capi-
tal stock when low-tech firms start to intensify their investments. This gap is the
reason why the average growth rate of low-tech firms’ productivity starts to rise in
the medium term and eventually exceeds the growth rate of high-productive firms.
As time elapses, this process gradually merges with the declining productivity gap
between high- and low-tech firms in terms of vintage choice and leads to the partial
technological catch-up of low-tech firms.
In the following, we want to discuss the emerging general skill dynamics in
more detail. As mentioned above, the general skill level of high-tech firms declines
throughout the simulation, while for low-tech firms it first declines and later it starts
to increase (see Figure 3.10 f). The dynamics of average skills is thereby a conse-
quence of labor market activities of firms. In the initial phase when outputs diverge,
high-tech firms expand their workforce while at the same time almost no high-skilled
workers are available. As a result, these firms hire more low-skilled workers, which
leads to a steady decline of their general skills. The average general skill level of
low-tech firms, in contrast, declines during the first 100 months suggesting that in
this phase there is a transfer of high-skilled workers from low to high-tech firms.
At about month 100, there are almost no high-skilled employees working for low-
tech firms. In the following, the average general skill level is constant at its lowest
possible level for a longer period.
A critical factor for filling vacancies are wage offers that the firms post (see
Section 3.2.6). Panel (a) of Figure 3.11 depicts the relative dynamics of base wage
offers. At the outset, there is a considerable gap between the base wage offers of
high- and low-tech firms, where the wage offers of low-tech firms are systematically
higher. This gap narrows over time and is almost closed at the end of the simulation.
The initial spread of base wage offers is caused by a systematical labor shortage of
low-tech firms during the pre-simulation phase. A higher labor demand especially
in the early stage of the main simulation prompts high-tech firms to increase their
base wage offers, which leads to the observed convergence of base wage offers.
From the workers’ perspective, it is not the base wage offer but the general skill
specific wage offer that matters for the acceptance of a job offer. Panel (b) plots
the (relative) wage offers for the low-skilled workers (black line) and high-skilled
workers (red line). A comparison of the two lines shows a clear difference; wages for
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 108
0 100 200 300 400 500
0.
95
0.
96
0.
97
0.
98
Months
pr
ic
e
0 100 200 300 400 500
1.
0
1.
1
1.
2
1.
3
1.
4
Months
a
ct
ua
l_
m
ar
k_
up
(a) (b)
0 100 200 300 400 500
1.
4
1.
6
1.
8
2.
0
Months
e
a
rn
in
gs
0 100 200 300 400 500
6
8
10
12
Months
de
bt
_e
qu
ity
_r
a
tio
(c) (d)
Figure 3.12: Spline smoothed ratios high vs. low-tech firms for prices (a), mark-ups
(b), earnings (c); spline smoothed evolution of debt equity ratios (f) for high-tech
(black line) and low-tech (red line) firms.
high-skilled workers are higher throughout the simulation if they are offered by high-
tech firms. But the distance changes over time; initially the relative attractiveness of
high-tech firms increases but later high-tech firms lose some of their leading position.
Consequently, it becomes more attractive for high-skilled workers to accept job offers
from low-tech firms. This leads to an increasing number of high-skilled workers
employed by low-tech firms in the long run. In contrast, wage offers for low-skilled
workers are higher for low-tech firms. The biggest difference can be observed at
the beginning of the simulation and it becomes smaller as time elapses. Thus, it
is initially less attractive for low-skilled workers to accept job offers made by high-
productive firms. Since these firms have a high labor demand, they need to become
more attractive for low-skilled workers, where this is achieved through a reduction
of the gap to the wage offers for low-skilled workers posted by low-tech firms.
A consequence of rising base wage offers is that wages of high-tech firms grow
disproportionally to their productivity so that labor becomes effectively more ex-
pensive. Since labor costs account for the biggest share of firms’ total costs, higher
unit labor costs will eventually affect unit production costs. This can be seen in
panel (c) in which the red line shows (relative) unit labor costs and the black line
(relative) unit production costs. Apparently, high-tech firms loose most of their cost
advantages over the considered time horizon, which is one of the main drivers for
the long-term convergence of output.
The dichotomy of the output evolution with a divergent phase in the short and
convergence in the long run is accompanied by an corresponding change of relative
prices (see Figure 3.12 a). During the output divergence, prices of low- and high-
tech firms drift apart where high-tech firms, which aim at gaining additional market
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Figure 3.13: Effects of the consumption subsidy policy (a), investment subsidy policy
(b), and technology subsidy policy (c) on the volatility of the business cycle.
shares, decrease their prices relative to the prices of their competitors. Conversely,
when low-tech firms try to catch up in terms of output, they must close the price
gap to the high-tech firms. Thus, the prices have to converge as well in the period
of output convergence.
The initial divergence of prices and the simultaneous relative increase of unit
costs of high-tech firms has a negative effect on the relative mark-ups (see panel b).
While at the outset of the simulation, high-tech firms have considerably higher
mark-ups, the lead melts away during the short period of strong price divergence
and cannot be regained afterwards.
Looking at the relative profitability in panel (c) of Figure 3.12, one can see that
high-tech firms generate higher profits throughout the simulation. Moreover, in the
period until month 200, high-tech firms are able to even enhance the profitability
compared to the low-tech firms. After month 200, profits of high- and low-tech firms
converge. Altogether, the curve of relative earnings resembles the curve of relative
outputs.
Finally, panel (d) shows the debt equity ratios indicating that high-tech firms
are more indebted. By comparing the relative debts between the low- and high-tech
firms (not shown here), one would see that for both measures there is again an initial
divergence while later the debts of low- and high-tech firms converge.
3.4.3 Policy Effects on the Business Cycle Volatility
We now turn to the comparison of the three stabilization policies. One of the policy
questions posed in Section 3.4.1 has been whether the policies are actually able
to smooth the business cycle substantially. As already described in Section 3.3, an
indicator for measuring business cycle volatility is the percentage standard deviation
computed for the cyclical component of the time series total output from its HP
filtered trend. For the baseline case, we have found an average volatility of 1.65%.
Figure 3.13 shows the effects of a variation of the policy intensity µ on this vola-
tility measure.12 The three panels demonstrate that each of the considered policies
can reduce the business cycle volatility. In that sense, the policies are suitable to
achieve the primary goal for which the policies have been designed. The effects
show qualitatively similar patterns. The estimated curves that describe the relation
12The policy effects are estimated with means of a GAM where the business cycle volatility is the
dependent and parameter µ is the explanatory variable. The dashed lines indicate the confidence
intervals of the corresponding smooth term.
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Figure 3.14: Estimated relation between business cycle volatility and policy expen-
ditures per GDP (averaged over all periods) for the consumption subsidy policy (a),
investment subsidy policy (b), and technology subsidy policy (c).
between volatility and the intensity of the policies are convex. Thus, the policies
are characterized by diminishing returns with respect to the intensity parameter µ.
Apparently, there seems to be a minimum level of volatility for each policy. The
lower bounds are almost identical for the consumption and the investment subsidy
policy but the minimum volatility of the technology policy is considerably higher.
It should be clear that a comparison of the policies based on Figure 3.13 cannot
account for input efficiency. The reason is that the intensity parameter µ is used in
different contexts such that equal values of µ are associated with different levels of
additional government spending. To make the policies comparable in this respect,
one can replace µ by an indicator measuring the average policy expenditures. In
Figure 3.14 we show the re-estimated policy effects where we use the average monthly
spending relative to the nominal GDP as input measure. Now one can see a clear
difference in terms of input efficiency between the three policies. For obtaining the
same volatility reduction, the government must spend a considerable larger share of
the GDP for the demand stimulating policy than for the investment or technology
stimulating policies. Overall, the technology policy seems to be the efficient one
even if this policy does not lead to the same volatility reduction as the other two
policies. A further observation is that in terms of fiscal spending the presumption
of diminishing returns still holds. Altogether, these observations lead to the first
qualitative insight:
Result 1: All three policies lead to a substantial reduction of the business cycle
volatility. However, the policies differ considerably in terms of their efficiency re-
garding the usage of fiscal resources. To obtain a similar volatility reduction, the
government has to spend most funds for the consumption stimulating policy, while it
has to spend considerably less for the investment and the least funds for the techno-
logy subsidizing policy.
Besides the effectiveness to stabilize the business cycle, the policy analysis in this
study tries to address possible long-term implications for other economic aggregates,
where long-term effects on the growth path and the fiscal stability of the economy
are of particular interest. In the following subsections, we will discuss the long-term
implications and the mechanisms generating the implications in more detail starting
with the consumption stimulating policy.
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Figure 3.15: Effect of the consumption subsidy policy on the debt GDP ratio of the
government measured at the end of the simulation.
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Figure 3.16: Policy effect on the average annual growth rate (left) and the evolution
of the aggregated output (right).
3.4.4 The Consumption Stimulating Policy
As already discussed above, the business cycle smoothing with means of consumption
stimulation is achieved at the expense of high fiscal payments. These subsidies are
financed by budgetary resources and increase the expenditures of the government.
This gives rise to the question which effect the policy might have on the government
debt. Figure 3.15 depicts the estimated relationship between policy intensity µ and
the public debt measured as the debt to GDP ratio at the end of the simulation.
When the policy is not implemented (i.e. µ = 0), the government budget is well
balanced as there is almost no public debt for µ = 0 after 500 months. The fis-
cally sound situation is superseded by an escalating indebtedness when the policy
parameter is gradually increased. Evidently, the implementation and intensification
of the policy forces the government to run fiscal deficits that accumulate to high
levels of public debt. As a result, a smoothing of the business cycle by consumption
subsidies can be associated with a lasting deterioration of the public debt situation.
But do these policy expenditures lead to a sustainable change of the long-term
growth? In order to demonstrate the policy effect on long-term growth, we show in
Figure 3.16 (a) the average annual real growth rate of the economy for the considered
range of the policy intensity µ. Apparently, the policy effect on economic growth
tends to be positive, where its strength increases with µ. Without policy, the average
annual growth rate is about 1.6% and rises up to approximately 1.68% for µ = 12.0.
Note that the growth rate in panel (a) is averaged over the simulation horizon. Due
to this time-based aggregation, one cannot obtain insights from panel (a) whether
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Figure 3.17: Policy effect on the nominal consumption budget (a) and the deflated
consumption budget (b).
the policy generates a sustainable effect on the growth rate that shifts the economy
at a higher growth trajectory. Otherwise the policy would only generate transient
growth effects shifting the output trajectory.
To address the question of how the effects evolve over time, one has to study
the effect of µ on the evolution of time series data. In this case, the policy effect is
statistically co-explained by a second covariate, namely time t; to account for both
explanatory variables, we specify a new GAM, in which the smooth term jointly
depends on t (in quarters) and µ. Technically speaking, since isotropic smooth
terms of the sort of s(t, µ) are only good choices when covariates are on the same
scale, which is not the case for µ and t, we opt for tensor product smooth terms to
explain the joint effect of policy intensity and time (see Wood, 2006). The GAM is
then described by
g = g0 + te(t, µ). (3.50)
Panel (b) of Figure 3.16 displays the policy effect on the time series of aggregate
output, where the effect is illustrated in terms of the relative deviation from the
baseline case.13 The Spline model confirms the hypothesis of a positive growth
effect of the policy but it also indicates that the change of the output premium is
not constant over time. This observation seems to contradict the hypothesis of a
possible uniform shift of the growth trajectory.
A more in-depth analysis of panel (b) reveals that the policy induces an initial
growth boost which seems to be relatively independent from the policy intensity. At
the outset, almost the same output increase can be achieved with low and high policy
intensities (this is indicated by the almost vertical contour lines). As time elapses,
this initial growth effect eases and the output gains become smaller, where under
higher policy intensities the slow-down is less pronounced as under low intensities.
Eventually, there is no further increase of the output premium for µ < 8.0 (indicated
by horizontal contour lines), whereas for higher policy intensities there still remains
a growing output effect. The strongest impact on the aggregate output can be
observed in the upper right corner of the predictor space at t = 500 and µ = 12.0.
In this area, the output is 3.6% higher than in the base scenario.
How does the policy lead to more output? The policy is a classical demand-
oriented policy measure that aims at supporting the economy through a stimula-
13In the following, we illustrate the effects of the policy with means of heat maps in which the
color code indicates the strength of the policy effect estimated from the Spline model with time (at
x axis) and the intensity parameter µ (at y axis) as predictor variables.
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Figure 3.18: Policy effect on the average annual inflation rate (left) and the evolution
of the change of quarterly inflation rates (right).
tion of private consumption. The higher consumption provokes firms to produce
more output, which prevents the economy from sliding into recession. Panel (a) of
Figure 3.17 shows the overall effect of the policy on the households’ consumption
budget, which is clearly positive; the premium increases steadily over time such that
the consumption budget is much greater than in the base scenario at the end of
the 500 months (e.g., for µ = 12.0 the premium is about 70%). A comparison with
the output effect reveals that the change of the consumption budget is several times
stronger (e.g. about 20 times for µ = 12.0).
It should be noted that panel (a) shows the nominal time series of consumption
while the time series of total output is measured in real terms, i.e. a direct compa-
rison is not meaningful. By adjusting for inflation, we can uncover the real policy
effect on the consumption budget. In this case the consumption budget is valued at
the same basis as real output, which makes a quantitative comparison appropriate.
The change of the deflated consumption budget is displayed in panel (b). Again, the
effect is positive throughout the simulation and becomes stronger as policy intensity
increases. For lower intensities (µ < 6), the policy seems to shift the real consump-
tion level uniformly upward such that the relative distance to the base scenario is
constant over time. For higher values of µ, the premium grows slightly with the
consequence that the maximum increase can be observed in the upper right corner
of the heat map.
If compared with its nominal counterpart, it turns out that the size of the deflated
effect is much smaller (for µ = 12.0, e.g., it is 6.5%). This suggests that the policy
leads to a considerable increase of inflation (see below). At the same time, the
effect on the deflated consumption budget is quantitatively stronger compared to the
output effect. This in turn suggests that the policy generates more (real) demand as
firms are actually able to satisfy (for µ = 12.0, the difference between the premium
of output and deflated consumption budget is 3.5% versus 6.5% at the end of the
simulation).
The actual effect on the inflation is illustrated in Figure 3.18, in which we show
the change of the average annual inflation rate in response to a change of µ (panel a)
and the dynamics of the policy effect on the inflation rate over time (panel b, here
we depict the effect on the quarterly inflation rate).14 As already suggested by the
strong deviation of the deflated consumption budget from the nominal budget, there
is a considerable increase of the inflation, where the effect seems to become stronger
14Note that in heat maps for variables denominated in rates such as growth rates, inflation, and
unemployment rates, we show differences to the base scenario rather than relative deviations.
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with increasing intensity µ.
We have assumed that firms are able to observe the nominal consumption budget
which they take into account as a proxy for market size in their production planning.
Hence, they realize when the nominal consumption budget has changed and adjust
their strategies accordingly. There are basically two responses when firms observe
an increased nominal demand, they can react by increasing the price or the output.
Actually, they will implement a combination of both choosing that strategy which
yields the highest expected gains given firms’ expectations (compare Section 3.2.4.2).
The observation of a positive effect on the deflated consumption budget suggests that
firms try to serve at least some of the additional demand rather than inflating it
completely. This conjecture is supported by the observation of increasing planned
production quantities (see Figure 3.19 a). Apparently, firms adjust their production
plans by increasing the intended output. But as there is a gap between the actual
and the intended output, firms cannot fully realize the desired production plans.
In order to expand output, firms have to hire additional workers, for which they
enter the labor market and post job vacancies. Panel (b) illustrates the positive
effect of the policy on the total number of posted vacancies. A consequence of an
increasing labor demand is that firms employ more workers and fewer households
are unemployed. Accordingly, the consumption subsidizing policy is also conducive
to reduce the unemployment in the economy (see panel c). The effect on the unem-
ployment rate is, however, not uniform; while for lower levels of the policy intensity
the (weak) impact on the unemployment seems to become slightly more intense over
time, the pattern is different for high values of µ. In this case the effect becomes
stronger until approximately quarter 90 and subsides afterwards. This pattern mir-
rors the evolution of the unemployment rate in the base scenario, which has its
maximum at around quarter 90 (compare Figure 3.7 on page 103). A high unem-
ployment rate is associated with a lower labor market tension so that the potential
for a reduction of the unemployment rate is high during this period.
A decreased unemployment rate reduces the pool of job seeking workers such
that firms are confronted with a situation in which they can fill less of their open job
vacancies. The additional rationing on the labor market is illustrated in panel (d),
which shows the effect on the fraction of posted vacancies remaining unfilled at
the end of the recruitment process. Obviously, the effect resembles that of the
unemployment rate such that the effect is the strongest when the largest reduction
of the unemployment rate can be achieved.
The emerging labor shortages can to some extent explain the gap between in-
tended and actual output. Besides the output gap, another consequence of a higher
labor market tension is a fierce competition for workers in which firms are forced to
gradually increase their wage offers to attract job seekers for their vacant jobs. This
higher competition at the labor market causes wage increases that are disconnected
from the productivity growth in the economy. Eventually, the input factor labor
becomes more expensive translating into higher unit labor costs. Panel (e) depicts
the change of the growth rate of unit labor costs, thereby indicating that labor costs
grow faster under the policy.
The increasing labor costs can explain why the increase of the consumption bud-
get is nominally much stronger than in real terms. The labor income is the main
contribution to households’ total income and, therefore, it is the prime determinant
of the nominal consumption. Thus, growing wages lead to increasing nominal con-
sumption budgets but at the same time they cause rising production costs. These
costs are mainly translated into higher prices with the consequence that, in the
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Figure 3.19: Policy effect on planned output of firms (a), number of posted vacan-
cies (b), unemployment rate (c), share of posted vacancies remaining unfilled (d),
quarterly growth rate of labor unit costs (e) and quarterly growth rate of deflated
labor unit costs (f).
end, the nominal wage increase is not associated with more real purchasing power.
Panel (f) shows the policy dynamics of the growth rate of real unit labor costs.
Except for a short period at the outset and for the last period at lower policy in-
tensities, the change of the real growth rate is almost null such that the growth of
nominal labor costs is largely offset by inflation. This suggests that, indeed, rising
labor costs are the main driver of additional inflation.
We now come back to the discussion of the policy effects on the unemployment
rate. In panel (c) of Figure 3.19, we have observed that for high policy intensities
there is a strong decline of the positive employment effect in the last phase of the
simulation. Even though the number of additionally employed workers declines rela-
tive to the base scenario, we cannot observe a simultaneous reduction of the output
premium in Figure 3.16 (b). To make this possible, there must be an increase of pro-
ductivity in the economy such that firms can produce more output with less input
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Figure 3.20: Policy effect on the average productivity of the used capital stock (a)
and the average vintage choice (b).
factors. This positive effect on productivity is indicated in panel (a) of Figure 3.20,
where this figure shows the average quality of the productive capital productivity
measure. Apparently, there is no effect on the technology except for the last phase
of the simulation. The positive effect on the technology coincides with the declining
employment effect. Moreover, it coincides with the positive effect on the output
growth for high policy intensities in the last phase of the simulation. Panel (b) indi-
cates that the improved capital productivity is the result of firms’ decision to invest
in more productive vintages of the capital good. Since the evolution of the frontier
is identical regardless the intensity of the policy, this suggests a faster diffusion of
new technologies.
Putting all the observed implications together, we can summarize the effective-
ness of the consumption subsidizing policy in the following qualitative insight:
Result 2: The consumption subsidizing policy has an amplifying effect on the
long-term growth in the economy and leads to more employment. At the same time,
the policy induces more inflation and increases the government debt substantially. In
the long run, the positive growth effect for high policy intensities is technology-driven
by a faster diffusion of new technologies.
So far, the analysis of the consumption policy has been focused on aggregated
time series. But Section 3.4.2 has revealed that firms are characterized by a consider-
able degree of heterogeneity with respect to output and technological productivity.
Even without the policy intervention, the economy undergoes dynamical changes of
firms’ heterogeneity so that the interaction of the policy and the heterogeneity of
firms might also be worth considering. Figure 3.21 shows the policy effect on firms’
heterogeneity with respect to output (panel a) and technology (panel b). Both pan-
els show a similar picture, namely that the policy effect on heterogeneity varies over
time, where three distinct phases can be identified. At the outset, the effects on the
heterogeneity of output and technology are both slightly positive, which coincides
with the initial increase of firms’ heterogeneity of technology and output in the base
scenario (compare Figure 3.8 on page 104). In the medium term, these positive ef-
fects turn into negative ones, where the effect on the technology heterogeneity seems
to lead the other effect. In the long run one can, at least for higher policy intensi-
ties, observe a strong increase for both types of heterogeneity. For lower intensities,
there is only a small increase of the output heterogeneity, whereas the technological
heterogeneity keeps its gap to the base scenario.
The observation that the policy influences the heterogeneity within the firm
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Figure 3.21: Policy effect on the percentage standard deviation of firms’ output (a)
and productivity (b)
population suggests that there are systematic differences in firms’ response to the
consumption subsidizing policy. In the discussion of the base scenario, we have
demonstrated that there are different dynamics of firms with a high-productive ca-
pital stock (high-tech firms) and those with a low-productive capital stock (low-tech
firms).15 In the following, we analyze whether there are systematic differences in
the policy effects on the behavior of high- and low-tech firms.
In the upper panels of Figure 3.22, we display the policy effect on output of
high-tech (panel a) and low-tech firms (panel b). The panels show that, indeed,
low- and high-tech firms respond differently, where the responses vary over time and
evolve systematically in opposite directions. We can basically identify three distinct
phases. In the short term, high-tech firms expand their production while at the
same time the output of low-tech firms slightly declines. This leads to an overall
increase of the heterogeneity as high-tech firms produce on average more output
than low-tech firms. As time elapses, the positive effect on the output of high-tech
firms ceases and becomes negative, while at the same time low-tech firms increase
their output substantially. This leads to a reduction of the output heterogeneity of
firms in the medium term. And finally, the effect on high-tech firms increases again
in the long run and the effect on low-tech firms declines, which is also consistent
with the positive effect on the heterogeneity in the long term. Qualitatively, the
same pattern can be observed for the policy effect on investments of high (panel c)
and low-tech firms (panel d).
How can the different behavior of low- and high-tech firms be explained? To
understand the underlying mechanism, we first focus on what happens in the short
term. The reason why high-tech firms benefit almost exclusively from the policy in
the short run is that these firms start with a competitive advantage. At the outset,
high-tech firms have (by definition) a higher technological productivity but also a
superior human capital endowment. Both translate into cost advantages that allow
high-tech firms to set lower prices without impairing the price costs margin substan-
tially. This competitive advantage in turn gives high-tech firms scope to respond
more aggressively on the additional demand generated by the policy. Thus, when
the policy is introduced, high-tech firms make use of their higher competitiveness
and grab most of the emerging demand.
The initial output expansion of high-tech firms comes along with a relative in-
crease of labor demand towards high-tech firms. This is illustrated in panel (a) of
15High-tech firms in period t are those firms whose productivity is above the median productivity
in t. Accordingly, low-tech firms are those firms with productivity below the median.
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Figure 3.22: Upper row: policy effect on the output level of high-tech (a) and low-
tech firms (b); lower row: policy effect on the investment level of high-tech (c) and
low-tech firms (d);
Figure 3.23, which shows the policy effect on the ratio of the number of posted
vacancies between high- and low-tech firms. As this ratio is shifted up in the short
run, high-tech firms account for a larger share of the additional job offers.
The relative labor demand has a positive effect on the size of high-tech firms’
workforce and the overall employment. At the same time, a higher employment in-
tensifies the competition on the labor market, which in turn influences the dynamics
of wage offers. This competitive pressure is mostly fueled by two phenomena of the
base scenario; first, high- and low-tech firms differ in their relative attractiveness for
workers with different general skills, where high-tech firms offer competitive wages
only for high-skilled workers (compare Figure 3.11 on page 107). And second, there
are almost no high-skilled workers available in the early phase of the simulation,
where high-skilled workers are almost exclusively employed by high-tech firms. As
a consequence, high-tech firms must aim at attracting low-skill workers for open
job positions. Since the wage offers for low-skilled workers are not competitive in
this period, high-tech firms have to adjust their wage offers by increasing the base
wage offer (Figure 3.23 b). Panel (c) indicates the effect on the relative wage offer
for low-skill workers between high- and low-tech firms. It illustrates that high-tech
firms become relatively more attractive for low-skilled workers. This explains why
high-tech firms succeed in increasing the number of workers and eventually in in-
creasing the production quantities during this phase. There is also an effect on the
wage offers for high-skilled workers (panel d), where the policy leads to a slightly
faster divergence between high- and low-tech firms.
Increasing base wage offers are associated with increasing wages that firms have
to pay to their employees. These wage increases are cost-relevant as they are dis-
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Figure 3.23: Policy induced change of the ratio of posted vacancies (a), base wage
offers (b), wage offers for low-skilled workers (c) and wage offers for high-skilled
workers (d) between high- and low-tech firms.
connected from the productivity growth and, therefore, result in higher unit (labor)
costs. As described above, base wage offers between high- and low-tech firms are
shifted towards high-tech firms with the consequence that high-tech firms lose some
of their cost advantages (see Figure 3.24 a). At the same time, high-tech firms set
prices more aggressively in order to expand and sell the additionally produced out-
put. As a consequence, mark-ups on labor costs (the price divided by unit labor
cost) of low-tech firms grow faster than those for high-tech firms in the short term
(see panel b showing the differences between the policy induced change of the growth
rates of mark-ups for high- and low-tech firms). The converging mark-ups indicate
that high-tech firms forfeit some of their relative profitability and competitiveness
over this period. At the same time, high-tech firms expand their workforce. As the
labor potential of high-skilled workers is almost depleted at this time, most of the
new hires are low-skilled workers. This in turn lowers the average general skill level
of high-tech firms (see panel c), which might additionally contribute to a reduction
of the competitive advantage of high-tech firms. Altogether, the observed phenom-
ena reduce the competitive pressure on low-tech firms and enable them to choose a
more aggressive competitive strategy. This allows them to lower the relative prices
and to start expanding their output. As a consequence, we observe the transition
to a medium-term state of the economy, in which low-tech firms expand relative to
the base scenario, whereas high-tech firms lower their output.
The shift of the relative output towards low-tech firms in the medium run is
associated with an increasing effect on the number of posted vacancies of low-tech
firms. Consequently, the strength of the relative effect on posted vacancies in Fig-
ure 3.23 (a) diminishes, where for higher values of µ the effect becomes even negative.
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Figure 3.24: Upper row: policy induced change of the ratio of unit labor costs (a)
and the growth rate of mark-ups on unit labor costs (b) between high- and low-tech
firms; lower row: policy effect on the general skill level of high-tech (c) and low-tech
firms (d).
Regarding the wage offers, there are almost no changes in the effects for the base
wage offers and also no effects on the relative wage offers for low-skilled workers.
But the gap in terms of wage offers for high-skilled workers becomes closer. Thus,
the policy amplifies the convergence of wage offers for this skill group with the result
that low-tech firms can increase their relative attractiveness for high-skill workers in
this phase. The improved attractiveness has a positive effect on the average general
skill level of low-tech firms (see Figure 3.24 d). The positive effect on the wage offer
for high-skill workers can thereby be explained by a growing capital productivity in
this period. The increasing productivity arises because low-tech firms intensify the
capital investments relative to the base scenario (see Figure 3.22 d). This leads to a
proportionately higher share of newer and more productive vintages in the capital
stock, which increases the average capital productivity.
Figure 3.19 on page 115 has shown that the policy has its strongest impact on
the labor market tension in the medium term. The effect on the unemployment rate
and the number of posted vacancies is the strongest in this period, while the ratio of
vacancies that remain unfilled also reaches a peak. At the same time, the observed
dynamics of wage offers in the medium term imply that first, high-tech firms cannot
enhance their relative attractiveness for low-skill workers, which means that low-tech
firms are still more attractive, and second, low-tech firms become more attractive for
high-skill workers. Thus, high-tech firms are increasingly facing the problem of labor
shortages. This can be seen in panel (a) of Figure 3.25, which shows the relative
effect on the fraction of unfilled vacancies. Apparently, the fraction of vacancies
remaining open after the hiring procedure in the medium run increases more for
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Figure 3.25: Policy induced change of the ratio of unfilled vacancies (a) and produc-
tion rate (b) between high- and low-tech firms.
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Figure 3.26: Upper row: policy effect on the vintage choice of high (a) and low-tech
firms (b); lower row: policy effect on the average capital productivity of high (c)
and low-tech firms (d).
high-tech firms than for low-tech firms. Because these firms are more rationed at
the labor market, the lack of workers has a corresponding effect on the production
rate (the ratio between actual and planned output). Indeed, as panel (b) indicates,
the proportion of actually produced output declines more for high-tech firms, where
the effect is the strongest for high policy intensities.
Besides employing more of the input factors capital and labor, there is also
another way of expanding the production quantity, namely by renewing the capital
stock through a replacement of old and less productive machines with newer and
more productive ones. This strategy of investing in more productive technologies is
pursued by high-tech firms in response to the labor shortage in the medium term.
This can be seen in Figure 3.26 (a), which shows the policy effect on the vintage
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 122
choice of high-tech firms. Apparently, under higher policy intensities, when the
effect on the output gap is the strongest, high-tech firms substitute the scarce factor
labor by investments in the more productive vintages of the technology. As a result,
the capital stock and, eventually, through the learning-by-doing process, also the
workers become more productive so that altogether the production capacity of high-
tech firms increases in the long term (see panel c for the capital productivity). The
enhanced productivity leads to the long-term increase of output of high-tech firms
and at the same time to a declined labor market tension.
For low-tech firms, there is only a small positive effect on the vintage choice
(Figure 3.26 b). This effect can mostly be explained by the positive effect on the
average general skill level for high policy intensities during the medium term. Ac-
cordingly, the positive effect on the vintage choice becomes smaller in the long term
when also the effect on the general skill level declines. The positive effect on the
average productivity of the capital stock for low-tech firms (panel d) is driven not
only by the vintage choice but also by investment effects. Intensified investments
lead to a higher share of new and more productive vintages in the capital stock of
low-tech firms.
Consequently, the increasing heterogeneity that we have observed in Figure 3.21
for firm sizes and productivity in the long run is due to an emerging competitive
advantage of high-tech firms that is triggered by reactions of high-tech firms on
a strongly increased labor market tension in the medium term. This advantage
enables them to gain and expand a leading position in the competition. Altogether,
we can summarize the obtained insights regarding the policy effects on the evolution
of firms’ heterogeneity in the following result:
Result 3: The effect of the consumption stimulating policy on the heterogeneity
of firms is not uniform over time. While the policy leads to more heterogeneity in
the short and in the long run, it has a heterogeneity reducing effect in the medium
run. This observation is mostly driven by different short-term adjustments of output
strategies of high- and low-tech firms and their corresponding adjustments of labor
demand in response to the implementation of the policy. The adapted labor demand
triggers medium- and long-term dynamics that alter the wage and cost structure in
the economy and result in the observed evolution of heterogeneity. For high policy
intensities, the induced dynamics at the labor market prompt high-tech firms to sub-
stitute labor with more productive technologies in the long run. This substitution
improves the productivity of high-tech firms and generates additional output.
3.4.5 The Investment Subsidy Policy
Quite a different picture emerges compared to our discussion in the previous subsec-
tion, if we consider the implications of the investment subsidizing policy. Under this
policy, a firm receives a public subsidy when it invests in physical capital. The size of
this subsidy depends on the intensity of the policy µ and the deviation of the quar-
terly growth rate from the threshold value gth. When deciding about investments,
it is assumed that firms take this subsidy into account.
Figure 3.14 on page 110 has indicated that the investment subsidizing policy can
achieve the same reduction of the business cycle volatility as the consumption policy
but with less financial resources. As pointed out in the discussion above, a criticism
regarding the consumption subsidizing policy has been its strong negative effect on
the public debt. If the investment policy is associated with less government spending,
it should also have a less pronounced negative effect on the public debt. Indeed, as
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Figure 3.27: Policy effect of the investment subsidizing policy on the public debt
measured as debt to GDP ratio at months 500.
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Figure 3.28: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the investment subsidizing policy on
quarterly growth rates of output (a) and the evolution of aggregated output.
Figure 3.27 indicates, the business cycle smoothing by subsidizing investments in the
consumption goods sector leads to a higher public debt at the end of the considered
time horizon but the increase of the debt GDP ratio is less pronounced as for the
consumption policy (compare Figure 3.15 on page 111). As a consequence, the
investment subsidizing policy seems to be fiscally superior.
If we compare the real effects of the investment policy, the observation becomes
more ambiguous. Figure 3.28 (a) shows the relationship of the average annual growth
rate and the policy intensity represented by parameter µ. The investment policy has
a negative effect on the long-term growth rate. Thus, the policy has the opposite
effect to the consumption subsidizing policy. Furthermore, while the growth effect of
the consumption stimulating policy increases monotonically in µ, the average growth
rate is first decreasing in µ but later the growth rate recovers and reaches almost
its initial level. Thus, the function representing the Spline-smoothed regression of
the relation between the policy intensity and the average annual growth rate is
U-shaped. Thereby, the policy has its strongest impact for moderate levels of µ
(between 5 and 15).
More information concerning the policy effect on the GDP provides panel (b),
in which we display the emerging dynamics of the policy effect on the aggregate
output trajectory measured relative to the base scenario. This panel indicates that
the policy generates not only a non-monotonic impact on the average growth rate
but also highly non-linear effects on the output trajectory. While there is virtually no
effect in the first two-thirds of the encompassed time, one can observe the emergence
of a negative output effect in the last third of the simulation. The strongest output
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Figure 3.29: Policy effect on investments (a) and capacity utilization (b).
reduction is obtained at intensities between 5 and 15, which is exactly the same
range in which the average growth rate has its minimum. Likewise, the observation
of an easing output effect for high values of µ is consistent with the U-shaped relation
reported in panel (a). It is in any case worth noting that the emergence of a negative
policy effect depends not only on the intensity of the policy itself but also on the
considered time horizon.
It is the direct effect of the subsidy to lower the price of capital goods. But does
the investment policy encourage firms to invest more in their physical capital stocks?
Panel (a) of Figure 3.29 depicts the policy effect on the investment level relative to
the base scenario. It indicates that firms initially intensify their investments in
response to the policy and build up more production capacity. But the investment
level is not permanently above the level of the base scenario. When the output
declines relative to the base scenario in the long term, firms adjust their investments
accordingly. Furthermore, the additional production capacity built up in the short
and medium term is not fully translated into more output. This can be seen in
panel (b), which indicates a lower capacity utilization of firms’ capital stock in this
period.
Figure 3.30 (a) illustrates that higher investments are not the result of a de-
liberate decision of firms to substantially increase the output in the aggregate. By
showing the policy effect on the planned output, it becomes apparent that the effect
on planned output resembles the effect on actual output. In the short and medium
term the policy does not lead to an appreciable increase of the planned output,
whereas in the long term the planned output declines relative to the base scenario.
There are, however, small differences between the policy effect on the planned and
the actual output. These differences can be highlighted by considering the policy
effect on the production rate, i.e. the ratio between the actual and planned output
(see Figure 3.30 b). In the phase of higher investments, there is a negative effect on
the production rate, which means that the gap between actual and intended output
increases. This suggests a certain level of rationing that firms experience in this
period.
In the lower row of Figure 3.30 we show the policy effect on the nominal (panel c)
and deflated consumption budget (panel d). Similarly to the consumption subsi-
dizing policy, the policy has a positive effect on the nominal consumption budget
throughout the simulation. The strength of the effect also grows over time but,
compared to the consumption policy, the growth is less pronounced (the premium is
at most 22% after 500 months compared to about 70% for the consumption policy).
Furthermore, the policy effect on the deflated consumption budget is positive in the
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Figure 3.30: Policy effect on the aggregated level of planned output (a), production
rate (b), nominal (c) and deflated consumption budget (d).
short and medium term but becomes negative in the long term. Thus, it shows sim-
ilarities to the policy effects on planned and actual output. It is worth mentioning
that in the short and medium term the effect on the planned output is almost null
despite the fact that the policy has a clearly positive effect on real market demand
in this period.
The differing evolution of nominal and real consumption budget is thereby con-
sistent with the effect on the inflation rate (see Figure 3.31). The average annual
inflation rate is increasing with the policy intensity (see panel a) but the impact of
the policy is less pronounced compared to the consumption subsidizing policy. For
the highest policy intensity, one obtains an average annual inflation of 2.2%, while
for the highest intensity of the consumption policy the maximum inflation becomes
3.0% p.a. Panel (b) shows that the strength of the effect on the (quarterly) inflation
rate changes over time, where most of the inflation is generated in the last phase
of the simulation. Apparently, the negative real effects on output and demand are
caused by an increasing inflation, when firms decide to increase their prices more
rapidly rather than to expand the production.
As already pointed out in the discussion of the consumption stimulating policy,
production costs are an important driver of inflation. When there are increasing
costs, firms will pass on most of the additionally arising costs to the price in order
to maintain their price cost margins. Panel (a) of Figure 3.32 shows the policy
induced change of the growth rates of unit labor costs. For the short and medium
term, the deviation of growth rates seems to be consistent with the policy effect on
the quarterly inflation rates, where the labor costs grow slightly faster than the price
index. In the long term, this link is obviously not present any more and the policy
effects on inflation and on the growth of labor evolve in different directions.
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Figure 3.31: Policy effect on the average annual inflation rate (left) and the evolution
of the change in the quarterly inflation rates (right).
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Figure 3.32: Policy induced change of the growth rate of unit labor costs (a); policy
effect on the number of posted vacancies (b), the share of posted vacancies that
remains unfilled (c); policy induced change of the unemployment rate (d).
Panel (b) depicts the policy effect on the number of posted vacancies. As this
effect resembles the effect on the growth rate of labor costs qualitatively, one can
conclude that also in this policy scenario the effect on the growth of unit labor
costs is mostly driven by the change in the labor demand of firms. Compared to
the baseline scenario, the number of posted vacancies increases in the short and
medium term and declines in the long run. At the same time, the number of unfilled
vacancies shows a qualitatively similar pattern (panel c). The strongest impact on
the number of unfilled vacancies in the medium term coincides with the effect on
the output gap (compare Figure 3.30 b). Thus, the (slightly) increasing output gap
seems to be a consequence of a lack of workers.
The positive effect on the labor demand can also explain why the nominal con-
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Figure 3.33: Policy effect on the average productivity of the capital stock (a) and
the average vintage choice of investing firms (b).
sumption budget is increasing with the policy. Through the higher labor demand, the
policy leads to an increase of nominal wages with the consequence that households
can spend more money for consumption. A further contribution to the growth of the
nominal consumption budget arises indirectly through the subsidies. As discussed
above, the subsidies are investment-enforcing in the short and medium term and,
therefore, increase the revenues of the investment goods producer. These revenues
are paid out as dividends and end up in the payment account of households.
The increased labor demand has also an effect on the unemployment rate of
the economy (see Figure 3.32 d), where as a general rule the policy is employment-
promoting. For fixed levels of the policy intensity, the effect on the unemployment
rate seems to pass two plateaus; while in the short run there is almost no effect,
the unemployment rate is shifted down by about one percentage point within a few
quarters in the medium term. In the long run the unemployment rate keeps the
difference to the baseline case despite some minor ups and downs. The maximum
reduction of about one percentage point is already reached at a low intensity of
about µ = 5.0. Altogether, the policy effect on the unemployment differs from the
pattern that has been observed for output and investments.
The reason why the policy does not cause a positive output effect despite the
observation of a positive employment effect in the medium and long term can be seen
in Figure 3.33. In this figure, we show the policy effect on the capital productivity
(panel a) and the vintage choice of investing firms (panel b). Panel (a) shows that
from the beginning the productivity of the capital stock declines compared to the
base scenario, where the (negative) effect becomes stronger over time. Similar to the
effect on the output level, the negative effect has its maximum for moderate policy
intensities in the long run. Panel (b) illustrates that the declining productivity is
linked with a negative policy effect on the vintage choice. On average, firms invest
in less productive capital vintages even if, as we have assumed an identical evolution
of the frontier for all simulations, the same menu of capital vintages is available at
a time regardless of the policy intensity.
Before continuing the discussion in more detail and providing an explanation
for the long-term effects, we can summarize the observations obtained so far in the
following result:
Result 4: Despite a positive effect on the investment activities in the short and
medium term, the investment subsidizing policy does not generate additional output
growth. Instead, it has no growth effect in the short and medium term but a negative
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Figure 3.34: Policy effect on the percent standard deviation of firms’ output (a) and
capital productivity (b).
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Figure 3.35: Policy effect on the output level of high-tech (a) and low-tech firms (b).
growth effect in the long run. At the same time, the policy has an employment-
promoting effect. But the higher employment does not lead to more output since the
policy causes also a negative effect on the technological productivity of the capital
stock in the economy. In addition, the policy is associated with more inflation and
leads to a higher public debt.
Even if there is almost no effect on the aggregated output in the short and
medium term, the policy effects on investments, labor demand and the techno-
logy suggest the emergence of considerable dynamics within the firm population.
This conjecture is supported by Figure 3.34, which illustrates the policy effect on
firms’ heterogeneity with respect to output (panel a) and technological productivity
(panel b). Apparently, the heterogeneity of firms’ output is differently affected by
the policy over time. In the short term, the policy leads to a decreasing hetero-
geneity, while in the medium term the heterogeneity increases and in the long run
declines again. Firms’ heterogeneity with respect to the capital productivity de-
clines monotonically throughout the simulation. Thus, the technological differences
of firms become smaller over time, where the maximum effect can be observed for
medium policy intensities at the end of the simulation.
Similar to the case of consumption subsidies, the policy effect on firms’ output
heterogeneity is caused by initially differing policy responses of low- and high-tech
firms. But in this policy scenario, the firms respond in exactly opposite ways, namely
high-tech firms by contracting (Figure 3.35 a) and low-tech firms by expanding (Fig-
ure 3.35 b). Apparently, as a major difference to the consumption subsidizing, low-
tech firms rather than high-tech firms benefit mostly from the investment subsidies
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in the first place. In the aggregate, the increase of output of low-tech firms offsets
the declining output of high-tech firms such that no significant effect on total output
can be observed (see above).
Why does the policy give low-tech firms more incentives to expand in the short
term? The state of the economy at the beginning of the baseline scenario plays an
important role to answer this question. In this phase, the output of high- and low-
tech firms is diverging, i.e. high-tech firms expand while the low-tech firms reduce
their output (compare Section 3.4.2). Moreover, high- and low-tech firms differ
with respect to wage offers at the outset of the simulation. While high-tech firms
offer competitive wages for high-skilled workers, low-tech firms post competitive
wage offers for low-skilled workers. At the same time, the employment level of
high-skilled workers is considerably higher. As a consequence, a great share of the
stock of available workers consists of low-skilled workers. This implies a structural
disadvantage of high-tech firms in hiring additional workers during this period.
The policy does not immediately generate more demand in the short term. As
illustrated above, the effect on the total market emerges rather at a slow pace. Hence,
short-term expansion of high-tech firms could be reached only with an aggressive
pricing strategy that forces low-tech firms out of the market. But as they also face
labor market rigidities which make aggressive pricing more expensive, high-tech firms
assess this strategy as being non-profitable. In this case, the subsidies are taken as
windfall gains without triggering further investments. At the same time, the initial
investment level of low-tech firms is low, i.e. most of the low-tech firms appraise
capital investments as not being worthwhile given the current market environment.
With subsidized capital prices, investments become cheaper and the likelihood of
an investment project to break even increases. This results in more investments of
low-tech firms and consequently affects their production capacity. Together with the
higher attractiveness for better available low-skill workers, an increased production
capacity gives low-tech firms the opportunity to gain additional market shares.
The expansionary strategy of low-tech firms is associated with intensified labor
market activities, where low-tech firms increase the base wage offers relative to that
of high-tech firms (Figure 3.36 a). Thus, the initial gap in terms of base wage offers
between low- and high-tech firms increases further in the short run. That way, low-
tech firms become also more attractive for low-skilled employees (panel b) and lose
some of their relative unattractiveness for high-skill workers (panel c). Thus, low-
tech firms can attract more of the available workers and can increase their workforce
relative to high-tech firms (compare Figure 3.36 d).
The base wage offers that firms need to rise to attract more workers result in
higher wages and, eventually, they lead to higher unit labor costs. Since the wage
offers grow faster for low-tech firms in the short run, they also cause a faster growth of
labor costs for these firms (see Figure 3.37 a) At the same time, low-tech firms have to
set prices more aggressively in order to ensure that the additionally produced output
can actually be sold. High-tech firms in turn react on this competitive strategy with
a passive pricing strategy. As a result, the ratio between prices of high- and low-tech
firms increases (see panel b).
The increased relative costs and the lowered relative price of low-tech firms lead
to a negative effect on the ratio of mark ups (see Figure 3.37 c). This relative decline
of profitability limits the scope of action for keeping the aggressive competitive
strategy and gives high-tech firms the opportunity to adjust the strategy toward a
more competitive one. Eventually, the changing competitiveness is a reason why
there is a reversal in output effects of the policy in the transition from the short to
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Figure 3.36: Policy induced change of the ratio of base wage offers (a), wage offers
for low-skilled workers (b) and high-skilled workers (c) and number of workers (d)
between high- and low-tech firms.
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Figure 3.37: Policy induced change of the ratio of unit labor costs (a), prices (b),
and mark-ups (c) between high- and low-tech firms.
the medium term.
The positive effect on the output of high-tech firms and the simultaneously oc-
curring negative effect for low-tech firms are accompanied by a corresponding change
of firms’ labor market activities in the medium. High-tech firms have an increased
labor demand and therefore increase the base wage offers more than low-tech firms.
This effect is transferred to the skill specific wage offers. As a consequence, high-tech
firms can expand their workforce and can eventually increase the output relative to
low-tech firms. The number of workers being made redundant by low-tech firms is
thereby smaller than the number of employees additionally hired by high-tech firms.
Thus, the overall employment level rises in this phase.
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Figure 3.38: Upper row: policy effect on the general skill level of high (a) and low-
tech firms (b); lower row: policy effect on the average specific skill level of high (c)
and low-tech firms (d).
Due to an improved attractiveness for low-skilled workers, a greater share of the
cohort of new employees hired by high-tech firms in the medium run belongs to
the group of low-skilled workers. Hence, the average general skill level of high-tech
firms is negatively affected (compare Figure 3.38 a). An enhanced recruitment of
low-skilled workers has thereby two effects on high-tech firms. First, not only the
general skill level but also the average specific skill level of high-tech firms declines
(see Figure 3.38 c). This negative effect emerges as the additionally hired low-skill
workers have a lower specific skill level compared to the incumbent workers. This
is due to the fact that these workers have mostly been employed by low-tech firms.
And second, the increased employment of low-skill workers and the consequential re-
duction of the general skill level have an effect on the vintage choice. Since decreased
general skills lower the firm’s perspective of taking advantage of high-productive vin-
tages, high-tech firms have less incentives to invest in more productive technologies
(see Figure 3.39 a). This in turn has an impact on the productivity of the capital
stock in the medium term (see panel c), which is gradually declining compared to
the base scenario. Moreover, as the technological productivity interacts with the
specific skills of employees, it also contributes to a further reduction of the average
specific skill level of high-tech firms (Figure 3.38 c). Altogether, there is a negative
effect on high-tech firms’ productivity that dampens the positive evolution of their
output.
At the same time, there is a positive effect on the vintage choice of low-tech
firms, which has already started to develop in the short run (Figure 3.39 b). This
positive effect can be explained by the short-term investment effect triggered by
the policy that results in a stronger replacement of old capital by new machines.
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Figure 3.39: Upper row: policy effect on the vintage choice of high (a) and low-
tech firms (b); lower row: policy effect on the capital productivity of high (c) and
low-tech firms (d).
Thus, the share of more recent capital increases within the capital stock of low
tech firms. This causes an increased productivity level (panel d), which reinforces
the attractiveness to invest in more productive vintages. As a consequence, the
productivity gap declines between high- and low-tech firms in the medium term.
Moreover, low-tech firms are able to post wage offers for high-skilled workers that
become more competitive. Therefore, low-tech firms can hire a growing share of
high-skill workers, which also exhibit not only a high general skill level but also
higher specific skills. Hence, there is a positive effect on the general skill level (see
Figure 3.38 b) and the specific skill level (see Figure 3.38 d). This external effect
on low-tech firms’ productivity feeds back on the wage offers and amplifies firms’
convergence in terms of general skills.
The relative output growth of high-tech firms in the medium run is associ-
ated with a more aggressive setting of wage offers, where the expansionary strategy
launches a similar mechanism as described for low-tech firms in the short run. On the
one hand, there is a negative effect on the relative unit labor costs of high-tech firms,
which is mainly caused by the increase of the base wage offers (see Figure 3.37 a); on
the other hand, high-tech firms pursue a more aggressive pricing strategy in order to
expand the price gap to the competitors (compare Figure 3.37 b). Both effects result
in a decline of relative mark-ups between high- and low-tech firms (Figure 3.37 c).
Thus, as time elapses, high-tech firms are forced to relax their competitive strategy.
In combination with the stronger convergence of firms’ productivity, this leads to
a ceasing of the positive output effect for high-tech firms and a strengthening of
low-tech firms in the transition from the medium to the long term (see Figure 3.35).
The subsiding output effect coincides with increasing labor shortages of high-tech
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Figure 3.40: Policy effect on the production rate of high (a) and low-tech firms (b).
firms. Panel (a) of Figure 3.40 shows that the growing difficulty of filling vacancies
leads to an increasing gap between planned and actual output. Unlike high-tech
firms, low-tech firms undergo an increase of the output gap earlier in the medium
term, namely when high-tech firms still have a high competitiveness (panel b).
In the long term, the policy has a fostering effect on the output convergence
between high- and low-tech firms. The output of high-tech firms drops by up to
12% while the output of low-tech firms increases by up to 10%. The output gain for
low-tech firms cannot compensate the output loss of high-tech firms such that the
overall output effect is negative. But what causes the strong negative effect on the
output of high-tech firms in the long run?
The negative effect on the output of high-tech firms and the simultaneously
occurring positive effect on the output of low-tech firms are mainly driven by a
complex interplay of cost and productivity dynamics in the long run. Figure 3.39 (c)
and (d) demonstrate that the productivity level of high- and low-tech firms declines
relative to the baseline scenario. But the productivity reduction of high-tech firms
is stronger so that the productivity tends to converge in the long run.
A main driver of the change of firms’ productivity is the policy effect on the
vintage choice. For high-tech firms, one can see that the strength of the negative
policy effect differs depending on the size of the policy intensity; for stronger policy
intensities the effect is almost negligible, whereas it becomes more pronounced with
a reduced intensity and reaches a maximum strength at an intensity level of about
µ = 7.0 (Figure 3.39 a). The strong impact at around µ = 7.0 in the long term
coincides with the strong negative effect on the general skill level. This suggests
that the change of the general skill distribution plays a major role for the long term
effect on the vintage choice.
But the general skill dynamics cannot completely explain the properties of the
emerging effect. Rather, the vintage choice of high-tech firms is additionally affected
by two other emergent phenomena, which interfere with the change of the skill dis-
tribution. The first is the policy impact on high-tech firms’ output gap (see above).
In the transition from the medium to the long term, high-tech firms experience an
increase of the output gap caused by labor shortages. In general, this can increase
the incentives to invest in vintages with a higher productivity because, given a suf-
ficient general skill level, firms can substitute lacking labor by a better technology.
In Figure 3.40 (a) one can see that the change of the output gap is the strongest
under high policy intensities such that in this case firms might have more incentives
to invest in more productive technologies. The second effect that counteracts the
negative effect of lower general skills on the vintage choice can be seen in panel (a) of
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Figure 3.41. In this panel, we show how the policy affects the average contribution
of high-tech firms’ investments to the capital stock of these firms. Apparently, high-
tech firms’ investments seem to be less fragmented when experiencing the negligible
effect on their vintage choice in the long term (i.e., for high policy intensities). A
low level of fragmentation means that investments show a higher lumpiness and, on
average, the new acquired capital accounts for a larger share of the total capital
of the investing firm. In this case, the vintage choice is more important because
new capital has a stronger impact on the average productivity. Then, the lumpier
investment behavior of high-tech firms has a choice effect toward higher vintages. If,
in contrast, the investment accounts only for a small share of the capital stock, then
the vintage choice becomes less important. This can be observed for lower levels
of µ, where it leads to an amplification of the negative effect of the general skill
dynamics on the vintage choice.
It is also the interaction of investment fragmentation with general skill dynamics
that contributes to the policy effect on the vintage choice of low-tech firms in the
long run (compare Figure 3.39 b). The positive effect on the general skill level of
low-tech firms overcompensates the increasing investment fragmentation that arises
for medium levels of µ (see Figure 3.41 b). For high policy intensities, the effect on
the average general skill level becomes weaker such that the effect of the investment
fragmentation dominates. In this case, the average vintage choice declines. This re-
duction is additionally amplified by the declining positive effect on the specific skills
that has emerged for high policy intensities in the medium run (see Figure 3.38 d).
The decreased specific skills in combination with a low level of general skills reduce
the prospects of investing in more-productive vintages.
Besides the converging productivity, a further channel that affects the long-term
convergence of output arises through the cost dynamics. In the short and medium
term, we have observed that expanding firms incur a stronger increase of unit labor
costs. This dampens and counteracts the expansionary strategy of these firms. But
in the long term, when low-tech firms are expanding and high-tech firms are exposed
to a strong negative output effect, there is no such counteracting effect on the relative
unit costs (compare Figure 3.37 a). Instead, the ratio between unit labor costs of
high- and low-tech firms increases further.
In the discussion of the base scenario in Section 3.4.2, it has been pointed out
that the gap between low- and high-tech firms in terms of unit labor costs con-
verges gradually over time. With the persistent positive effect on the relative unit
labor costs under the policy in the medium and long run, the convergence of firms’
competitiveness is even accelerated. For the long term, this means that in absolute
terms, high-tech firms have already lost their competitiveness. Thus, there are no
cost advantages of high-tech firms any more. At the same time, high-tech firms pass
the rising costs on their prices such that there is also a faster convergence and, even-
tually, a complete catch-up of prices (see Figure 3.37 b). Altogether, the complete
loss of their competitive advantage contributes to the strong effect on firms’ output
convergence in the long run. In this period, high-tech firms shrink faster than the
market such that low-tech firms can take over market shares from their high-tech
competitors.
But what drives these long-term cost dynamics? As pointed out earlier in the
discussion, the base wage offer is a major determinant for unit labor costs. In
Figure 3.36 one can see that the ratio between base wage offers of high- and low-
tech firms evolve differently in the long run depending on the intensity level of the
policy. For moderate levels of µ, there is a positive effect on the ratio, which means
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Figure 3.41: Upper row: policy effect on the average ratio between purchased ca-
pital and existing capital of investing high (a) and low-tech firms (b); lower row:
policy induced change of the deviation of the individual from the economy-wide
productivity growth for high (c) and low-tech firms (d).
that base wage offers of high-tech firms grow faster than those of low-tech firms. This
positive effect is a response on a self-enforcing mechanism that emerges for moderate
intensities: the convergence of firms’ productivity reduces the relative wage offer
for high-skill workers. Then, the reduced attractiveness has a negative effect on
the average general skill level of high-tech firms, which in turn affects the vintage
choice negatively. Since the vintage choice determines the speed of productivity
convergence, also the productivity convergence is reinforced. But if the relative
wage offer for high-skill workers declines without gaining additional attractiveness
for low-skill workers, then it becomes even more difficult for high-tech firms to hire
workers. As a consequence, these firms are forced to increase the base wage offers,
which induces a relative increase of unit labor costs.
For high policy intensities, there is no significant change of the impact on the
ratio of base wage offers. Hence, the number of posted and left over vacancies seem
to be balanced between high- and low-tech firms. In this case, the policy effect on
base wage offers of high- and low-tech firms offset each other. Furthermore, there
is almost no convergence of firms’ productivity such that high-tech firms can keep
some of their relative attractiveness for high-skill workers. Nevertheless, one can
observe a positive effect on the relative unit labor costs for high policy intensities
in Figure 3.37. This positive effect is driven by a change of the growth of firms’
productivity. As explained in Section 3.2.6, the wage of incumbent workers increases
with the average growth rate prt−1 of the aggregated capital stock in the economy.
Thus, depending on whether the productivity growth of a single firm is below or
above the economy-wide growth rate prt−1, the wages grow faster or slower than the
firm’s individual productivity. This leads either to increasing or to decreasing unit
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Figure 3.42: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the technology subsidizing on the
government debt GDP ratio (a) and the average annual growth rate (b).
costs. In the lower row of Figure 3.41, we depict the change of the average deviation
of firms from the economy-wide productivity growth compared to the base scenario
(panel c for high-tech firms, panel d for low-tech firms; note that self-evidently
panel c and panel d are perfectly mirrored). While there are apparently only small
changes for most of the simulation time with no significant effects on the relative
costs, high-tech firms experience a strong negative change of the deviation of the
productivity growth for high policy intensities. This growing deviation causes rising
unit labor costs of high-tech firms. Therefore, a positive effect on the relative unit
labor costs arises for high values of µ, even if the relative base wage offers as the
most relevant cost driver are not substantially affected.
To put all this together, the observations regarding the effects of the investment
subsidizing policy within the firm population can be summarized as follows:
Result 5: The investment subsidizing policy has a differing effect on firms’
heterogeneity with respect to output. While there is a slight reduction in the short
run and a slight increase of the heterogeneity in the medium term, the policy causes
a strong reduction of the heterogeneity in the long term. In contrast, the policy leads
to a gradual decline of firms’ heterogeneity with respect to the productivity throughout
the simulation. These results are driven by a different response of low- and high-tech
firms on the policy in the short run, where low-tech firms benefit from the policy and,
consequently, expand their production in the first place. This triggers cost and wage
dynamics, which in turn induce effects on the dynamics of firms’ average general
skills and productivity. Eventually, the emerging convergence of firms’ productivity
and unit costs result in a complete loss of competitive advantages of high-tech firms
in the long run. As a consequence, low-tech firms are able to catch up to high-tech
firms in terms of output levels.
3.4.6 The Technology Subsidy Policy
The technology subsidizing policy is the third stabilization policy that has been
identified as being successful in smoothing the business cycle in Section 3.4.3. The
general principle of this policy is similar to the principles underlying the investment
policy. There is, however, a crucial difference between the policies: in case of the
technology policy only those investments are subsidized that will flow into the most
up-to-date technology. Likewise the consumption and investment subsidizing policy,
we have shown that the technology policy leads to a significant reduction of the
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Figure 3.43: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the technology subsidizing on the
evolution of aggregated output (a) and the evolution of quarterly growth rates (b).
business cycle volatility, but the achievable reduction is smaller than for the other
two policies.
Despite this obvious disadvantage, the technology policy has two effects that
seem to make the policy superior. First, the policy has the weakest effect on the
government debt (see Figure 3.42 a). While without policy the government is al-
most unindebted after 500 months, the debt level grows with an increasing policy
intensity. But compared to the consumption and investment policy, the increase is
much smaller. At the highest intensity of µ = 20.0, the debt ratio is below 100%
of GDP. For the highest intensity of the investment policy, the debt is more than
twice as high as and for the consumption subsidy policy it is even six times higher
than GDP. Second, the policy has the strongest effect on the long-term growth of
the economy. In panel (b) of Figure 3.42 one can see that the average annual growth
rate increases steadily with the policy intensity from 1.6% to 1.9%. The maximum
average growth rate of the consumption policy has been observed at a level of 1.68%
p.a. and the growth effect of the investment subsidy has been even negative.
In Figure 3.43 we show how the policy affects the evolution of the aggregated
output over time. Panel (a), which depicts the effect on the output level, illustrates
that the additional average growth is translated into a growing output premium.
Apparently, the impact becomes stronger with the policy intensity; for the highest
value of µ, the real output is about 13% higher than in the baseline case after 500
months. Panel (b) indicates that the policy generates an unsteady growth effect
without any growth-promotion in the short run but with a considerable growth
boost in the medium and long term.
The idea behind the technology policy is to provide incentives for firms to invest
in the best practice technology. The policy reduces only the price of the most pro-
ductive vintage with the result that it becomes more rewarding to invest in the latest
technology. This might increase the speed of technological diffusion and, through a
consequently higher productivity in the economy, it might generate additional and
sustainable real growth. Figure 3.44 (a) shows how the policy affects the average
vintage choice of firms. It can be seen that the average productivity of the acquired
capital is significantly higher than in the base scenario. Thus, the policy seems to
affect the average vintage choice of firms. Moreover, the effect seems to become
stronger over time but also stronger for higher policy intensities. Panel (b) shows
the impact of the policy on the average productivity of the capital stock. One can
see that through the promoted vintage choice, the distance to the base scenario
increases gradually over time where again the impact of the policy depends on the
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Figure 3.44: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the technology subsidizing policy on
the evolution of the vintage choice (a) and the capital productivity (b).
intensity of the policy. Quantitatively, the strength of the effect on capital produc-
tivity resembles the effect on the output trajectory. Therefore, it appears that most
of the growth of total output is driven by a faster diffusion of new technologies.
According to the wage adjustment rule described in Section 3.2.6, the producti-
vity growth triggered by the policy is passed on the wages of workers and, therefore,
causes additional growth of the nominal wages. In this case, however, the resulting
higher labor costs are compensated by higher productivity such that firms’ unit la-
bor costs are not forced up. Furthermore, there is only an increased labor demand
at the outset of the simulation for high policy intensities. In the medium and long
run, the number of posted vacancies is even lower than in the base scenario (see
Figure 3.45 a). In this phase, the strongest reduction of the number of offered jobs
can be observed for medium policy intensities. As indicated in panel (b), the policy
effect on the vacancies provokes a similar effect on the base wage offers. Driven by
the higher labor demand in the short term, the base wage offers is higher than in
the base scenario. But in the long term, the positive effect on the base wage offers
declines and becomes negative. As argued in the discussion of the other policies, the
base wage offer leads to wage increases that are not compensated by productivity
gains and are therefore cost relevant. Consequently, the policy effect on the unit
labor costs is positive in the short and becomes negative in the long term. Panel (c)
of Figure 3.45 plots the corresponding deviation of the growth rates of unit labor
costs from the base scenario. It indicates a slight positive deviation in the short and
a strong negative deviation in the long term.
Two implications can be obtained from these observations. First, with the no-
minal wages also the nominal consumption budget increases over time. This can be
seen in panel (d) of Figure 3.45, which depicts the effect on the nominal consump-
tion budget. And second, the low cost effects of the policy avoid a similar inflation
pressure as it has been observed for the consumption and investment policy.
Figure 3.46 displays the inflation effect, where panel (a) illustrates the average
annual inflation rate dependent on the policy intensity and panel (b) shows the policy
induced deviation of the quarterly inflation rate from the inflation rates of the base
scenario. Apparently, the policy has almost no effect on the average annual inflation
rate. Thus, it remains at a level of about 1.85% regardless of the policy intensity.
Panel (b) indicates that if the time-averaged effect is disaggregated, it turns out that
the policy also causes changes of the inflation; in the short and medium term, the
effect is positive while in the long term the effect becomes negative. The negative
long-term effect corresponds with the negative effect on the growth rate of unit
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 139
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
0.96
0.98
1.00
1.02
1.04
 0.95 
 
0.96
 
 
0.97 
 0.98 
 0.99 
 
1 
 1 
 
1.01 
 
1.0
2 
 
1.0
3 
 
1.
04
 
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
0.96
0.97
0.98
0.99
1.00
1.01
 0.955 
 0.96 
 0.965 
 0.97 
 0.975 
 0.98 
 0.985 
 0.99 
 0.995 
 
1 
 
1 
 1.005 
 1.005 
 1.01 
 1.015 
(a) (b)
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
−0.0015
−0.0010
−0.0005
0.0000
0.0005
0.0010
 
−0.0016 
 
−0.0014 
 
−0.0012 
 
−0.001 
 
−8e−04 
 
−6e−04 
 
−4e−04 
 
−2e−04 
 −2e−04 
 0 
 
0 
 
2e
−0
4 
 
4e
−0
4 
 
6e
−0
4 
 
8e
−0
4 
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
1.00
1.02
1.04
1.06
1.08
1.10
1.12
1.14
 
1 
 1.02 
 1.04 
 1.06 
 1.08 
 1.1 
 1.12 
 1.14 
(c) (d)
Figure 3.45: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the technology subsidizing policy on
the evolution of posted vacancies (a), base wage offers (b), growth rates of unit labor
costs (c), and total consumption budget (d).
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Figure 3.46: Policy effect on average annual inflation rate (left) and the evolution
of the change of quarterly inflation rates (right).
labor costs. However, the strength of the effects that emerge at the different stages
of the simulation is relatively weak, especially if compared to the additional growth
of the nominal consumption budget. Hence, only a small share of the additionally
generated nominal demand is inflated. As a consequence, the policy generates not
only nominal demand but also a considerable amount of real demand. This real
demand can be satisfied as the economy becomes more productive in the aggregate.
In Figure 3.47 (a) we show how the quantitative investment decision is affected
by the policy. Apparently, the policy triggers a higher investment level in the short
and for high policy intensities also in the medium and long run; whereas for the
other instances the investment level is lower than in the base scenario. While the
investment level and, therefore, the capital stock is higher in the short run, one
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Figure 3.47: Spline-smoothed policy effects of the technology subsidizing policy on
the evolution of investments (a) and the unemployment rate (b).
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Figure 3.48: Policy effect on the percent standard deviation of firms’ output (a) and
capital productivity (b).
cannot observe a reduction of the unemployment rate in this period (see panel b).
Instead, the policy effect on the unemployment rate is null and even slightly positive
for low levels of µ. In the medium term, a positive employment effect emerges
that reduces the unemployment rate by up to 0.4 percentage points. This positive
employment effect becomes less intense in the long term. Compared to the two other
policies, the overall strength of the unemployment-reducing effect is substantially
smaller.
Wrapping up the observations obtained so far, we can write the following quali-
tative result:
Result 6: The business cycle smoothing by subsidizing the adoption of the best
practice technology leads to strong and sustainable long-term growth. This growth
effect arises through a faster diffusion of new technologies and the resulting more
productive capital stock in the economy. At the same time, the policy is associated
with only a small increase of public debts and has only weak effects on the inflation,
where these effects are inflation-fostering in the short and inflation-reducing in the
long run. Despite temporary negative employment effects, the policy leads to more
employment in the medium and long run, where eventually the positive effect ceases.
As in the discussion of the two other policies, we now turn to the policy impli-
cations for the heterogeneity of firms. The policy effect on firms’ heterogeneity with
respect to firm size and productivity is depicted in Figure 3.48. Likewise the other
policies, the technology subsidizing policy generates non-linear dynamics for both
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Figure 3.49: Policy effect on the aggregated output trajectory of high-tech (a) and
low-tech firms (b).
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Figure 3.50: Policy effect on investments of high-tech (a) and low-tech firms (b).
types of heterogeneity. The policy leads to a strong reduction of the heterogene-
ity in the short term, but the heterogeneity-reducing effect starts to decline in the
medium term and almost vanishes and becomes even positive in the long run. Thus,
the policy tends to increase the heterogeneity of firms in the long term.
Similar to the two other policies, the effect on the evolution of the heterogeneity
can be explained by emerging wage and productivity dynamics that are triggered by
different short-term responses of high- and low-tech firms. In Figure 3.49 we depict
the policy effect on the output trajectory of high-tech firms (panel a) and low-tech
firms (panel b). In the short term, the technology policy generates a negative effect
on the output trajectory of high-tech firms, whereas low-tech firms can increase their
output. Both translate into a short-term reduction of output heterogeneity. In the
medium term, however, high-tech firms intensify the output growth such that the
gap to the output level of the base scenario declines. At the same time, the low-tech
firms lower their output with the result that the output heterogeneity increases.
Figure 3.50 shows the corresponding effects on the quantitative investment de-
cisions. In the short term, the investments of high-tech firms are strongly reduced,
whereas the investments of low-tech firms are massively intensified, which is in con-
cordance with the output effect. Later, as time elapses, the strength of the effects
ease but the investment level of high-tech firms remains below the level observed in
the base scenario while the investment activity of low-tech firms is higher throughout
the simulation. But how does the policy affect the qualitative investment decision
of high- and low-tech firms, namely the choice in which vintage to invest? The
subsidizing of only the best practice technology increases the likelihood that a firm
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Figure 3.51: Upper row: policy effect on the vintage choice of high (a) and low-
tech firms (b); lower row: policy effect on the capital productivity of high (c) and
low-tech firms (d).
chooses this technology. The stronger the policy intensity is, the higher is the av-
erage subsidy rate and, therefore, the higher is the likelihood to invest in the best
practice technology. Figure 3.51 depicts the effect on the average productivity of
the vintage choice. It illustrates that the subsidization gives high- and low firms
more incentives to invest in the most up-to-date technology. This can be seen as
the productivity of the new capital is on average higher than in the base scenario
throughout the simulation. However, the figure also shows that the effects evolve for
high- and low-tech firms differently over time. While for high-tech firms the average
vintage choice becomes gradually more productive throughout the simulation, the
effect for low-tech firms is moderately positive in the short term, rises sharply in the
medium term and declines again in the long term. Altogether, the subsidization does
not prompt all firms to invest in the best practice. There is still a considerable gap
between the productivity of purchased capital and the frontier productivity, which
suggests that the vintage choice of low-tech firms is less affected than the vintage
choice of high-tech firms by the policy.
In the lower row of Figure 3.51, we depict the effect on the capital productivity.
Apparently, the effect on the productivity of high-tech firms resembles the effect
on the vintage choice. Thus, driven by the subsidization of the best practice, the
distance to the baseline case grows gradually over time. For low-tech firms, the
evolution of productivity also resembles their vintage choice but the effect on the
average productivity is higher than the effect on the vintage choice. This can be
explained by the intensified investments of low-tech firms in the short run, which
increase the share of newer and more productive vintages in the capital stock. This
in turn raises the average productivity of the capital stock and widens the gap to
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 143
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
0.95
1.00
1.05
 0.94 
 0.96 
 0.98 
 
1 
 1 
 1.02 
 1.04 
 1.06 
 1.08 
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
 0.7 
 0.75 
 0.8 
 0.85 
 0.9 
 0.9 
 0.95 
 1 
 
1.
05
 
0 50 100 150
0
5
10
15
20
linear predictor
t
pa
ra
m
e
te
r
0.92
0.94
0.96
0.98
1.00
1.02
 0.92 
 0.93 
 0.94 
 0.95 
 0.96 
 0.97 
 0.97 
 0.98 
 0.98 
 0.99 
 1 
 
1 
 
1.
01
 
 
1.
02
 
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3.52: Policy effect on the ratio of capital productivity (a), the workforce size
(b) and the vacancy filling rate (c) between high- and low-tech firms.
the base scenario.
The mechanism that leads to the initially differing competitive responses is ba-
sically the same as for the investment policy. Since the technology subsidizing does
not affect the market demand in the short run, high-tech firms react in a passive
way. This is because an increased production capacity would only lead to higher
market shares when high-tech firms implement a predatory pricing strategy. At the
same time, high-tech firms also face the structural disadvantage at the labor market
that the more available low-skilled workers prefer to work for low-tech firms. As a
consequence, high-tech firms would have to increase the base wage offers in order
to attract more workers. This would increase the unit costs and would reduce the
profit prospects for an aggressive competitive strategy. For low-tech firms, in con-
trast, the policy reduces investment barriers such that they have the opportunity to
build up production capacities now. At the same time, they have better access to
the available pool of workers and can hire the amount of employees required for an
expansionary strategy.
But how does the targeting of the investment subsidies contribute to the dif-
ferences to the case of untargeted subsidies in the investment policy scenario? An
explanation is that the policy has quantitatively different effects on the producti-
vity of high- and low-tech firms in the short term. At the outset of the simulation,
the general skill distribution is highly polarized among high- and low-tech firms.
Since high-tech firms have a high average general skill level, the vintage choice of
these firms is already close to the frontier. In this case, the subsidizing has almost
no impact on their productivity. On the contrary, due to the low average general
skills, the vintage choice of low-tech firms is off the frontier. This productivity
gap provides more scope for the policy to affect the productivity of low-tech firms.
Actually, low-tech firms intensify their investments, where they choose the best prac-
tice technology more frequently. As a consequence, the productivity of the capital
stock of low-tech firms shows a much higher growth rate than the productivity of
high-tech firms. This results in a short-term technological catch-up (see panel a of
Figure 3.52). The technological catch-up improves low-tech firms’ position in the
competition and amplifies the output convergence during the short run.
Panel (b) of Figure 3.52 indicates that low-tech firms increase the workforce
compared to high-tech firms. This suggests that the initial output convergence is
not only driven by a technological convergence but also by an emerging flow of
workers from high to low-tech firms. The reduction of high-tech firms’ workforce is
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Figure 3.53: Policy effect on the base wage offers (a), wage offers for low-skilled
workers (b), and wage offers for high-skilled workers (c) between high- and low-tech
firms.
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Figure 3.54: Policy effect on the general skill level of high-tech (a) and low-tech
firms (b).
thereby not completely voluntary. Indeed, these firms cannot fill a growing share of
their posted vacancies (see panel c, which depicts the relative policy effect on the
ratio of posted vacancies that are successfully filled).
At the same time, low-tech firms increase the base wage offers in order to achieve
the expansion of the workforce (see Figure 3.53 a). This short-term increase drives
up the skill specific wage offers for low-skill and high-skill workers (panel b and c).
As a consequence, low-tech firms become more attractive for both types of workers,
where the effect on the relative wage offers for high-skill workers is amplified by the
relative convergence of firms’ productivity.
The differing evolution of firms’ workforce in the short term has also implications
for the general skill distribution. Due to the higher wage offers for low-skill workers,
low-tech firms absorb most of these workers in this period. Thus, the number of
low-skill workers employed by high-tech firms declines and a slight increase of the
average general skill level arises during the short run (Figure 3.54 a). At the same
time, the attractiveness of low-tech firms for high-skilled workers increases such that
a growing share of their workers belongs to this skill group (see panel b). This
positive effect reaches its maximum strength in the medium term and influences the
vintage choice of these firms positively. This explains why a much stronger effect on
the vintage choice of low-tech firms can be observed in the medium rather than in
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Figure 3.55: Policy effect on the ratio of unit labor costs (a) and prices (b) between
high- and low-tech firms.
the short term.
As mentioned above, high-tech firms face an increasing difficulty to fill vacancies
in the short run. At a certain point, the dominance of low-tech firms at the labor
market becomes so prevailing that high-tech firms need to push the wage offers up
in order to prevent a further labor tightening. As a result of this adjustment, there
is a strong medium-term increase of the relative base wage offers towards high-tech
firms (see Figure 3.53 a). The strong increase of the base wage offers is accompanied
by the emergence of a positive effect on the wage offers for low-skill workers and a
reduction of the, from the perspective of the high-tech firms, negative effect on the
wage offers for high-skill workers (Figure 3.53 b and c). But the strong increase of the
base wage offers also causes a strong increase of the unit labor costs in the medium
term (Figure 3.55 a). Thus, the labor costs of high-tech firms grow more rapidly in
this period, which limits the scope for a more aggressive competitive strategy.
But, eventually, the shift of relative competitiveness at the labor market towards
high-tech firms triggers the cost-driving increase of low-tech firms’ base wage offers.
This gives high-tech firms the opportunity to gradually increase the output in the
medium run (for which high-tech firms reduce the relative price, see Figure 3.55 b).
The output expansion is accompanied by intensified investments where these invest-
ments increase the productivity of the capital stock of high-tech firms significantly
through the targeting of the investment subsidies. The raised productivity widens
thereby the spread between the wage offers for high-skill workers of the firms so
that high-tech firms become much more attractive for this skill group. In the fol-
lowing, a self-reinforcing feedback effect emerges that causes the divergence of firms’
capital productivity and output in the long term: Due to the improved relative at-
tractiveness, high-tech firms can increase the share of high-skilled workers in their
workforce, while the average general skill level of low-tech firms declines. As the
subsidizing of the best practice technology is not as effective for low-tech firms as
for their high-tech competitors, the declining general skill level reduces the average
productivity of their vintage choice. As a consequence, the productivity level of low-
and high-tech firms diverge further, which amplifies the advantage of high-tech firms
at the labor market to hire high-skill workers. This in turn reinforces the polariza-
tion of the general skill distribution among firms. In the end, low-tech firms have no
possibility for a technological catch-up as their general skill level is clearly inferior.
Moreover, they cannot increase the workforce as soon as the low-skilled labor force
is exhausted. For this reason, one can observe the long-term divergence of low- and
high-tech firms in terms of output and productivity. Altogether, these findings can
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 146
be summarized in the following result:
Result 7: The subsidizing of only the most recent generation of the technology
leads to a reduction of firms’ heterogeneity in the short run but to an increasing
heterogeneity in the long run. The short-term convergence in terms of output and
productivity is driven by lowered investment costs that lead to a relative output ex-
pansion of low-tech firms. This initial catch-up results in a relative loss of competi-
tiveness of high-tech firms at the labor market and triggers adjustment processes of
base wage offers through which high-tech firms can stabilize and, eventually, expand
their relative output in the medium term. Since the subsidies provide more incentives
for high-tech firms to invest in the most recent technology, the investments required
for the output expansion increase the relative productivity of high-tech firms. This
in turn raises their relative wage offers for high-skilled workers and causes eventu-
ally a strong selection mechanism with respect to general skills at the labor market.
Finally, the emergent highly-polarized human capital allocation among firms ignites
a feedback loop between wage offers, general skill dispersion and vintage choice that
reinforces the process of productivity divergence. As a result, the heterogeneity of
firms with respect to productivity and firm size increases in the long run.
3.5 Robustness Checks
3.5.1 Sensitivity of the Model
The policy results discussed in the previous section have been obtained from sim-
ulations conditioned on the specific setting of exogenous model parameters. An
overview of the parametrization can be found in Table 3.1 on page 93. In general,
there is a high degree of arbitrariness in the choice of parameters, where differing
parameter settings have potentially different impacts on the simulation outcome.
In order to reduce the arbitrariness, the parametrization of the model has been
based on a combination of a direct empirical estimation when empirical counter-
parts to parameters are available and an indirect calibration otherwise (compare
Section 3.2.8). As a result, we have obtained a parameter setting that generates
simulation output matching realistic features and reproducing empirically observed
stylized facts. Nevertheless, the parametrization is still associated with considerable
degrees of freedom and the employed estimation and calibration procedure can at
best provide interval estimations for the parameters. But even if a reasonable range
has been found for each parameter, a variation of single parameters within this range
or interaction effects of a simultaneous variation of multiple parameters can have
strong impacts on the simulation outcome. Those effects can considerably influence
the results of the policy analysis. For this reason, it is important to analyze whether
the policy analysis is robust against such a variation of model parameters.
A detailed analysis of the robustness of the policy experiments must include two
steps. The first step is to test the general sensitivity of the model with respect to its
parametrization. This means one has to check whether and how the behavior of the
model changes when model parameters are varied within a reasonable range around
their default values. The second step has to consider the impact of a variation of the
parametrization on the results of the policy experiments. In this context, it has to
be checked whether the qualitative findings of the policy analysis stay intact when
model parameters are varied. This subsection will deal with the former step while
the next subsection will consider the latter.
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To test how the model behavior changes in response to a deviation from the
calibrated parametrization, we define intervals of plus and minus 15% around the
default values listed in Table 3.1. These intervals are the range in which each of
the model parameters can be varied. As indicator variables that describe the model
behavior subject to the parameter variation, we use the average growth rate of GDP
and the business cycle volatility. We opt for these variables for two reasons: first,
they have been key macro variables to describe the policy effects in the discussion
of the experiments in Section 3.4. Second, the volatility describes the short-term
behavior and the average growth the long-term behavior of the model so that we can
distinguish short-term and long-term sensitivity. In order to analyze which of the
listed parameters have significant effects, we have run 1000 Montecarlo simulations
of the model, where in each run the parameter values have been randomly drawn
from the defined parameter range. As a result, we have obtained 1000 pairs of
observations for long-term growth and short-term volatility, each pair generated by
simulations based on a random set of model parameters.
The relation between model parameters and the indicator variables growth and
volatility can be formalized with means of statistical models. Each of the indicator
variables is then defined as the dependent variable of a statistical model16, while
the parameters of the simulation model are employed as covariates. Similar to the
statistical analysis in the policy experiments, we formulate the relationship as a
Generalized Additive Model (GAM) that relates the response variable (growth or
volatility) to the predictor variables (parameters). The response variables linearly
depend on unknown smooth functions of the predictor variables. Suppose Ξ is a
vector containing all model parameters ξl with l = 1, ..., L. and g is the dependent
variable, i.e. long-term growth or short-term volatility. Then, the GAM can be
written as
gˆ = g0 +
L∑
l=1
sl(ξl). (3.51)
Table 3.3 shows the statistical summaries for the estimated meta-model of long-
term growth on the left-hand side and volatility on the right-hand side. In order to
control the possible impact of the growth rate on volatility, we have also included
a smooth term for growth in the specification of the meta-model of business cycle
volatility. The table provides the estimated degrees of freedom (edf) and the residual
degrees of freedom (Ref.df) for each smooth term, as well as a test of whether the
smooth functions significantly reduce model deviance. Moreover, it provides a fit
for the parametric intercept (mean and standard error) and the table reports the
adjusted R2, the pseudo R2 (deviance explained) and the generalized cross validation
score (GCV) as measures for the goodness of fit.
One can obtain some interesting insights from Table 3.3 regarding the behavior
of the model. First of all, the constant or intercept is significantly positive for both
dependent variables. This means, if the model is parametrized such that all para-
meter effects, i.e. all smooth terms s(.) are zero, then the model yields a positive
average growth rate of 1.6% p.a. and a business cycle volatility of 1.7%. Thus,
growth and short-term volatility are generic properties of the considered parameter
subspace. Second, the table illustrates that a considerable number of smooth terms
are statistically insignificant. If, however, a smooth term is insignificant, then the
underlying predictor variable makes no significant contribution to explain the de-
16In order to distinguish the statistical model from the simulation model, we use in the following
the term meta-model for the statistical model.
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pendent variable and, therefore, could be removed from the regression model. In
this case, a variation of that parameter has no effect on the model behavior, at least
within the given parameter range. As a consequence, the dependent variable can be
considered as being robust against a variation of this parameter around its default
value. This does not imply that a variation of those parameters has no impact at all.
But we focus on the neighborhood around the default values, in which all parameters
can vary within the identical (relative) interval of plus and minus 15%.
If one compares the parameters that are significant for growth and for volatility,
one can see that it is not necessarily the same set of parameters which is significant
for both dependent variables. Thus, if one of the variables is robust against the
variation of that parameter, this does not automatically mean that the whole model
is robust.
In Figure 3.56 we display the estimated smooth functions for all parameters of
the growth model that are reported to be statistically significant. The estimate of
a smooth function can thereby be interpreted as individual profile or partial effect
of a parameter. The red vertical lines in the panels show the default values of the
parameters used in the simulations of the policy experiments.
Apparently, even if all smooth terms displayed in Figure 3.56 are statistically
significant, the strength of the effects and, therefore, their importance for determin-
ing the average growth rate differ considerably. Some parameters have only a minor
impact so that the average growth rate seems to be quite robust regarding their
parametrization. At the same time, the model shows a higher sensitivity with re-
spect to changes of other parameters, where especially those parameters yield strong
growth effects that are related to the production and investment decision of firms.
Most notably are the effects of the depreciation rate δ (panel a), the time horizon in
the investment planning TLT (panel c) and the parameter for the speed of techno-
logical progress ∆qinv (panel d). The effect for the depreciation rate is positive so
that a higher depreciation rate leads to higher growth. This seems plausible as the
depreciation influences the speed by which firms have to renew their capital stocks.
The length of the planning horizon in the investment decision, which determines
how many future periods are considered when computing the net present value of
investment projects, has also a positive effect on the growth rate. The longer the
horizon, the more periods contribute to the cash flow and the higher is the likelihood
to break even. As a consequence, one can observe higher investment activities for
higher TLT that eventually lead to higher levels of growth. In this context, one
would expect a negative impact of the discount rate on growth rates. Indeed, the
effect is negative but the considered parameter range is too small so that the effect
is insignificant here.
The speed of technological change has a strong and positive effect on the average
growth rate of the economy. If the speed of the development of the best practice
technology is improved, then also the productivity of the capital stock grows faster
through the process of embodied technological change, which eventually leads to
higher real growth. The other parameters listed in Figure 3.56 are statistically
significant but the strength of their effects are quantitatively much weaker as those
of δ, TLT , and ∆qinv.
For the volatility the picture is more ambiguous (see Figure 3.57). The smooth
term of the growth rate is statistically significant so that the growth rate contributes
to the explanation of the business cycle volatility. But the estimated smooth function
of growth rate (panel a) is non-monotonic so that one cannot derive a clear trend of
its effect. There is one parameter, the investment planning horizon TLT (panel c),
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Figure 3.56: Estimated smooth functions of the statistical meta-model explaining
long-term growth for the parameters of the simulation model depreciation rate δ
(a), intensity of choice γC (b), investment planning horizon TLT (c), technological
progress ∆qinv (d), debt repayment period TLoan (e), Central bank base rate rC
(f), threshold full dividend payout d¯ (g), consumption adjustment κ (h), expected
demand variance σ2D (i), service level demand χ
S (j), wage update ϕ (k), and un-
employment benefit percentage u (l).
that has quantitatively a strong positive impact on the business cycle volatility. This
suggests that the higher the investment level caused by taking more future periods
into account, the stronger is the business cycle volatility. The service level (panel i)
and the expected variance of demand σ2D (panel j), both determining the buffer in
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Figure 3.57: Estimated smooth functions of the statistical meta-model explaining
short-term volatility for the parameters of the simulation model growth (a), con-
sumption adjustment κ (b), investment planning horizon TLT (c), maximum defer-
ral period TEx (d), debt repayment period TLoan (e), Central bank base rate rC (f),
debt rescaling factor ω (g), wage update ϕ (h), service level demand χS (i), expected
demand variance σ2D (j), firm birth hazard rate h
FB (k), and unemployment benefit
percentage u (l).
the production planning, have a weaker but still a considerable positive effect so
that a higher inventory buffer lowers the business cycle volatility. For the other
parameters, the effects seem to be weak so that the volatility is robust against a
variation of these parameters, even if the smooth terms are significant.
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The goodness of fit of both models is relatively high but it can even be improved
by incorporating interaction effects between parameters. Therefore, we extend the
statistical models in Table 3.3 by introducing specific interaction terms for each pair
of parameters. Formally, we can write the extended meta-model as
g = g0 +
L∑
l=1
sl(ξl) +
L∑
l=1
l−1∑
k=1
I(ξl, ξk) · telk(ξl, ξk). (3.52)
In this case, telk(ξl, ξk) are interaction terms using tensor product smoothing func-
tions. I(ξl, ξk) are binary variables that indicate whether the interaction effect for
the pair ξl and ξk is significant
17 in a reduced meta-model of only one interaction
term, which is given by
g = g0 +
L∑
l=1
sl(ξl) + telk(ξl, ξk). (3.53)
The estimations of the reduced meta-models yield 32 significant interaction terms
for growth and 38 for volatility, where in the estimations of the full meta-models 6
and, respectively, 10 of them remain significant.
Incorporating the interaction effects in the regression models improves the ex-
plained deviance from 72.5% to 84% for growth and from 69.4% to 77.1% for vola-
tility. Qualitatively, the interaction effects do not reshape the individual parameter
profiles reported for the meta-models in Table 3.3. Furthermore, the single interac-
tion effects have almost no quantitative impacts on volatility and growth rate.
Altogether, the sensitivity analysis has revealed a relatively high robustness of
the model, where it seems to be quite robust against changes of most model pa-
rameters in the neighborhood around their default values. This observation can be
made for both, the long-term growth and the short-term volatility of the business
cycle. The estimated statistical models show a relatively high goodness of fit, where
about 70% of the deviance can be explained by the variation of the parameters in
isolation and additionally 10% of the deviance by incorporating interaction effects.
3.5.2 Robustness of Policy Findings
In the previous subsection we have analyzed the sensitivity of the model disregarding
the three stabilization policies discussed in this study. General model parameters
have been varied within an interval of 15% around their default values but param-
eters related to the stabilization policies have been set such that no policies was
applied. As a consequence, the sensitivity analysis does not allow for any conclusion
whether and how the results of the policy experiments in Section 3.4 change with
a varying parametrization. In this subsection we provide robustness checks that
study the effects of a variation of model parameters on the policy scenarios. We
focus on the robustness of the qualitative results of the policy experiments for the
three stabilization policies with respect to its primary objective, the reduction of the
business cycle volatility and its effect on the long-term growth rate. As before, we
restrict our analysis on the neighborhood around the default values that have been
obtained from the (partially empirical) calibration.
The strategy to test the robustness of the policy findings is similar to the stra-
tegy used for the sensitivity analysis. For each stabilization policy we have run
17This means: I = 1 if the p-value < 0.1, I = 0 otherwise.
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 153
simulations in which the parameter setting has been determined by independent
and uniformly distributed random draws from the parameter range of 15% around
the default values. But in contrast to the sensitivity analysis, we have varied the
policy intensity parameter µ stepwise within the same range as used in the policy
experiments in Section 3.4. For each of the corresponding values of µ, we have run
25 batch runs. The pooled simulations for each policy scenario can then be used
to estimate generalized additive regression models for long-term growth and short-
term volatility, in which model parameters and the policy intensity µ are deployed
as covariates.
Regarding the variation of the parameters, there are two types of effects of par-
ticular interest; the one is the isolated effect of the policy intensity on growth and
volatility, which can be used to generally check whether the random choice of model
parameters changes the effect of the policy substantially. The second type are joint
effects of µ with each of the model parameters that illustrate how the policy effects
are affected by a variation of these parameters.
To extract the isolated effect, we formulate a GAM in which all model parameters
and the policy intensity are wrapped in independent smooth functions. We obtain
the following estimated model:
g = g0 + sµ(µ) +
L∑
l=1
sl(ξl). (3.54)
Again, ξl with l = 1, ..., L is the set of model parameters contained in vector Ξ. The
estimated smooth function sµ(µ) indicates the isolated effect of the policy on the
dependent variable g.
The joint effect of the policy intensity and a parameter ξk can be obtained by
estimating the following GAM:
g = g0 +
k−1∑
l=1
sl(ξl) +
L∑
l=k+1
sl(ξl) + te(µ, ξk). (3.55)
In this model, each parameter except ξk, for which the interaction is assessed, is
included in independent smooth functions to capture their impacts on the depen-
dent variable g. The tensor product smooth function te(µ, ξk) indicates the joint
effect and can be interpreted as the effect of the policy intensity µ conditioned the
parametrization of ξk. Note that in the following we discuss the interaction effects
only for selected model parameters. For the business cycle volatility we present the
interaction for the parameters investment planning horizon TLT , expected demand
volatility σ2D, and service level in the production planning χ
S . For the average
growth rate we limit the discussion on the depreciation rate δ, the investment plan-
ning horizon TLT , the speed of technological change ∆qinv and the intensity of
consumers’ choice γC . We opt for these parameters as they have been reported in
Section 3.5.1 to have the strongest impacts on the business cycle volatility and the
average growth rate. We have also checked the interaction effects for the other pa-
rameters but, compared to the effects of the parameters above, they are qualitatively
similar and quantitatively negligible.
Figure 3.58 depicts the isolated effects of the consumption subsidy policy esti-
mated with GAMs as specified in Expression 3.54, where panel (a) displays the effect
for volatility and panel (b) for growth rates. One can see that the effectiveness of
the consumption subsidization does not qualitatively change to the results obtained
in Section 3.4 (compare Figure 3.13 and 3.16); thus, the result that a subsidizing of
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Figure 3.58: Smooth terms for the intensity of the consumption subsidy estimated
for the GAM with volatility (a) and average growth rate (b) as dependent variables.
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Figure 3.59: Joint smooth terms for the policy intensity of the consumption subsidy
and the parameter investment planning horizon TLT (a), expected demand volatility
σ2D(b), and service level of demand χ
S (c), estimated for the GAM explaining the
business cycle volatility.
households’ consumption leads to a reduction of the business cycle volatility and at
the same time to a slight positive effect on the average growth rate in the economy
shows a considerable degree of robustness against the parametrization of the model.
This observation does not change when looking at the joint effect of the policy
intensity with each of the model parameters (estimated with GAMs described in
Expression 3.55). In Figure 3.59 we show for the business cycle volatility the joint
effects of µ with the parameters investment planning horizon TLT , expected demand
volatility σ2D and service level in the production planning χ
S . Apparently, since all
three plots indicate a monotonically decreasing area from west to east along the
x-axis, the volatility reducing effect of the consumption subsidy is robust against
a variation of these parameters. An exception can only be observed for low values
of TLT . When a short planning horizon is assumed in the investment decision, the
policy has no effects on the business cycle volatility. However, this finding is not
surprising as the sensitivity analysis has already pointed out that a reduction of TLT
is associated with a decreasing business cycle volatility.
We now turn to the growth effect of the consumption subsidizing policy. The
joint effects of the policy intensity µ with the depreciation rate δ, the investment
planning horizon TLT , the speed of technological change ∆qinv, and the intensity
of consumers’ choice γC are displayed in Figure 3.60. All four panels indicate that
an increase of the policy intensity µ is associated with an increasing average growth
rate for any of the four parameters within the considered value range. Therefore, the
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Figure 3.60: Joint smooth terms for the policy intensity of the consumption subsidy
and the parameter depreciation rate δ (a), investment planning horizon TLT (b),
speed of the frontier growth ∆qinv (c), and the intensity of consumers’ choice γC ,
estimated for the GAM explaining the average growth rate.
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Figure 3.61: Smooth terms for the intensity of the investment subsidy estimated for
the GAM with volatility (a) and average growth rate (b) as dependent variables.
slight positive growth effect of the policy, which has been observed in Section 3.4,
stays intact if we vary the model parameters from their default value.
Also the analysis of the investment subsidizing policy reveals a high robustness
of the key results of the policy experiment. Figure 3.61 depicts the isolated policy
effects for volatility (panel a) and growth (panel b). As for the consumption policy,
the isolated effects resemble the policy effects obtained in Section 3.4 under the
default parameter setting (compare Figure 3.13 and 3.28). Hence, if we randomize
the parameter setting in the neighborhood of the default values and we isolate the
effect on volatility and growth, we still obtain a reduction of short-term fluctuation
and a negative effect of the policy on the long-term growth. The effect on the growth
rate seems to cease as policy intensity increases.
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Figure 3.62: Joint smooth terms for the policy intensity of the investment subsidy
and the parameter investment planning horizon TLT (a), expected demand volatility
σ2D(b), and service level of demand χ
S (c), estimated for the GAM explaining the
business cycle volatility.
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Figure 3.63: Joint smooth terms for the policy intensity of the investment subsidy
and the parameter depreciation rate δ (a), investment planning horizon TLT (b),
speed of the frontier growth ∆qinv (c), and the intensity of consumers’ choice γC ,
estimated for the GAM explaining the average growth rate.
Figure 3.62 and 3.63 show that these policy effects are qualitatively little affected
when considering the interaction of the policy intensity with those parameters hav-
ing strong effects on business cycle volatility and growth rates. One can see that
the shape of the effects stays intact, where only for the planning horizon of the
investment decision, TLT , the effect on the business cycle volatility disappears for
low values of TLT (see Figure 3.62 a) and the effect on the growth rate disappears
for high values of TLT (see Figure 3.63 b).
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Figure 3.64: Smooth terms for the intensity of the technology subsidy estimated for
the GAM with volatility (a) and average growth rate (b) as dependent variables.
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Figure 3.65: Joint smooth terms for the policy intensity of the technology subsidy
and the parameter investment planning horizon TLT (a), expected demand volatility
σ2D(b), and service level of demand χ
S (c), estimated for the GAM explaining the
business cycle volatility.
Finally, Figure 3.64 to 3.66 illustrate the robustness of the policy findings for
the technology subsidizing policy. Both, the isolated effects (Figure 3.64) as well as
the joint effects (Figure 3.65 and 3.66) show a high similarity with the policy effects
obtained from the policy experiments (compare Figure 3.13 and 3.43). This means
the variation of the model parameters alters neither the business cycle volatility
reducing effect of the policy nor its strong growth-fostering effect.
Altogether, a variation of model parameters in the neighborhood around their
default values does not change the qualitative findings of the policy analysis. This
means the results that we have obtained in Section 3.4 are apparently robust and
valid not only for the specific parameter setting used for the policy experiments
(see Table 3.1 on page 93). It should be noted that this does not mean that the
effects identified in the policy analysis are generic results which can be obtained
from any parametrization of the model. However, as pointed out above, the para-
metrization used for the experiments has not been chosen arbitrarily but has been
obtained from a systematic attempt to estimate and calibrate the model. The un-
derlying assumption for this parametrization method is that the parameter space is
restricted by, on the one hand, empirically observed values for parameters that have
empirical counterparts and, on the other hand, by values that lead to economically
reasonable simulation outcomes for the other parameters. The parametrization in
Table 3.1 represents such a specification. The robustness checks in this subsection
have demonstrated that the policy experiments are robust in the neighborhood of
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Figure 3.66: Joint smooth terms for the policy intensity of the technology subsidy
and the parameter depreciation rate δ (a), investment planning horizon TLT (b),
speed of the frontier growth ∆qinv (c), and the intensity of consumers’ choice γC ,
estimated for the GAM explaining the average growth rate.
this reliable parameter setting.
Besides the parametrization of the model, the initial condition of the economy has
also an important impact on the simulation outcome. The initial condition describes
the endowment and memory of agents with which they enter the first iteration of
the simulation. In Section 3.2.8 we have explained that the start state used for the
experiments has been a snapshot of a pre-simulation. The pre-simulation started
with an equal initialization of all agents except for some variables as, for example,
the general skill endowment of households. The iteration used as start state for the
simulations has been chosen such that the simulation has passed the transient phase.
In the following, we want to demonstrate that the results from the policy analysis
are also qualitatively robust against a variation of this specific start state. Therefore,
we have run a set of simulations based on the default parametrization in which we
varied the date TPol at which the stabilization policies are introduced for the first
time. Actually, this leads to an expansion of the pre-simulation, so that also here
the start states are not determined arbitrarily. The maximum deferral of the policy
implementation is by 250 months so that we vary TPol between month 1 and month
250 (in the experiments, TPol has been set to 1). In order to make the indicators
for the effectiveness of the policy comparable, we had to adjust the length of the
simulations accordingly such that the total simulation time is TPol + 500 months.
The business cycle volatility and the average growth rate are then computed for the
last 500 months.
We estimate the impact of TPol on the business cycle volatility and the average
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Figure 3.67: Policy effects of the consumption (upper row), investment (middle row),
and technology subsidizing policy (lower row) on volatility (left column) and average
growth rates (right column) for different initial conditions of the economy.
growth rate with the following GAM:
g = g0 + te(µ, T
Pol). (3.56)
In Figure 3.67 we depict predictions for the business cycle volatility (left panels)
and the average growth rate (right panels) for the three stabilization policies. One
can see that especially the average growth rate varies substantially conditioned on
different start states where apparently for start states that are lagged by 100 months
the growth rate reaches a maximum. Nevertheless, the qualitative results regarding
the effects of the three policies stay intact for both, the effect on the business cycle
volatility and the average growth rate. As a result, the start state at which the policy
is applied for the first time does not change the qualitative findings of our policy
experiments. The policy results are then not only robust against the parametrization
but also against the selection of initial start states from possible candidates generated
by the pre-simulation.
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3.6 Discussion and Conclusion
In this study we have analyzed three distinctive fiscal policies, each of them aiming
at a stabilization of the economy during downturns. The first stabilization policy is
a demand-oriented policy that provides consumption subsidies to households. The
two other policies are supply-oriented policies that provide subsidies to firms in
order to encourage them to carry out investments in physical capital. Thereby, the
supply-oriented policies differ from each other in their technological alignment; while
the one policy grants subsidies for any investment regardless its technological focus,
the payout of subsidies is limited for the other policy to those investments that flow
in the best practice technology. The choice of these policies has been motivated by
real world examples of stabilization policies contained in economic stimulus packages
enacted by the U.S. government during the recent economic crisis. In the Economic
Stabilization Act of 2008, the U.S. administration provided tax rebates to households
and investment subsidies to business firms, where the investment subsidizing was
achieved by changing tax treatment rules for investment projects without deliberate
steering effects. Besides an even bigger tax cut for households, several other measures
contained in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 had a strong
focus on supporting investments that generate sustainable growth by enhancing
technological progress.
The goal of the policy analysis in this study has been to investigate the effec-
tiveness of these three discretionary stabilization policies. In this context, we have
addressed the following research questions: Are the three policies actually able to
stabilize the economy? Do the policies have long-term effects on the economic perfor-
mance? If so, do the long-term implications differ between the policies? And, finally,
are the policies fiscally self-sustained so that they do not substantially change the
level of government debt? While the first research question addresses the effective-
ness of the policies with respect to their primary goal, the other questions address
possible effects that may arise over time and can lead to conflicts of goals between
short-term stability and other long-term economic goals. Besides of a possible con-
flict with the goal of sustainable government debts, those are especially conflicts
between short-term stability and long-term growth, price stability and employment.
Our approach to address these questions has been to use a closed agent-based
macroeconomic model in which each stabilization policy has been analyzed in an
independent policy scenario. The agent-based model, which is an extension of the
Eurace@Unibi model, is able to replicate a considerable number of empirical stylized
facts. Furthermore, the model has the appealing property that it generates endoge-
nous business cycles with realistic features, which makes the business cycle analysis
independent from introducing exogenous shocks to generate economic fluctuations.
We have run extensive simulations of the policy scenarios and obtained robust
results regarding the effectiveness of the stabilization policies. In particular, we have
found that all three policies have similar effects on the business cycle volatility. The
policies reduce the short-term fluctuations substantially where a higher reduction of
the volatility can be achieved by increasing the policy intensity. As a result, there
are only little differences between the policies regarding their common primary goal.
Regarding possible growth effects, however, we have obtained a more ambiguous
picture. The technology subsidizing policy has a strong growth-enhancing effect that
is increasing in the policy intensity. The consumption subsidizing policy leads only
to a slight improvement of the average growth rate, where the effect of this policy
becomes also stronger with the intensity of the policy. In contrast, the investment
Stabilization Policies and Long Term Growth 161
subsidizing policy leads to a reduction of economic growth that is not monotonic
in the policy intensity; for this policy we could identify a critical policy intensity
at which the policy has its greatest negative impact on the average growth rate.
Altogether, these observations lead to a first striking conclusion: even if the policies
are almost equal with respect to their effectiveness to smooth the business cycle,
they differ regarding their implications for long-term growth substantially.
At the same time, the considered stabilization policies show substantial differ-
ences in their fiscal requirements and, therefore, have different implications for the
accumulation of government debts. While the technology policy has almost no ef-
fect, we have shown that the two other policies, the investment subsidizing and the
consumption subsidizing policy, lead to higher levels of public debt, where quantita-
tively the effect is stronger in case of the consumption policy. The policies also differ
in their implications for price stability. The consumption policy leads to a strong
increase of inflation, while the investment policy has a less pronounced effect and
the technology subsidizing policy has almost no effect on inflation. Based on these
observations, we can expand our conclusions by the following statement: regarding
long-term effects on macroeconomic aggregates, the technology policy dominates
the two other policies, where a second best policy cannot be determined without
articulating relative preferences for long-term growth, fiscal sustainability and price
stability.
We have explored the mechanisms underlying the different policy effects and
shown that the heterogeneity of firms with respect to productivity is an important
determinant for the differences of the emergent medium- and long-term effects. We
have shown that especially in the period after the outset of the simulation, when
the state of the economy is still almost equal between the scenarios, high- and
low-tech firms react in different ways to the implementation of the policies. More
precisely, depending on the type of policy, high-tech firms expand their output and
low-tech firms reduce the output in response to the policies and vice versa. These
reaction patterns result in short-term changes of the distribution of market shares
and prices, but also in a relative shift of the labor demand between high- and low-
tech firms. Sooner or later, the effects on the labor demand will change the size and
composition of the supply side of the labor market, so that the short-term reaction
of firms will also change the wage offers and, eventually, the total wage structure in
the economy. These wage adjustments influence the cost structure and, therefore,
the relative competitiveness of firms. This triggers corresponding adjustments of
production strategies, which in turn launch further changes of prices, labor demand,
wages and so forth. Altogether, the initially differing response of high- and low-tech
firms triggers a complex interplay of wage, productivity, cost and output dynamics,
which drives the different medium- and long-term effects of the stabilization policies.
These non-linear dynamics illustrate the importance of the time horizon for the
policy analysis. Furthermore, the exploration of mechanisms has shown that the
heterogeneity of firms is not only an important determinant for the policies effects
but also itself affected by the stabilization policies. This means, policies change the
evolution of the distribution of firm sizes and productivity in the economy. We have
shown that in the long run the heterogeneity with respect to firm size increases for
the consumption and technology policy, but declines for the investment policy. Since
a higher heterogeneity with respect to firm size is associated with a higher market
concentration, these results suggest negative implications for the competition in the
economy of the former policies and a positive implication for the competition of the
latter policy.
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What are the implications for the economic literature? The question whether
stabilization policies have effects on long-term growth has been addressed especially
by the endogenous growth literature with inconclusive results. Many studies have
concluded possible effects by analyzing the effect of short-term fluctuations on long-
term growth without explicitly considering stabilization policies in their analysis.
Others have incorporated a (fiscal) stabilization policy, but focused on the automatic
stabilizers income tax and unemployment payments without paying attention to a
more elaborate design of discretionary stabilization policies. The endogenous growth
literature has stressed the importance of structural factors of the models under
consideration for the long-term effects of stabilization polices. Structural factors
can thereby be the assumption regarding the mechanism generating endogenous
growth (Schumpeterian models versus learning-by-doing hypothesis) or the source of
shocks driving the short-term volatility (monetary versus real shocks). Our analysis
suggests that besides those structural aspects also the concrete design of the policy
plays an important role for long-term effects of stabilization policies. In that sense,
maybe the wrong question has been posed in the literature. Given our findings,
the question should not be whether stabilization policies foster or reduce long-term
growth, the question should be which stabilization policies foster or reduce long-term
growth.
The results obtained from our policy analysis have also strong implications for
policymakers. In general, policymakers can choose from a wide variety of different
discretionary policy measures to alleviate an economic downturn. Our policy experi-
ments suggest that different policy opportunities may have different consequences
for the economic development in the medium and long run, even if they can equally
stabilize the economy in the short run. For our policy examples, we have shown that
there is no ideal policy, all three are associated with at least one conflict of goals
between short-term stability and long-term economic parameters. However, a policy
that supports the speed of technological change seems to be the best choice as it
leads to sustainable long-term growth and at the same time to almost no additional
government debts and to stable prices. The only negative aspect of this policy is its
long-term impact on the market concentration. Unlike for the technology policy, we
have found more serious conflicts of goals for consumption subsidizing and untar-
geted investment subsidizing policies. The most striking one can be found for the
case of investment subsidization; if the government grants subsidies for any invest-
ment without technological targeting, then the short-term stabilization leads to a
reduction of long-term growth. For consumption subsidizing policies, one can find
conflicts especially between short-term stability and the long-term goals of price and
fiscal stability rather than the classical trade-off between smoothing of short-term
volatility and long-term growth. In that sense, the policy measures contained in
the U.S. stimulus package of 2009 with their technology-oriented targeting could be
considered as a more appropriate choice for a farsighted stabilization policy. Such a
policy would have potential to bring the U.S. economy not only back on its pre-crisis
output level but also at a higher long-term growth path. Nevertheless, policymakers
should be aware of the fact that any stabilization policy comes at a price. It is then
the job of policymakers to carefully assess possible long-terms effects of their candi-
date policies and to rate which of the possible negative consequences have higher or
lower priorities.
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